The government has blamed the recent flooding on once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall. Blames have been assigned to climate change too.
I have never experienced such prolonged rainfall before, and it was an extraordinary experience. Thankfully I did not have to suffer the flooding. Unfortunately, many others did and they were cursed with an incompetent government at the helm that was slow to realize the problem, and slow to act upon it. For a government so used to living the crisis-mode, one would expect they would have some kind of preparedness, or seasoned enough to lead a proper competent response. But no, it was a disastrous handing. Old clueless men and women, they are.
The Environment Minister himself back in October dismissed the talks of big floods, despite the prevailing La Nina phenomenon that brought increased rainfall across the Asia-Pacific region. His dismissal played a deplorable role of lowering down the greater population’s guard. There are several persons in government should be fired for incompetence and negligence—lives were lost, properties damaged—and that particular minister is high in the long list.
But the severe floods across Malaysia has happened much more often than once in a century. Kuala Lumpur alone has had its share of several bad floods. The big one in Kelantan that happened less than 10 years ago. Clearly, there is more to it than just once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall.
And excessive logging is one of those several contributing factors.
Specifically, here, I would like to highlight the regulatory environment relating to logging. The system is flawed and provides excessive incentives leading to widespread environmental disasters that makes the big flooding possible. Instead of remedying the problem of misaligned incentives, the system makes the tragedy of the commons worse.
The two-part systemic flaw
There are two major parts of the systemic flaw: the state controls the issuance of logging permit, while the federal authority leads the environmental policing part. To further complicates matter, the federal regulator regulates peninsular matters only.
The approving authority trumps federal authority due to the current constitutional arrangement, as provided under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia. The extensive power of the state governments over the forest is further clarified in the National Forestry Act 1984. In short, the federal regulatory body is powerless in the face of state governments.
Furthermore, the state governments, particularly the poorer ones like Pahang, suffers from adverse incentives arising out of the lack of revenue. In Malaysia, tax revenue (income tax and consumption tax are the major ones) is mainly the purview of the federal government and not enough has been returned to the states from the federal level. This insufficient sharing is also a reflection of the low-tax regime Malaysia has: you cannot share if you do not have enough in the first place. It is also a reflection of partisan politics, as Kelantan and Terengganu suffered before.
Given the state’s lack of tax revenue, and insufficient revenue support from the federal government, the states have to resort to other means of generating revenue: among them include monetizing land and the forest. With the goal of supporting state government operations, excessive logging permits are issued.
(In Sabah and Sarawak where the regulator comes under state authority unlike in the 11 states in the Peninsular, arguably the pressure for revenue forces the government to prioritize harvesting over protection. For instance, Sabah recently lifted its state-wide ban on timber exports that was imposed in 2018).
Additionally, many of these states come under the influence of the royal houses, which demand a share of the forest resources. The state government more often than not, would comply. I have a short family history to share here to illustrate the problem of toothless regulation in the face of state rights. An uncle of mine decades ago used to be a forestry officer in a certain large state. He stopped a logging operation linked to the royal house of the state. He ended up being transferred out of the state. The logging operation continued.
Managing the commons
One way to address the flaw and manage the commons better is to take away the states authority over the forest, and have the federal government compensates the state government through large institutional sharing of tax revenue beyond what is provided currently through items like capitation grants. The downside is that, as you can guess it, higher tax burden for everybody on average.
Through this realignment of powers and incentives, the pressures of deforestation through logging could be removed, and the regulatory authority would have stronger powers to preserve the jungle. That will help lessen the chances of big floods recurring (with all else the same).
