Category: Economics

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Books, essays and others Economics Politics & government

[2954] The frustrating read that is Notes to the Prime Minister

The ringgit has been on a depreciating trend versus the US dollar since early April 2022. While it is natural for Malaysians to focus on the ringgit, the depreciation is best explained by the strengthening of the US dollar against a slew of other currencies. Global events are triggering capital to head to the US, leaving other economies having to deal with the repercussions of such capital flight. But this fact does not stop Malaysians from calling domestic authorities to do something about the depreciation. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed recommends Malaysia pegs the ringgit as the country once did.

This is where Wong Sulong’s Notes to the Prime Minister: The Untold Story of How Malaysia Beat the Currency Speculators might be useful in providing greater details how pegging and capital control of the 1990s came about.

Unfortunately, the book does not do the job very well by digressing too much.

The book is firstly a reproduction of notes Nor Mohamed Yakcop wrote for the Mahathir at the heights of the crisis. Nor Mohamed is the architect behind the pegging and possibly the brain behind the rebuilding of Malaysia post-Asia Financial Crisis.

Secondly, it is an unexpected festschrift-like tangent in honor of the man, written by men and women (themselves had, and have, big roles in corporate Malaysia post-1998) Nor Mohamed recruited to head various government bodies and companies.

While the notes are useful and enlightening, the book is deficient in a way the notes are ill-supported by context-making commentaries. Because of the structure, the book makes a disorienting read, which leaves me dissatisfied.

When I bought the book some time back, I had expected it would discuss how Malaysia came to the decisions it made, and how the debates among those in power went. Furthermore, given the book was published more than 10 years after the crisis, possibly a critical review of the pegging and capital control.

There is no critical review. When I write critical, I do not mean criticizing the actions. Rather, I expect an examination why the policy worked for Malaysia. What we have instead is assertion that it worked and everybody else in the world was wrong.

Debates had around the various policies advocated by Nor Mohamed through notes are totally absent. A reader would need prior and outside knowledge of the economic and political environment of the 1990s to truly comprehend the reasons and tensions behind the notes. For instance, Nor Mohamed in his letters to Mahathir here and there criticized decisions taken by the Finance Ministry and the central bank, both of which were responsible to the then Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. But Wong Sulong left the tensions largely out. I did not expect a full political analysis of tensions between Mahathir and Anwar, but I think it would be reasonable to expect an exploration of policy difference between the two men in response to the Asian Financial Crisis.

This makes me feel reading the book a little like reading Malaysian newspapers in the 1990s and the 2000s. Journalists during those decades (sometimes, even now) liked to write about the government’s reply to an issue, but not the issue itself. Imagine the government saying “everybody is alright” in response to a major vehicular accident, but that accident is not mentioned at all. The public of that era would have to guess what the government was referring to. Reading Notes to the Prime Minister is a little bit like that: frustrating. Annoying even.

Nor Mohamed proposed multiple policies in his notes, but readers are left to guess whether the policies were adopted. This is yet another example how the Wong leaves the notes uncontextualized.

My frustration grows further when in the chapters following the ‘notes,’ the book goes off tangent to celebrate Nor Mohamad. The man deserves to be celebrated, but the book overly does it by having various then-contemporary corporate captains (several of them are still active) recounting how they met the man and describing the man’s best traits in a festschrift style.

Nevertheless, some of the stories told help readers understand some aspects of government policy in the 2000s. I also become more appreciative how many GLC men and women were Nor Mohamed Yakcop’s men and women. When Najib was at war with Mahathir, and reopened the forex scandal of the 1980s and inevitably found Nor Mohamed as the number one scapegoat, I wonder how these men and women felt. But again, these insights come only frustratingly indirectly.

Finally, the notes themselves are fascinating. I learned one or two things that I took for granted before. I think more importantly, I am just impressed how detail-oriented Nor Mohamed Yakcop was, how knowledgeable he was, and how he was able to explain complex financial transactions in simple terms to the Prime Minister. Very clear-minded.

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Economics Society

[2952] When did dates become popular among Muslim Malaysians?

