Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2951] Politics of prices is counter-productive

There has been a global supply constraint of various kinds for at least a year now. The supply chain disruption was expected by many—I quickly noted the post-war Malayan supply-side crisis as a parallel. Nevertheless, few people expected the constraints would be this tight for so long. I certainly did not.

The tightness has slipped over into the Malaysian consumer market. Chicken, beef, vegetables are the usual suspects.

The waitlists for cars are long due to a persistent global chip shortage: I test drove a Peugeot several weeks back and that experience to me underscores how modern ground vehicles these days are more and more an electronic device than a mechanical one. I knew vehicles had an ever increasing electronics (and electrical) components to them. Several months earlier, I read a report showing how the share of electronic cost relative to total car manufacturing cost has gone up drastically in the past 20 years, from less than 1% to maybe 40%-60%. But there is a difference between reading it, and riding the thing. The dashboard is a computer screen popping more information any older car could show. When I say dashboard, I mean a dashboard full of dynamic data, with customizable menu. The air-conditioning controls are only accessible through a separate central LCD screen, which also controls other aspects of the car. Even the brakes can be controlled by the computer, along with so many other things.

It is not just chip and electronic components are in short supply. Somebody on Twitter jokingly said “oh, this is the chip shortages they were talking about” in reference to shortages of fries at McDonald’s in Malaysia and Japan.

Consumer prices are rising, and it would have risen higher if it was not for price control mechanism and subsidies in place in Malaysia. This is readily observed from the following chart, where consumer prices are not rising as fast as producer prices. The latter is a proxy to global prices.

PPI vs CPI

Nevertheless, despite enjoying the shield, consumers have been complaining about rising living costs. They demand actions. More than a few activists and politicians have demanded the same.

All governments are sensitive to such criticisms and this government, especially as weak, incompetent and clueless as it is, is doubly so. The opposition has been relentless in their criticism. Some Pakatan Harapan supporters have highlighted how their government played a better and proactive role in addressing prices, and go on to claim a Pakatan Harapan government would have been far more effective in managing cost of living problem. And when Pakatan Harapan was in power, Barisan Nasional and Pas, on top of their usual racist rhetoric, also attacked the government for rising living costs regardless of whether prices was actually rising (prices then were actually very stable due to the imposition of an overly generous blanket fuel subsidy).

I dislike politics of prices. While it has its uses in cases when there are monopoly abuses and regulatory hurdles (the drop in broadband prices are a great exception), in the current climate prices are largely out of the government hands. The truth is, if Pakatan Harapan was in power, they too would not be able to do much about it either.

But that does not matter. Such is the politics of prices.

The problem is with the supply itself and the players of politics of prices simply ignore the cause of the problem. Some even go has far as misdiagnosing it as unhelpfully as greed.

A supply-driven crisis like this requires investment to loosen up the supply chain: expansion of ports, new technology to hasten production and delivery, new plants, more workers, etc. Yet, the aversion for price hikes have led to large government subsidies (think fuel), which takes fund away from productive investment purposes that are needed to address the supply chain disruption.

Politics of prices not only ignore the source of price pressures Malaysian consumers are experiencing. They ignore wages. Prices and wages are part of the same coin: wages are prices of labor. Notwithstanding issues relating to income distribution between employees and employers, and technology-driven price cuts among others, the politics of prices suppresses price growth, and through it, risk of suppressing wage growth.

More than once, the politics of prices have led to calls for wage cuts. The targets have been high-paying professionals and ministers (and their unqualified advisors), but too often, it has gone a little bit too far. Mahathir as the 7th Prime Minister for instance, is a fan of pay cuts and that unfortunately set the tone for the whole economy when he was in power. Coupled with his obsession with government debt (government debt and transparency were a problem), and his history with the gold dinar movement, it felt like he wanted a deflationary environment.

All that set the tone for austerity. There was really no austerity in place—government spending went up and the economy expanded—but the narrative set by the PM made it difficult to convince many out there that that was no austerity. And the economy, even as it expanded, took heed of the deflationary sentiment.

