Categories
Economics

[2985] Malaysia’s EV policy risks running obsolete

The government has been incentivizing electric vehicle purchases and use as a way to boost domestic electrification trend. Those incentives come in the form of zero import duty, zero excise duty, zero road tax and non-tax on EV and/or related equipment, among others.

Whatever the early rationale behind these incentives,[1] changing global conditions are making these policies dated. Rising trade barriers across the world are affecting EVs adversely, especially those made in China. Regardless of the appropriateness of US and more relevantly European policy in response to China’s dominance in the space, these barriers would redirect Chinese EV volume from places with high tariffs to other economies without similar restrictions. These other economies—many of them are small-to-medium sized (like Malaysia)—might be the ones having to absorb oversupply. In other words, there is an EV oversupply coming our way.

Under a scenario where there are downward pressures on EV prices, would Malaysia’s set of incentives still make sense? I would argue no, especially for the retail side of the equation.

There are several reasons for the negative answer.

First, the downward pressures on prices caused by manufacturers’ need to reduce their inventories would likely be good enough to encourage domestic electrification on the road.

Second, the prospects of higher petrol prices caused subsidy rationalization exercise should already be a big incentive enough for road users to migrate from internal combustion engine to EV. This is of course depending on the government going through with the rationalization exercise.

Third, the coming oversupply would be an opportunity for the Malaysian government to shift the burden of encouraging EV from the public towards private manufacturers. After all, these are private EVs we are talking about, not public transport. And even better, the burden would be shifted towards foreign manufacturers, which many of these manufacturers originating from China.

Fourth, the government faces fiscal pressures and the migration towards EV would be a chance for Putrajaya to reap the migration dividend in the form of more duty and levy revenue. This does not mean raising those duties and levies to punitive level. It could mean just normalizing it (i.e. undo the incentives). That additional revenue could be used to either finance electrification facilities, or other pressing needs in education, health or even defense… or finance public transport projects instead of boost private vehicle ownership.

If it were up to me, I would quickly cut short these incentives. Immediate reversal of policy is likely too disruptive to be good and that suggests undoing it by end of 2024 sounds reasonable.

Otherwise, these EV incentives do have sunset clauses. I would recommend letting them lapse. But waiting until 2025 might be too long for Malaysia to benefit for changing global landscape.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedHafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedHafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — Given early (still?) focus on luxury electric vehicles and the government being overly focused on retail side of EV supply chain, the policy might have been captured by what I would call hobbyist lobbyists, i.e. rich men who take electric vehicle as a symbol of prestige.

It definitely didn’t help with the perception when early major lobbyist was an association named Malaysian Electric Vehicle Owners Club.

If the policy had not been captured, it would have focused early on the mass market, allowed leeway for cheap but reliable Chinese brands instead of the likes of Tesla, and also would provide better stress on industrial rather than retail.

Categories
Economics Politics & government Society

[2982] Insufficient law enforcement as a symptom of fiscal pressures

Rules and regulations would become non-credible if it is unenforced enough. Smoking ban at eateries. Running the red light. Private vehicles on bus lanes. Illegal parking by the roads. We all have seen these cases frequently that violations are expected to be the norm.

In frustration, a person recently publicly tweeted Health Minister Dzulkefly Ahmad to complain about zero enforcement of the smoking ban. The Minister replied that the Ministry indeed enforced the bans and shared some statistics of people caught violating the rules. He shared that more than 96,000 citations were given, and 42,000 alone were linked to violations at eateries. So, technically, the Minister is right. There has been a non-zero enforcement. Yet, a non-zero is not sufficient.[1]

After all, what is the percentage of 42,000 caught violators to total violations?

The actual answer might be difficult to get to without a proper survey. But we can run a guesstimate. One 2018 paper suggests there were 5 million smokers in Malaysia.[2] Let us assume several things:

  • The 2024 figure is the same as suggested by the paper.
  • 1% of the 5 million are regular violators.
  • These 1% visit a restaurant (mamak) at least once a month (12 times a year).
  • They violate the smoking ban during every visit.
  • There is no corruption.

If we agree these are reasonable assumptions (these assumptions all in all are very conservative, except maybe the no-corruption part), then the 42,000 citations (caught violations) would represent only 7% of total assumed violations (caught and uncaught). The 7% figure suggests a low rate of enforcement. The revealed preference suggests that if the 7% figure is right, then it is below the rate necessary to make the law credible.

But even if we reject these assumptions and reject that 7% guesstimate, there is also revealed preference at work here: the fact that violations keep happening suggests the actual ratio must be very low that many continue to ignore the regulation brazenly.