Dates now feel ubiquitous on Ramadan dinner tables among the Malay (and the wider Muslim Malaysian) community. Not only that, more often than not, they break fast with the fruits first.

Just the other day, somebody spotted me breaking my fast with something else (a glass of water), and the person commented how unusual my behavior was.

I found that comment very peculiar. Contrary the person’s assertion, I feel date-eating had never been normal in Malaysia. I remember a time when dates were not even at all popular. It was not even available in the Malaysian mass market easily unlike now. The Yusuf Taiyoob trend, in particular, is really a recent phenomenon appearing in the early 2010s.

I myself first tasted dates not in Malaysia, but at a mosque in the United States in the early 2000s. There was a large Arab community—Iraqis, likely due to the Gulf Wars—and they loved their dates.

That comment made me wonder, how and when did dates start to become popular?

I know how it became popular: many would tell you it is religiously preferable to break fast with fresh dates. It is sunnah, which means extra pahala, or merit for those practicing it. And during Ramadan, Mulims believe everything good has a big multiplier assigned to it, unlike normal times when one good deed is considered one. Do not ask me about how the scorecard works.

So when?

I figured, the best way to know when dates became popular in Malaysia, and to prove whether I was right (that is mass date consumption being a relatively recent phenomenon in Malaysia), is to look at trade data over the years.

Here, two public databases are helpful. First, the International Trade Center, a body under both the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. Second, the UN Comtrade Database. Unfortunately, the best I could get was data all the way back from 1989.

So, when did dates first becoming popular in Malaysia (within the confines of Ramadan)?

I will let the graph talk.

The chart suggests date consumption grew in popularity (within its own context) over time. More supply means more could consume it: at the very least, date import volume grew at a faster rate than population growth.

Specifically, 1989 date imports were approximately 440 g/person. It rose to 480 g/person in 2000. An increase, but not too much. But it surge to 640 g/person in 2010 and then 700 g/person in 2020. There was a big jump between 2000 and 2010. I think that says something.

Things changed some time in the 2000s or the 2010s, which coincided with the rise of Tunisia as an exporter to Malaysia. Prior to that event, China, Iran and Egypt were the biggest suppliers. Both China and Egypt have fallen off the rung since the last decade.

With that, I think I can say in the 1990s, it was not that popular. That justifies my experience. It is not me that is unusual. It is the community that has changed.

I also suspect date consumption was popular among rich Malays first, way way before. The culture became popular with masses later partly due to religious exhortation/advisory (sunnah) and a version of conspicuous consumption at work: a Veblenian way of saying rich religious people eat it, and if I eat it, I would be seen as a rich religious person too. This is probably harder to prove.

Finally, it is good to put the rising popularity of dates into context. These date imports are small compared to other (foreign) fruits. For instance, nearly 170,000MT oranges (citruses really), 150,000MT apples and 50,000MT grapes and the likes were imported in 2020. Compare that to the 2020 dates imports of 22,500MT.

Still, 2020 date imports were bigger than bananas. But Malaysians do grow bananas locally. So, it is not a proper comparison.

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Economics Politics & government

[2951] Politics of prices is counter-productive

There has been a global supply constraint of various kinds for at least a year now. The supply chain disruption was expected by many—I quickly noted the post-war Malayan supply-side crisis as a parallel. Nevertheless, few people expected the constraints would be this tight for so long. I certainly did not.

The tightness has slipped over into the Malaysian consumer market. Chicken, beef, vegetables are the usual suspects.

The waitlists for cars are long due to a persistent global chip shortage: I test drove a Peugeot several weeks back and that experience to me underscores how modern ground vehicles these days are more and more an electronic device than a mechanical one. I knew vehicles had an ever increasing electronics (and electrical) components to them. Several months earlier, I read a report showing how the share of electronic cost relative to total car manufacturing cost has gone up drastically in the past 20 years, from less than 1% to maybe 40%-60%. But there is a difference between reading it, and riding the thing. The dashboard is a computer screen popping more information any older car could show. When I say dashboard, I mean a dashboard full of dynamic data, with customizable menu. The air-conditioning controls are only accessible through a separate central LCD screen, which also controls other aspects of the car. Even the brakes can be controlled by the computer, along with so many other things.

