Tag: fiscal deficit

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2940] Immediate fiscal agenda for the new (old) government

The next finance minister is unlikely to be thinking too far ahead since election is just less than 2 years away. It is short time to set any long-term agenda. There will not be enough time for learning and there will not be enough to start implementing. For the most parts, the new finance minister will likely be carrying on with established policy until the general election is called. Even if he or she dares introduce new long-term measures, there is a good chance it would be overturned once a new minister takes the Level 12 office in the Treasury Building in Putrajaya after the election.

Nevertheless, given the situation we as a country are in, the 2-year period is important. I think there are two items of concern during this period that could affect the long-term fiscal policy of the country:

  1. The 2023 fiscal cliff
  2. Fiscal consolidation.

The Perikatan Nasional government that Umno was committed to a quick fiscal consolidation exercise that necessitates a 2023 fiscal cliff and I think there is a question whether the same policy would be taken up.

What is the 2023 fiscal cliff?

To handle the Covid-19 crisis, the government changed certain law that allowed it to practically have a current deficit. Without the changes, the government’s current balance must always be in surplus, or in balance. In other words, total revenue must exceed all operating expenditure. Here is a restatement of: the government can only borrow for investment purposes (or in public sector jargon, development expenditure).

More specifically, the government created a Covid-19 fund that officially neither operating or development expenditure (but in fact, mostly operating expenditure). It was a necessary accounting trick that bends the law. Revenue dropped substantially during 2020 and 2021 relative to previous immediate years, while the need for spending rose dramatically. If the laws were not changed, we would have faced a worse version of this already bad recession. Even so, actual spending done was insufficient (the comic I drew below) due to the then policymakers’ naïve belief in V-shape recovery, and failure to adopt precautionary approach. This was the costly mistake of Budget 2021.

This fund is set to expire on December 31 2022. Upon expiry, the normal way of doing things—current balance cannot in deficit—becomes the rule again. This means any borrowing must be repaid (or from what I am seeing, I suspect it would be absorbed into development fund despite a large chunk of it is not developmental in nature. The 2020-2021 RM21 billion drop in Covid-19 is almost as large as the sudden RM19 billion increase in the corresponding development expenditure).

Based on Ministry of Finance publication, the fund had RM17 billion in it as of end-June 2021. It is likely higher given additional spending announcement made during the quarter. Expiry would mean (assuming it is not reclassified lock, stock and barrel as development expenditure) paying off that RM17 billion to meet the current balance requirement. It could also mean a percentage point worth of government spending unmade if it is paid off. That RM17 billion is roughly equivalent to a percentage point of 2021 deficit ratio.

So, if the fund expires in 2022 and the borrowing gets paid off (instead of reclassified as development expenditure), there will be a fiscal cliff: a stark drop in spending, which would take some steam off GDP growth, and more importantly, recovery.

Remember, economic recovery is not merely about growing again after a recession. Neither is it just about returning to pre-crisis level (which by the way, we are a risk of not doing so in 2021). A comprehensive recovery is one where current level would match the level it would be if no crisis had happened. Our insufficient spending had left the gap big, and catching up with that pre-crisis level and trend is hard.

Inappropriate time for fiscal consolidation

This is on top of fiscal deficit-to-NGDP ratio that the government might target. It is unclear now what the deficit ratio target is. Former Finance Minister Zafrul Abdul Aziz had stated that the figure for 2021 after accounting additional unplanned Covid-19 spending could rise to 6.5%-7.0% of NGDP, from the unrealistic Budget 2021 projection of 5.4%. It is unclear if this accounts for lower-than-expected GDP growth. If it does not, it will go higher.

If the new government (if it could be called new given the composition is… the same) insists on fiscal consolidation still, there will be pressure to let the Covid-19 fund expire while cutting services to keep spending under control.

Two immediate agenda for the next finance minister

Malaysia is clearly behind the curve by a big margin in terms of economic recovery. Getting recovery on track is the immediate concern. Unfortunately, as much as I hate to say it, the government is likely the main driver of growth in these times.

The government can start playing that role properly by first, extending the expiring date for Covid-19 fund and second, postponing any fiscal consolidation exercise. The second can be done by maintaining deficit ratio high, possibly in the range of 6%-8% in the next several years.