These smokers ignore the ban because they do not believe they would get caught. And if they do get caught at all, the cost they would suffer is low. This is true not for just the smoking violations, but other things as well.

The laws themselves are meaningless if people do not believe in it. It is the act of enforcing enough that make people believe certain laws are credible.

But enforcement is expensive. Enforcement has been funded and here is where there is a link between insufficient enforcement and the fiscal pressures the government faces. To put it differently, resources are scarce enough that funding has to be prioritized and not enough has been channeled to boost the ratio of citations/total violations.

I take this as yet another symptom of the government being underfunded, and a case of needing to raise taxation level in Malaysia from its current low levels.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedHafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedHafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — Hi & Thanks Paul @paultantk Lest you missed these..lm attaching it here for you et al to peruse..for your ‘zero enforcement’ n ‘completely toothless’ law. [Dzulkefly Ahmad. X. Accessed March 31 2024]

[2] — Approximately 5 million Malaysian adults (22.8%), aged 15 years and over, were current smokers. The prevalence of current smokers was significantly higher in males (43.0, 95%CI: 42.0-44.6) compared to females (1.4%, 95%CI: 1.0-1.8), as a whole and across all socio-demographic groups. The Chinese (14.2%, 95%CI: 12.7-15.9) and Indians (16.5%, 95%CI: 13.9-19.4) had a significantly lower prevalence of smoking compared to other ethnic groups. Adults aged 25- 44 years (28.3%, 95%CI: 26.9-29.8) reported the highest prevalence of smoking, but those with tertiary educational attainment (14.9%, 95%CI: 13.5-16.3) and those with an income level at the lowest (16.5%, 95%CI: 14.6-18.6) or highest (19.3%, 95%CI: 17.7- 21.1) quintile had significantly lower prevalence of smokers. On the other hand, the smoking prevalence was significantly higher among the self-employed workers (35.4%, 95%CI: 33.2-37.6) and those who worked in the private sector (31.7%, 95%CI: 29.8-33.6), compared to government servants, retirees and homemakers [Prevalence and factors associated with smoking among adults in Malaysia: Findings from the National Health and Morbidity Survey (NHMS) 2015. National Center for Biotechnology Information. National Library of Medicine. Accessed March 31 2024]

Categories
Economics WDYT

[2976] Guess the 2Q23 Malaysian GDP growth

The second quarter GDP for Malaysia will be published tomorrow, at noon Malaysian time.

As a reminder, the first quarter economy grew by 5.6% year-on-year. That was a surprisingly resilient quarter, despite deceleration in growth.

How fast do you think did the Malaysian economy expand in 2Q23 from a year ago?

  • 2% or slower (8%, 1 Votes)
  • 2.1%-3.0% (38%, 5 Votes)
  • 3.1%-4.0% (23%, 3 Votes)
  • 4.1%-5.0% (23%, 3 Votes)
  • 5.1%-6.0% (8%, 1 Votes)
  • Faster than 6.0% (0%, 0 Votes)

Total Voters: 13

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All available statistics point towards a second quarter slowdown. Export numbers during the quarter have been horrible, and the country’s industrial output, given how Malaysia is an small, open economy, has not been doing well either.

Part of the reason why the decline in exports and industrial output is due to the extraordinary post-lockdown growth, amid severe supply chain complications: that created an extremely high base effect and that effect will likely persist until the third quarter.

But that should distract us from the ongoing global growth slowdown. Europe is in recession and China is in trouble. The only real bright spot is the US, which is surprising because much, much earlier, many had expected the country to go into a recession.

But the US strength itself is causing troubles elsewhere in the form of capital outflows and foreign exchange volatility, since it gives more room for the Fed to raise rates. The end of the hike cycle keeps getting delayed.

The good news is that the domestic labor market remains solid, and there has been a little bit more medium-term direction given out by this government. The political heat has come down a bit after the recent state elections, which hopefully, will convince the government to shift more attention towards the economy, and other nation-building exercise.

And challenges in the next several quarters will not be small. Next in the list is a strong El Nino phenomenon, resulting, very likely, the hottest season we will go through yet. That will require a little bit of preparation: water supply, electricity transmission, manufacturing inputs, health services, firefighting services, etc.

And I pray there will be no forest fire and haze this time around.

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2970] Politics of living costs and the inevitable language of austerity

Extraordinarily, the Economy Minister has been holding press conference for every consumer price index release in the past few months. Extraordinary, because in the past, CPI releases were treated with silence by the government, and from time to time, cited in largely unread government press statements. But the new Minister, Rafizi Ramli, is focused on cost of living issues. He sees CPI statistics as a way to regularly talk about it.