It is not just chip and electronic components are in short supply. Somebody on Twitter jokingly said “oh, this is the chip shortages they were talking about” in reference to shortages of fries at McDonald’s in Malaysia and Japan.

Consumer prices are rising, and it would have risen higher if it was not for price control mechanism and subsidies in place in Malaysia. This is readily observed from the following chart, where consumer prices are not rising as fast as producer prices. The latter is a proxy to global prices.

PPI vs CPI

Nevertheless, despite enjoying the shield, consumers have been complaining about rising living costs. They demand actions. More than a few activists and politicians have demanded the same.

All governments are sensitive to such criticisms and this government, especially as weak, incompetent and clueless as it is, is doubly so. The opposition has been relentless in their criticism. Some Pakatan Harapan supporters have highlighted how their government played a better and proactive role in addressing prices, and go on to claim a Pakatan Harapan government would have been far more effective in managing cost of living problem. And when Pakatan Harapan was in power, Barisan Nasional and Pas, on top of their usual racist rhetoric, also attacked the government for rising living costs regardless of whether prices was actually rising (prices then were actually very stable due to the imposition of an overly generous blanket fuel subsidy).

I dislike politics of prices. While it has its uses in cases when there are monopoly abuses and regulatory hurdles (the drop in broadband prices are a great exception), in the current climate prices are largely out of the government hands. The truth is, if Pakatan Harapan was in power, they too would not be able to do much about it either.

But that does not matter. Such is the politics of prices.

The problem is with the supply itself and the players of politics of prices simply ignore the cause of the problem. Some even go has far as misdiagnosing it as unhelpfully as greed.

A supply-driven crisis like this requires investment to loosen up the supply chain: expansion of ports, new technology to hasten production and delivery, new plants, more workers, etc. Yet, the aversion for price hikes have led to large government subsidies (think fuel), which takes fund away from productive investment purposes that are needed to address the supply chain disruption.

Politics of prices not only ignore the source of price pressures Malaysian consumers are experiencing. They ignore wages. Prices and wages are part of the same coin: wages are prices of labor. Notwithstanding issues relating to income distribution between employees and employers, and technology-driven price cuts among others, the politics of prices suppresses price growth, and through it, risk of suppressing wage growth.

More than once, the politics of prices have led to calls for wage cuts. The targets have been high-paying professionals and ministers (and their unqualified advisors), but too often, it has gone a little bit too far. Mahathir as the 7th Prime Minister for instance, is a fan of pay cuts and that unfortunately set the tone for the whole economy when he was in power. Coupled with his obsession with government debt (government debt and transparency were a problem), and his history with the gold dinar movement, it felt like he wanted a deflationary environment.

All that set the tone for austerity. There was really no austerity in place—government spending went up and the economy expanded—but the narrative set by the PM made it difficult to convince many out there that that was no austerity. And the economy, even as it expanded, took heed of the deflationary sentiment.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2949] Misaligned powers, incentives between the federal regulator and state authorities contributed to the 2021 great Malaysian flooding

The government has blamed the recent flooding on once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall. Blames have been assigned to climate change too.

I have never experienced such prolonged rainfall before, and it was an extraordinary experience. Thankfully I did not have to suffer the flooding. Unfortunately, many others did and they were cursed with an incompetent government at the helm that was slow to realize the problem, and slow to act upon it. For a government so used to living the crisis-mode, one would expect they would have some kind of preparedness, or seasoned enough to lead a proper competent response. But no, it was a disastrous handing. Old clueless men and women, they are.

The Environment Minister himself back in October dismissed the talks of big floods, despite the prevailing La Nina phenomenon that brought increased rainfall across the Asia-Pacific region. His dismissal played a deplorable role of lowering down the greater population’s guard. There are several persons in government should be fired for incompetence and negligence—lives were lost, properties damaged—and that particular minister is high in the long list.

But the severe floods across Malaysia has happened much more often than once in a century. Kuala Lumpur alone has had its share of several bad floods. The big one in Kelantan that happened less than 10 years ago. Clearly, there is more to it than just once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall.

And excessive logging is one of those several contributing factors.

