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Economics History & heritage

[2910] Few lessons from post-war 1940s Malayan supply-side crisis

We are experiencing a supply-side crisis. The lockdown is inducing labor shortage, and it has the potential of exerting lasting damage on the economy if not handled properly.

It seems to me that the last time Malaysia or any of its components had a supply crisis was in the 1940s during World War II and during the immediate post-war period. Productions of various kinds were devastated, leaving many without jobs and forced into subsistence. The war not only destroyed productive capacity, but also suppressed demand.

The end of the war brought demand back up quickly. Unlike demand however, production took time to get back to speed. Wars had destroyed all the equipment, and killed off many that worked at the mines, plantations, factories and shops. Rebuilding those and reemploying the workers took time.

That meant massive unemployment in the meantime.

Massive unemployment also meant employers had great bargaining power: wage growth was weak if any. Faced with unemployment, weak wage growth and spiking prices, social discontent was prevalent. This was one of many reasons the communist movement gained sympathy among the masses: industrial sabotage became a norm which worsened efforts to restore production.

There are a few lessons to take from the economics of post-war 1940s. Disrupted supply chain in the form of business failures and labor shedding took time to recover, and could not move as fast as demand. When demand returned with supply failing to do the same, that demand went unfulfilled. This led to massive shortages and subsequently, massive inflation. Never mind the social issues and the complex 1940s political situation.

In this sense, the negative economic effects of the war lasted beyond the war.

Coming back to today, our mines, plantations, shops, offices and other facilities obviously do not suffer similar war devastation. And the social reality is different and undeniably more stable though racial tension that originated from the war continues to linger.

But our current supply-side crisis, now lengthened to 4 weeks, is heightening the risk of business failures and job loss. That means reduced potential and once the crisis is over and demand back up, that reduced potential means shortages and significantly higher inflation, and higher prolonged unemployment. Growth could be depressed for some time until the potential returns to its pre-crisis period. The negative economic effects of this supply-side crisis would last beyond the actual crisis.

This is why we need to protect the potential now. Prevent business failures. Protect jobs. This is so that once the crisis is done, we could press on the demand paddle right away without having to wait for some time to repair the supply transmission. We do not have to suffer a lasting effect of this crisis.

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Economics

[2906] Stimulus during a period of intense social distancing/partial lockdown

How do you stimulate an economy during a period of intense social distancing or partial lockdown, with many workers not working, a majority of productions offline and most movements restricted?

It is the ultimate supply-side disruption.

Malaysia has just announced a movement restriction order, which is an eventuality especially given the 3-week the government came to a grinding halt that led to a significant loss in lead response time.

With the restriction in place, I think the earlier stimulus announced by the government may have lost some of its meanings. Its objectives have changed.

The social distancing like this is a severe form of supply-side disruption, with effective labor supply dwindling, except perhaps those with automated processes. No stimulus could stimulate growth, because the space for improved demand is limited by supply capability. There is no demand to be had beyond whatever provided by the supply-side frontier. Or perhaps the best we could do is to lower inflation once we hit that supply frontier.

And so, the priority of a stimulus would be transformed from stimulating demand to:

  1. partial income replacement
  2. cost saving assistance
  3. facilitating restriction
  4. perhaps more importantly, preserving output potential

For Point 1 and 2, it is about ensuring the population would meet the minimum level of wellbeing. In fact we should try as much as possible to maintain the welfare of the people. We clearly do not want people and businesses to die during a period intense social distancing or a lockdown. This is where cash transfer is helpful, and perhaps more liberal employment insurance too.

Point 3 is employing methods that make restrictions more palatable. Like encouraging delivery services and the use of cashless payments.

Point 4 is the ultimate objective. When things become normal, we want the economy to jumpstart and hit its pre-crisis mode as soon as possible. Here, we try to avoid having permanent, or prolonged potential loss. Permanent losses could happen as workers become out of work for too long, and losing their momentum to work or even their skills. So, the relevant policy is labor hoarding and incentives to keep firms in business. Both will need convincing expectation-setting by the government.