He is not alone in focusing on living costs. Information Minister, Fahmi Fadzil in an interview recently said:

“The people don’t really care about the slogan, they care about the cost of living, prices of goods and internet access. Therefore, it is essential for every minister and ministry to act immediately to resolve issues of concern to the people.” [Fahmi: ‘Govt to solve people’s issues through Malaysia Madani concept’. Bernama. New Straits Times. January 25 2023]

A very, very short history of living costs politics

Component parties of Pakatan Harapan (and previously Pakatan Rakyat) have a long history of stressing on living costs politics. When energy prices were high in the late 2000s, DAP, Pas and PKR were pressing on the cost-of-living buttons furiously, and that played well to popular anger at that time.

Furthermore, the focus on living costs is a way to shift attention away from race and religion, towards more welfare-based issues. That shift is something to be welcomed, definitely.

Regression in policy

But as I have written earlier, while living costs deserve attention, the the politics of living costs is counterproductive in many ways. Such politics is the reason why policy progress Malaysia made in the past 10-15 years with respect to welfare policy has been partially reversed. Specifically, I am referring to the shift from subsidies to cash transfers. Cash transfers in many ways superior to subsidies in terms of welfare enhancing. Therefore, blanket subsidies and cash transfers are meant to be competing policies.

Yet, now, we have both and the government for the past 5 years have taken the two as complementary. The confused policy mix is proving to be expansive. And it does not help that the government is scared of new taxes, and prefer hard-to-implement-but-low/unstable-revenue taxes to easier-and-high/stable-revenue ones, which causes a severe fiscal constraint.

Rafizi, who previously was a strong believer in blanket petrol subsidies, appears to have walked back, perhaps after realizing the state of government finance, He, along with Prime Minister-Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim, are now talking about targeted subsidies instead, which has been discussed since at least 2019, not long after blanket subsidies were reintroduced. But having both targeted subsidies and cash transfers are still a confused policy mix. The ideal would be to move to cash transfers fully.

Politics of living costs almost always means large subsidies

The politics of living costs is counterproductive because, with its logical framework, the easiest way to address it is through subsidies and price controls. Other ways—wage hikes for one, or competition regulations—are much harder to implement and takes longer to be realized. The thing with subsidies is (in some ways cash transfers too, but at least cash transfers is much, much more efficient in enhancing welfare while it can always be clawed back via taxes if the wrong persons received it), it tends to take resources away from other things, like funding healthcare, investing and maintenance infrastructure or building defense capabilities in a region has been taking peace too much for granted.

You cannot solve these structural long-term things, if politics of living costs that is always in the now, is the ultimate priority.

The language of austerity

Since such politics takes resources away from many things, it sets the tone of belt-tightening: pay cuts, no pay, RM1.5 trillion government debt (and liabilities), etc. When there is so little left for anything else, usually, a lot of people would be scared and pull back what they could, except subsidies.

Anwar Ibrahim, at a forum in Jakarta, quipped that Malaysia was no longer the country of the 1990s in response to a request by an Indonesia luminary for more Malaysian scholarship for Indonesian students.

Rafizi, just this week, said:

“It is like an overweight person. You know your ideal weight and you constantly remind yourself that you are getting worse,” he said at a forum titled ‘Resetting the Malaysian economy’ organised by Parliament.

“The solution is simple. You need to eat less. If you want to eat a lot, you need to run more. Doctors, gyms will tell you that. Most struggle despite the diagnosis.

“That’s where we are as a country. With the current fiscal trajectory, things will get worse. It takes a lot of courage, political will and cohesion with all stakeholders (to carry out changes).”

[Fixing economy like fat person trying to lose weight, says Rafizi. Joel Shasitiran. FMT. January 27 2023]

Fat. Diet. Those are words one typically associates with austerity. We do not have austerity, but using this kind of language, it would impress many that there is one.

And the source of this language, and the wider fiscal problem the government faces is the politics of living costs.

This second Pakatan Harapan government appears to be repeating some of the mistakes of the first Pakatan Harapan government: too much focus on government financial burden that it was accused of running austerity policies, despite the fact, clearly, there was no austerity at play.

Categories
Economics History & heritage Politics & government

[2966] A short history of soft-budget constraint in Malaysia, and the challenge the Anwar administration faces

For the past few days, I have been thinking about the 2020-2022 roles reversal in the Malaysian version of soft-budget constraint, but ended up trying to trace the history of SBC in Malaysia.