Specifically, here, I would like to highlight the regulatory environment relating to logging. The system is flawed and provides excessive incentives leading to widespread environmental disasters that makes the big flooding possible. Instead of remedying the problem of misaligned incentives, the system makes the tragedy of the commons worse.

The two-part systemic flaw

There are two major parts of the systemic flaw: the state controls the issuance of logging permit, while the federal authority leads the environmental policing part. To further complicates matter, the federal regulator regulates peninsular matters only.

The approving authority trumps federal authority due to the current constitutional arrangement, as provided under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia. The extensive power of the state governments over the forest is further clarified in the National Forestry Act 1984. In short, the federal regulatory body is powerless in the face of state governments.

Furthermore, the state governments, particularly the poorer ones like Pahang, suffers from adverse incentives arising out of the lack of revenue. In Malaysia, tax revenue (income tax and consumption tax are the major ones) is mainly the purview of the federal government and not enough has been returned to the states from the federal level. This insufficient sharing is also a reflection of the low-tax regime Malaysia has: you cannot share if you do not have enough in the first place. It is also a reflection of partisan politics, as Kelantan and Terengganu suffered before.

Given the state’s lack of tax revenue, and insufficient revenue support from the federal government, the states have to resort to other means of generating revenue: among them include monetizing land and the forest. With the goal of supporting state government operations, excessive logging permits are issued.

(In Sabah and Sarawak where the regulator comes under state authority unlike in the 11 states in the Peninsular, arguably the pressure for revenue forces the government to prioritize harvesting over protection. For instance, Sabah recently lifted its state-wide ban on timber exports that was imposed in 2018).

Additionally, many of these states come under the influence of the royal houses, which demand a share of the forest resources. The state government more often than not, would comply. I have a short family history to share here to illustrate the problem of toothless regulation in the face of state rights. An uncle of mine decades ago used to be a forestry officer in a certain large state. He stopped a logging operation linked to the royal house of the state. He ended up being transferred out of the state. The logging operation continued.

Managing the commons

One way to address the flaw and manage the commons better is to take away the states authority over the forest, and have the federal government compensates the state government through large institutional sharing of tax revenue beyond what is provided currently through items like capitation grants. The downside is that, as you can guess it, higher tax burden for everybody on average.

Through this realignment of powers and incentives, the pressures of deforestation through logging could be removed, and the regulatory authority would have stronger powers to preserve the jungle. That will help lessen the chances of big floods recurring (with all else the same).

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2948] Government money is best used for actual spending and investing, not replenishing EPF savings

National Union of Bank Employees (Nube), the banking union in Malaysia, wants the government to “return monies withdrawn by B40 and M40 members under the Covid-19 relief package.”[1] I take that as demanding the government to directly replenish EPF contributors’ savings that were depleted by government Covid-19 withdrawal programs. The news report does not mention when the union spokesperson wants the replenishing to happen, but I assume as soon as possible.

For the uninitiated, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) is a compulsory retirement scheme for private sector workers.

I disagree with the withdrawal EPF schemes, and along with many others, instead have advocated for the government to raise its borrowing and commit to greater spending instead in order to provide greater assistance.[2] But the government was too worried about its fiscal deficit, too fresh to learn all the economic levers it had, and too desperate to find ways to relieve the spending pressures they felt. Among the chaos, they heard Najib Razak’s bad advice and took it.

But it is done now. A mistake has been made. While too many EPF contributors find their account depleted as a result, the overall economic circumstances have changed. During the pandemic, we needed economic programs guaranteeing everybody a certain level of welfare, particularly when a significant part of the economy was shutdown. With the private sector disabled so thoroughly, it was the responsibility of the government to secure everybody’s basic needs. It was a hibernation policy: lockdown and government assistance.

Now that the economy is back operating albeit weakly, priorities have changed. We need to strengthen the economy. Instead of hibernating, we need more spending and investing by the both the public and the private sectors.

This of course assumes we will not make any more mistake on the health front. While there is a real room for optimism going forward, with vaccination rate running high, and that we know more about the virus, after the government’s naïve V-shape recovery blunder, we can never be too careful.