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2916] Change must lead to greater political stability

Early on during the Pakatan Harapan government, a majority of market investors were concerned about Malaysia’s policy direction. The magnitude of political change Malaysia experienced in 2018 undoubtedly brought uncertainty. Such uncertainty needed to be addressed. To allay those concerns, the Ministry of Finance then frequently engaged with representatives from various funds invested in Malaysia.

A great deal of these funds were fixed income investors. So, they were concerned with the state of public finance. What will the government’s spending priority be? What will the projected deficit level be? How is tax collection with the GST abolished? How is the health of the banking system? How is the government facing the trade war between China and the US?

Such questions were easy to answer because the storyline was clear and plans were in place. Data was available and progress updates could be shared easily. Close engagement and high transparency level alleviated a great deal uncertainty in the market.

One concern was difficult to handle however. Mahathir had promised to handover power to Anwar Ibrahim. But the transition date was blurry. “When?” they asked.

“When” was an important question. Transition could mean, and likely would mean, policy change. And with it, investment rationale.

However the Ministry answered it, they could not be convinced and some of them were the biggest funds in the world.

Regardless whether they believed the transition plan, they were in the opinion that Malaysia could focus better on the economy if it had addressed its political uncertainty. Specifically, the trade war was once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Malaysia to move up the value chain and gain from the reorienting global supply chain. Yet to the investors, political transition was distracting Malaysia from the task at hand.

Unfortunately, the level of political uncertainty in the country has worsened since then.

Muhyiddin’s supporters claimed formation of the Perikatan Nasional government would calm the politics down. We now know such claim is patently false. The faintest rumors would cause our collective heart to skip a beat.

It has become so bad that policymaking is grinding to a halt. Measures needed to mitigate the ongoing recession have been weak and late. Meanwhile, unemployment rate is shooting up and it will rise further. The result: we as Malaysians are experiencing more economic pain than necessary.

Not enough has been done. Continued inadequate and untimely government response will have long-term repercussions on the prosperity of the country. Remember, Malaysia has never fully recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis. Our growth since has been slower than before. This current crisis if not handled well would reduce the pace of our growth further.

Malaysia needs political stability to address the recession well. At the rate things are going, Perikatan Nasional is incapable for providing that stability.

Pakatan Harapan sees an opportunity to retake the power it won in 2018. If it succeed, could PH provide the much needed stability?

In order to answer the question confidently in the affirmative, I think PH will need to avoid having to face the transition question all over again. Either let their candidate be the PM until the next election (presumably in 2023), or ideally, do away with the transition plan altogether.

Categories
Economics

[2901] We are incentivizing the wrong people to save

Who does not love big dividends that could be gained through low-risk instruments?

For many Malaysians capable of saving, either voluntarily or otherwise, low-risk investment with high returns of 5%-8% yearly or even more for some, is something that has been taken for granted. This is thanks to years of expectation settings made by a set of institutions the government has put in place to encourage saving.

So much so that in the case of Tabung Haji when the fund could not even pay its depositors high dividend anymore, the previous administration felt compelled to manipulate its accounts so that it could sustain its dividend level and avoid the political backlash from its base. In fact when ASB under PNB announced a reasonable dividend of 5.5% for 2019, enough Malaysians expressed unhappiness how that was unacceptably low and how that it would remove arbitrage opportunity that existed through low-cost borrowing to invest in higher yielding but low-risk investment, like those provided by PNB.

I for one believe the way and quantum these dividends are given need to change.

The reason: the state is encouraging the wrong people to save. Specifically, the existing system encourages those that do not need to save more to save further. This in turn places a downward bias on consumption growth and the size of funds available for productive investment (not the financial ones). I have a suspicion that if we stop encouraging the wrong (and rich) people to save, we could bump consumption growth and possibly funds for productive investment up, and boost economic activities on the ground. I am suggesting the economy could grow faster if we correct this flawed incentives.

What do I mean by encouraging the wrong people to save?

This is plain to see from the distribution of wealth in two big funds in Malaysia.

Based on the latest annual report from the EPF, that is the 2018 publication, the top 10% biggest depositors owned approximately half of all of EPF fund. And EPF is the biggest fund in Malaysia, and one of the biggest in the world.