Ideally, this should followed by a long-term agenda of tax reform to increase government revenue, which the Pakatan Harapan government, and the previous Perikatan Nasional government, as I understand it, was willing to go ahead with parts of it.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2934] Hindsight is 2020, myopia is 2021

We did not know many things about Covid-19 back in 2020. Early on, the authorities and health professionals were urging the public not to panic by highlighting the probabilities of dying from other causes were higher than Covid-19. The intention of avoiding panic was probably good: by end-January 2020, I was looking for face masks to buy but most stores ran out of it. We know better now that the logic was wrong. Covid-19 is serious business.

We made missteps. The Pakatan Harapan government was worried about border closure and its effects on the economy. Nevertheless, travel restrictions were imposed eventually, though not comprehensive.

Then as we were learning about the virus further, party politics got in the way. The unexpected political maneuvering stole from Malaysia several weeks’ worth of lead time to fight the pandemic. At this time, members of Perikatan Nasional and their collaborators appeared unconcerned with the virus and took time to buttress their political position. The new government was lucky because Pakatan Harapan’s last act before their fall was to launch an additional government spending to fight off Covid-19. That bought Muhyiddin Yassin, the Prime Minister nobody elected, a little time as the health crisis worsened quickly.

Eventually, his unelected government got it right: lockdown with financial assistance provided. Lockdown implemention was chaotic, and the accompanied assistance should have been bigger. But the mistakes were forgivable however angering. Year 2020 was a new reality altogether and the hesitance in bringing in the big bazooka was understandable although less than ideal.

Moreover, it was a new government facing a steep learning curve: new ministers on the job had little understanding of fiscal levers, while facing an unprecedented crisis. Like I said, less than ideal but we had to make do.

After several months of mucking around, it seemed Malaysia was succeeding, in large part due to the civil service. The public sector had handled outbreaks before albeit on a smaller scale. That institutional memory served the country well at a time when the executive was scurrying in the dark. Additionally, there were economic response templates from other countries to follow by April-June 2020. Malaysia copied it.

There was damage to many aspects of Malaysian life. Democracy and basic rights were sacrificed. It was a dangerous sacrifice with adverse long term repercussions, but we could argue we skipped the worst. Whether we would pay for our sins is yet to be seen.

In the meantime, we bragged about our success while multiple countries, particularly the US and UK, were bungling their responses.

We bragged so much that overconfidence overcame us. That led us to repeat the same mistake we made in February-March 2020 in the second half of the year. Just like when party politics interfered with crisis management at the start of the pandemic, unreasonable political ambition to take over Sabah state government in the middle of the pandemic brought in the second wave.

This time, the trouble was so not new. There was less excuse to be made. Double-standard regarding quarantine during and after campaigning, and other questionable decisions by the government, made things worse. It was during this period health measures suffered from serious credibility erosion.

But we all need reminding from time to time. Sometimes, we make mistakes because we forget our lessons.

The point is, in retrospect, throughout 2020 we probably would have done things differently. But things should be judged not by how we would have done it differently knowing now things we did not know then. Instead, it is only fair to judge previous decisions based on how they were decided based on the best available information at that time. And we did not have the best information for most of 2020. It was all too new.

We can be angry about 2020. I still am. But that was how the cookie crumbled. Things happened and decisions were made based on the best, or second-best available information.

That excuse can no longer be used for 2021.

If hindsight is 2020, then myopia is 2021. By this year, we know more and we know almost enough information to fight the pandemic effectively. Yet somehow, we refused to use the information.

The disastrous handling of 2021, I think, could be traced back to November 2020, when Budget 2021 was debated in the now suspended Parliament. The budget could have been used to fight the health and economic crises comprehensively.

But we did not use that opportunity.

The government of the day preferred to declare victory prematurely, and engaged in fancy public relations exercise. A sharp V-shape recovery was taken as the base case scenario: base effect was taken in as victory. “This is the biggest budget in history!” declared the government, somehow forgetting the budget of the current year almost always the biggest in history. Rarely does government spending fall. Such was the nature of the government’s meaningless sloganeering to invoke awe in the unenlightened minds.

The budget was big, but it was just not big enough. Budget 2021 rested on rosy assumptions. So rosy that the government intended to resume fiscal consolidation immediately while the economy was still in recession.