First off, a short primer on SBC: soft-budget constraint is usually a problem between a government, and its state-owned enterprises. In Malaysian parlance, those enterprises are government-link companies. It is called soft-budget constraint because the budget of those enterprises is hard to be fixed; company revenue does not provide a hard limit on company expenditure. The government ends up financing those companies beyond what the latter’s revenue provides. That financing comes in the form of subsidies, loans, tax breaks and grants, and designed to meet various political, social or even economic objectives.

This problem is most prevalent in command economies, but it also exists elsewhere where the market is more open, like Malaysia.

Now, let us dive into the history of SBC in Malaysia.

From the 1970s until the 1990s: NEP and privatization

Malaysia had several influential state-owned enterprises prior to the 1980s and this made SBC a common problem, especially with the New Economic Policy running at full steam.

Luckily for Malaysia, raw material prices—petroleum, rubber, tin—were high at that time, making budget constraint problem manageable. These companies’ budget constraint was soft, but government revenue was bountiful.

Troubles came in the 1980s, when global recession depressed commodity prices. Budget constraint suddenly became very pressing, when government coffers could no longer support growing expenditure needs. Here, Mahathir Mohamad, addressed it through rapid and widespread privatization. Market discipline was instilled, and these companies found their budget constraints becoming stricter than in the past.

During the 1990s, through rapid modernization and super economic growth, along with privatization, SBC seemed like it had been consigned to history. SBC became a curiosity. The government enjoyed large growing surplus, and there were fewer companies requiring government support, save several instances where Mahathir insisted on import-substitution industrialization (Perwaja?).

When the Asian Financial Crisis hit Malaysia, all the bailouts meant the return of SBC.

SBC of the 2000s

The 2000s is significant in this telling because it was during this decade that off-budget spending took off earnestly. Government revenue did not grow fast enough to meet the country’s rising spending needs, especially so soon after the late-1990s recession. The government overcame its finance gap by devising clever methods to circumvent various accounting rules, and expand its spending capacity enormously. The methods are complex, and I will not go through it here except by sharing a post I wrote several years back, which explains various liabilities the government carried, but previously undisclosed.

Expanding off-budget obligations necessarily means growing SBC problem. Off-budget approach gave the government extra leverage, but it does not mean the government not having to fund them.

Off-budget approach, and SBC, came under intense scrutiny when 1MDB corruption came into the picture, and brought onto the government severe public demand for transparency. That demand, along with other concerns, led to collapse of the Barisan Nasional government, and the rise of Pakatan Harapan administration.

PH attempted to solve the problem by instituting greater transparency (this is part of the RM1 trillion debt and liabilities controversy), putting some off-budget spending back on budget (this partly raised the 2018 fiscal deficit ratio) and adopting accrual accounting, to make sure all financial obligations get recorded properly. But the SBC problem, intertwined with complex off-budget method, has become so big that it needs time to be addressed. And PH fell short of two years into office.

Reversal of roles during Covid-19 pandemic

The fall of PH coincided with the Covid-19 global pandemic. The new government needed to expand its spending fast to save lives and to preserve the economy’s productive capacity. But those in power were reluctant to boost government spending, possibly out of inexperience while facing a steep learning curve. With that reluctance, they looked to state-owned enterprises for solutions.

This caused a reversal of roles between the government and its companies. The government leaned on its GLCs to support its spending needs, instead of the other way round in the normal SBC problem. This made government budget to be softer than it was. GLC’s capacity became the government’s capacity.

Those financial supports from GLCs to the government come in the form of extremely long delayed payments. More specifically, the government throughout 2020, 2021 and 2022 engaged in massive subsidies and these subsidies were financed by the GLCs. The GLCs were supposed to be reimbursed immediately but that did not happen. To put it more plainly, these GLCs ended up financing the government.

For proofs, I would encourage everybody to inspect some of the largest utilities-GLCs out there. Check their growing receivables listed in their balance sheet (receivables refer to amount owned by buyers to suppliers).

There is another way to understand the roles reversal: these companies’ budget constraint becomes stricter than it was during normal times. Soft-budget constraint at the GLC level becomes really hard-budget constraint.

The problem became more complex in the post-Covid recovery, where subsidies ballooned tracking surging commodity prices.

2023 and into the future

Unlike the government, companies have troubles going over their budget constraint without outside support for too long. The cash crunch is coming.

The new Anwar Ibrahim administration will have the misfortune of having to address the roles reversal problem. It will be painful, involving large payments to be made/reimbursed by the government. Anwar Ibrahim the Finance Minister does not have much time: the cash crunch at several GLCs is coming.

That will add pressures for a broad tax hike, that Malaysia needs even before the pandemic.