Having the government replenishing EPF savings, especially if immediately or the near future, runs contrary to current priority of economic recovery: pushing for greater spending, investing in capacity building, and simultaneously creating jobs.

Why?

Because putting government revenue (or borrowing or both, since the government unlikely to enjoy any kind of fiscal surplus) into EPF savings would store the money into passive activity for an extended period of time (due to the nature of the scheme, which savings could only be withdrawn at retirement age under normal circumstances; for the macro-inclined, you would remember S=I, but here I would argue S=aI where a<1 since EPF typically invest in equities and debt, and not directly, and if directly definitely in the very minority, into new productive assets like factories and infrastructure). It would go into the financial market, but that is not the most productive of all options available out there. In other words, the act of replenishing will take a lot of steam needed to power the recovery.

And it is worth remembering that economy in 2021 will be smaller than it was in 2019: recovery is not complete. This is an important point because it has long-term repercussion on the economy.

To illustrate the point, it is good to go back to the 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis. The Malaysian economy only truly recovered from the 1990s crisis by mid-2010s: actual GDP only surpassed the what-if-there-was-no-1990s-crisis GDP around 2015-2016. To put it differently, actual GDP level only surpassed the pre-crisis level around 2014. That is close to 20 years of lost potential.

Actual GDP vs hypothetical pre-AFC growth trend

For 2021, we are still both below pre-crisis level and trend.

For fear of losing more potential, we need to focus on spending and investing. Having the government correcting their EPF mistake by replenishing the accounts will heighten the risk of us losing potential.

The replenishing size, and in turn, potential loss from the replenishing policy, is not small. A report from the Finance Ministry shows the cumulative EPF withdrawal under the 3 programs (i-Lestari, i-Sinar and i-Citra) was RM90.3 billion as of early October 2021. More has been approved but yet to be withdrawn. Replenishing it as soon as possible would take at least RM90.3 billion off the economy in terms of spending and investment, ignoring any multiplier effect.[3] To put the number in perspective, that is nearly 30% of what the government plans to spend in 2022 and in fact, RM15 billion bigger than the government’s development allocation. Even by spreading the replenishment over 2 or 3 years, such policy would take so much money from most parts of the economy, and into the finance industry that will eventually manage those money.

But that does not mean there is no other way of replenishing it. Two ways I can think of are:

  • Tiering the dividend, which those with the least savings getting the highest rate. I have suggested tiering because, but it was primarily made out of realization the wrong people are given the incentive to save, and so, disincentive to spend and invest.
  • Increasing employers’ mandatory contribution. This will increase cost of doing business, but the government, while not doing enough, did a lot for businesses. Perhaps, it is time for businesses to play their role here.

Both however will be a slow replenishing process. Furthermore, increased mandatory contribution, for instance, might reduce take home pay as employers recalibrate their wage structure.

Another way by way of indirect replenishing is to make something like a senior citizen cash transfer bonus, payable by the government upon a person’s retirement, on top of existing cash transfer programs. But done together with dividend tiering, increased contribution and perhaps other ways too, this could reduce the size of the program, while pushing it far enough into the future.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — KUALA LUMPUR (Nov 22): The National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) had on Monday (Nov 22) urged the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to demand that the government return monies withdrawn by bottom 40% (B40) and middle 40% (M40) segment EPF members to protect their retirement savings at a time when EPF members’ retirement savings have depleted due to Covid-19 pandemic-driven economic challenges. [Shazni Ong. EPF asked by NUBE to demand govt to return monies withdrawn by B40, M40 members during Covid-19. The Edge Markets. November 22 2021.]

[2] — Two experts Malaysiakini spoke to had concerns about allowing such a large number of people to dig into their retirement savings. Instead of tapping into EPF, both opined that the government could have spent more to provide assistance to households amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. Economist Hafiz Noor Shams previously analysed that the government was not spending enough in Budget 2021 to support the economy, by virtue of what he regarded as an overly conservative deficit estimate. [Annabelle Lee. Economists: Why let 8m tap EPF when govt can afford cash assistance?. Malaysiakini. November 27 2020.]

[3] — Laporan LAKSANA ke–76. Page 11. Ministry of Finance, Malaysia. November 17 2020.]