So intent the government was on fiscal consolidation that the RM5 billion meant to vaccine-related purchases were not actually included in the Budget. How outrageous could it be?

Constructive criticism came in quickly. The government was told the budget was not big enough. The government was told it should take a more precautionary projection. The government was told to widen the deficit significantly to fight the pandemic off.

Critics were proven right. Budget 2021’s rosy assumptions were dismantled just 4-5 months after it was passed. In November 2020, the government aimed to cut the 2021 deficit ratio to 5.4%. By March 2021, the figure was raised up to 6.0%. It is likely higher now given how things are going. Not only was fiscal consolidation was the wrong policy to pursue at that time, but now since it could not be achieved, the government’s credibility has taken a hit.

The budget should have been rejected: the failure of Budget 2021 is both the fault of the Perikatan Nasional government—including Umno for those still in denial—and Pakatan Harapan. The non-rejection in the House was mind-boggling: we live in a tragic comedy.

Now, as Covid-19 is making its ugliest spread yet, with death toll mounting, health workers exhausted, the Ministry of Finance approved another RM200 million for the public health sector.

What is RM200 million when a vaccine dashboard alone worth RM70 million? What is RM200 million when the total Health Ministry Budget is RM32,000 million a year, and that the public health sector is running out of capacity?

To solve this crisis, we require a much bigger deficit spending: boost the deficit to 9%-10% or even more. Do whatever is necessary to finance the fight. Do it properly instead of through half-baked measures. There is no time for dry powder.

The cost of failing to address this crisis is greater than the cost of higher deficit ratio.

Categories
Economics

[2907] No time for dry powder

With extreme social distancing in place, severe movements restriction and work disruption, it is unclear to me the role of economic stimulus. At the very least, its function to stimulate the economy is becoming irrelevant. There is little to stimulate with the supply-side frontier collapsing.

Moreover, the earlier stimulus must have been rendered inadequate. It is designed to address externally driven supply-side shock. It is not designed for domestically driven supply shock, which is essentially the whole economy running aground.

As I have written recently, Malaysia is experiencing its ultimate supply shock in terms of drastic labor supply cut. Given the massive shock we are facing domestically, there is a strong case for the stimulus to be enlarged quite significantly.

You could keep your powder dry a month ago, but the situation has changed so much since then. In fact in the last day or two, this incompetent government has botched the restriction order so much that a third wave is likely: a policy that was meant to restrict public gatherings ended up created massive public gatherings at the borders, at KL transport nodes and at police stations among others. I am suspecting a longer restriction period beyond 2-week to fight the likely third wave.

And so, if we are not already in recession, this government’s poor handling of our case is ensuring a deep one will happen.

Hence, this is the time for radical policy. We desperately need one.

Examples include: SMEs in particular will need hard cold cash, if they are to hoard labor and preserve their potential. One of my favorite ideas involving the central bank is for Bank Negara to buy SMEs’ assets like account receivables through repo facility. This essentially means the bank injecting cash into SMEs in return for SME account receivables. The whole exercise could be unwind in a year’s time. More assets could consider in fact.

Fiscal policy will also need to play its role. I have heard suggestions for withdrawal from EPF account 2. That is doable without hurting government finances. A more flexible borrowing scheme by the government is also necessary, especially given yields are so low these days. The deficit can wait. An A- sovereign credit rating is not the hill I would want to die on.

If our powder is still dry, we are just not doing enough.

Categories
Economics

[2800] What is the fiscal deficit status now?

Back in January, the official deficit projection for 2015 was revised up by the government to 3.2% of GDP from 3.0% due to the falling energy prices. I concluded then the new target was achievable if government revenue would increase by at least 1.2% YoY. It was a reasonable target eight or nine months ago.

Unfortunately, a lot of things have happened since then and that 1.2% YoY revenue growth does not look easy anymore. That means, the current deficit target seems incredible now.

I have updated my sensitivity analysis. I think the fiscal deficit this year will likely be around 3.5%-3.9% of GDP. I did a tighter projection for work but I can afford to cast a wider net here.

Below is a table of deficit-to-GDP, dependent on revenue and NGDP changes this year. I have highlighted several cells in red corresponding to my expectations.