It is worse in Tabung Haji. Based on data contained within the TH Recovery and Restructuring Working Plan document, about 1% of depositors owned half of the fund. A particular news report went on to cite that one depositor (likely the top depositor) had RM190 million saved in Tabung Haji. He or she could afford to live in Mecca luxuriously just on the Tabung Haji dividends alone!

With so much money, it is a no-brainer to put excess cash into these relatively high-returns low-risk funds. And dividend rates do spike up when it comes to election times previously, which indicates that the government do have a say in determining the dividend rate if it wants to through various means.

I am arguing that the high dividend for low-risk instruments is unhealthy to the wider economy. The relatively high-returns low-risk fund creates artificial incentive to save, which leads to excessive saving behavior by the rich. That artificial incentive to save translates into artificial disincentive to spend and invest in actual economic activities beyond financial instruments.

If we could rationalize and structure the dividend in a more reasonable way – such as reducing the dividend rate progressively the higher the size of savings is or capping the amount of savings at a reasonably high but not too high level – I think we can correct this, and unleash more money for spending by the rich, or encourage them to be more adventurous with their money by investing in real economic activities, like productive start-ups and new businesses, instead of things like the stale old and safe banking and other GLC stocks.

And after all, the financial-type people are complaining that Malaysian stocks are overpriced. Is it a wonder why that is so when the size of EPF funds is outgrowing the size of assets available for investment in Malaysia?

We could still encourage people to save. But let us incentivize the right people to save. My favorite way of doing so is to raise the dividend rate for the bottom and mid-savers, and progressively cut for the top ones (after passing beyond a certain level).

Categories
Economics

[2708] That cycle between private and government investment

Here is something I have taken for granted before, taken from the latest Malaysian national accounts (GFCF is investment).

2Q2013 GDP GFCF

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2676] Investment growth is volatile, a slowdown is not necessarily extraordinary or worrying

Some parts of the economy enjoy stable growth rates in normal times. Consumption and government spending are two of the GDP components which grow in a stable manner, unless there is a recession. As much as ridiculous as it may sound (yeah, that is the libertarian in me speaking out), the government does plan its expenditure and that is one of the reasons for smooth government expenditure growth. The same with consumers and others in the private sector too.

Export and import growth rates are stable too, although it is more volatile that the consumption component.

The same cannot be said with investment. It is a stylized fact in macroeconomics that the investment component of the GDP is wildly volatile. It is by far the most volatile of all GDP components. In one period it could reach for the sky and in the next, it could be six feet underground.

Here is a chart to show exactly how volatile investment is compared to other components of the real GDP of Malaysia:

Malaysia RGPD Component 2006-2012

The volatility of GDP investment component (truly, it is gross fixed capital formation) will be mostly true for other countries as well.

So, anybody who wants to score a political point cannot really score a political point if investment in one period slowed drastically. It is the nature of the series. It is just how the economy works.

I write this because the Penang state government has come under criticism because investment into the state has fallen dramatically.[1] Given the context of volatility and investment, I would not take the criticism too seriously.

Now the investment figures referred to are not strictly the real GDP investment component (the one that is of controversy is the approved investment figures), but the nature of volatility is the same anyway.

Slow investment growth may be a worry but only if there is a significant slowdown in the sense that there is structural break. In other words, something like if the average investment growth from 2005 to 2010 is significantly lower than the average from 2001 to 2005. In contrast, if investment growth in 4Q2012 is significantly lower than in 3Q2012, or even if 2012 as a whole is lower than 2011, I do not think one can say much without further context: from the series itself without further context , an investment growth slowdown or even an outright investment slowdown gives out no real story.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
[1] — GEORGE TOWN: A DIP of 73 per cent in investment flow into Penang has the state Barisan Nasional questioning the state government’s abilities to drive and continue growing the manufacturing and services sectors. Both sectors, state BN committee member Ong Thean Lye said, were the main sources of revenue for the state and had in previous years placed Penang at the top in the country’s investment ranking. However, there were now growing concerns that investments were on the decline with Penang only getting RM2.47 billion in investments last year compared with RM9.11 billion in 2011 and RM12.24 billion in 2010. [Looi Sue-Chern. Harvard’s Gopinath Helps France Beat Euro Straitjacket. New Straits Times. March 22 2013]