2015 Fiscal deficit sensitivity analysis

The assumptions (projections?) are:

  1. 0%-2% revenue contraction
  2. 4%-5% NGDP growth.
  3. For government spending growth, I imputed 1.2% YoY into my model, which is the exact increase the government announced from its budget revision back in January. I do not expect any spending cut due to… hmm… some political imperatives and I suppose, Keynesian tendencies within the government. I am unsure how the Monday announcement would affect spending as details are scarce so far but my gut feeling says it will not matter.

The weaker revenue is mostly due to depressed petroleum tax collection, lower petroleum royalties and lower dividend. I am a bit unsure how other taxes, especially company and individual income taxes, will change. But what we do have is the first half data and individual income tax collection is already down by 33% YoY, partly, I guess, because of the earlier tax cuts. Company income tax collection rose strongly however, increasing 43% YoY but judging from earning reports so far, I think the second half will be very different.

The 1MDB Minister Prime Minister Finance Minister will table the government budget on October 23. We will know more then.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
p/s — It would be interesting to compare current assumptions with past ones:

  1. My current expectation is based on 1.2% spending growth, 0%-2% revenue contraction and 4%-5% NGDP growth. These are part of the three assumptions listed above.
  2. Back in January 2015 during the revised budget, the assumptions were 1.2% spending growth, 1%-2% revenue growth and 4%-5% NGDP growth.
  3. The original 2015 official projection, shared in October 2014, was 3.2% spending growth, 4.5% revenue growth and 9% NGDP growth.

You can see the drastic change in projections and assumption since October 2014. Maybe a table will be clearer for comparison:

Malaysian deficit ratio target change

Categories
Economics

[2763] Is the new 3.2% deficit target achievable?

People are asking me if the Malaysian government’s new 3.2% deficit ratio target is achievable.  I have read in the news that several politicians are skeptical about the target. I do not remember who said that but I feel the sentiment is shared by many.

But the only way to really answer this objectively is to run a sensitivity analysis.

It is relatively easy to do a sensitivity analysis and I have done one last week under the assumption of no expenditure cut. That one shows how the deficit ratio would react if the government had not changed its budget under a range of NGDP and revenue assumptions. I think it somewhat presents the realistic worst-case scenario. The government said its fiscal deficit would have gone up to 3.9% of GDP in 2015 without any expenditure cut. I think that would come close to my expectation (4.0%-4.1%), which is based on no revenue growth (not unreasonable) and at about 4%-5% NGDP growth. I am not reproducing the table here because I do not want to confuse the readers. If you are interested in that sensitivity analysis, you should revisit the post.

But that sensitivity analysis does not indicate whether the new 3.2% target is realistic. To answer that, it requires a bit more moving parts added into it. One additional dimension is required to be exact.

I am doing that here by showing 3 cases of revenue change under a range of NGDP and expenditure assumptions (note the not-so-small difference from the above model). To cut through the graphics, I think the 3.2% fiscal deficit ratio target is achievable if revenue grows by about 2% (I said about because I am too lazy to run a differential equation).

Before that, some legends for the three charts at the bottom. The yellow-highlighted cells describe the would-be situations if the expenditure was not cut (yes, it is a funny coincidence that the government had planned to increase its expenditure by 3.2% from 2014 in the original budget). The red-highlighted cells show the deficit ratio under the January 20 revised budget expenditure figures (Under revised budget, expenditure would still grow 1.2%. So, please do not call this austerity).

Here is the deficit ratio if 2015 revenue does not change from last year. Achieving 3.2% target seems impossible under this scenario (I wrote impossible because it would require a very strong NGDP growth at a time the GDP deflator appearing weak. If government revenue is flat this year, then my projection for the deficit would be about 3.6%):

No revenue change

Things would look a bit better if the government revenue would grow by 1% this year, but it would miss the deficit target still as 9% NGDP growth is beyond our reach, given current constraints:

Revenue growth 1%

Under 2% revenue growth case, the 3.2% deficit ratio looks achievable:

Revenue increases 2%

So, after reading through this, do you think the 3.2% deficit is achievable?

Ultimately, your answer must rely on revenue and NGDP growth. I think the reasonable NGDP growth assumption is about 4%-5%. As for revenue, I am unsure at the moment. There are just too many moving parts that require further investigation but the original budget had it grown at 4.5%. It will definitely be lower than that this year.