In other economies like in the US and Europe after the financial crisis, we know that recovery happened long after the crisis ended. In Greece for instance, the economy took a very long time to reach pre-crisis output, even after the crisis is over. So, it is a very possible scenario and that is something we should avoid.

We may need a “demand-side” stimulus later, but for now, our stimulus has very a different objective altogether.

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Economics

[2767] Deflation is coming to Malaysia. Is it bad?

January inflation clocked at only 1.0% from a year ago while in December it was 2.7%. That was a pretty drastic slowdown that I bet someone will cry deflation wolf somewhere soon.

The cause of the slackening is easy to explain. It is unambiguously due to the drop in retail petrol and diesel prices. RON95 fuel price, the most popular fuel in Malaysia by far, in January dropped from MYR2.26 per liter to MYR1.91 in December. Diesel went down 30 sen to MYR1.93 per liter in the same period. In January 2014, RON95 was MYR2.10 per liter.

At this rate, Malaysia might be seeing actual deflation this month. In February, both RON95 and diesel went down further to MYR1.70 per liter. The drop in yearly terms in February 2015 is greater than that seen in January because in February 2014, RON95 was MYR2.10 still. In January 2015, it fell 9% YoY. In February 2015, it decreased 19% YoY.

In fact, on monthly terms, we are already in deflation. This is not your monthly, seasonal price fluctuation that people usually ignore and say, ah, it is nothing. This is a clear deflation.

Is this deflation something to worry about?

No. I do not think so.

Deflation these days connotes bad news. Japan and Europe are trying hard to avoid deflation. In Singapore, deflation played a role in convincing the monetary authority there to loosen up its forex policy, which is their monetary policy. And the last time Malaysia had a deflation, it was during the 2009 recession.

But not all deflation are the same.

In Japan and Europe and Singapore today, and Malaysia in 2009, deflation came about from reduced economic activities. There was less demand and so, price pressure was weak and that pulled prices down. It was demand-driven. In fact, we really are worrying about demand rather than price itself. Price changes — inflation or deflation — are usually a symptom of something else.

Unlike in 2009, the (possible) February deflation would be supply-driven. The weakening in prices has been supply-driven in the sense that technological improvement — all the talk about shale mining that is turning the US into the world’s largest oil producer — has created oil glut in the market.

I do not worry because this is the same pressure that forced computer prices down over the decades. It is a kind of pressure that makes a typical person feels richer because he or she could now buy something else with the same amount of money and still afford the same quantity of fuel or more. Or save them. I do not see a price-wage spiraling down out of control here. The price deflation does not make them feel poorer because the deflation does not come about from them losing them job or suffering a pay cut. There are news of some retrenchment in the oil and gas sector but the size is small so far, as far as I know and besides, the sector is not the biggest contributor to the Malaysian economy. Indeed, the biggest sector, electronics, is having swell of a time and being ignored by the press.

I also do not worry about deflation because fuel is not something a typical consumer can live without for too long. Deflation can be disastrous to the economy in the sense that people would stop buying or postpone their purchases until prices fall further to stabilize at some low prices. But with fuel, I do not think you can do that to the point it would adversely affect growth. Fuel is an essential good and you just have to use them, especially in a society that is so dependent on combustion-type vehicles. If you do wait out, then you might not be able to drive or get to somewhere at all. You just need them and you will keep buying it even when you know prices are falling.

More importantly, the postponement of purchase is dangerous to growth especially when consumers do not know when prices would bottom out. So, they keep holding back and then not making purchases at all. This can be particularly devastating for fixed assets like homes and durable goods. In the case fuel prices, it does appear prices have bottomed out, especially since the prices used for the determination of petrol prices in Malaysia is lagged by a month, as I have explained previously. If global crude prices hold at the current level at about $60 per barrel compared to $45 in mid-January, it is very likely that retail petrol prices will be higher in March next month. So, a February deflation will be temporary. This also means people would line up at the gas stations at the end of this month preempting the loophole that comes with Malaysia’s imperfect dirty float system. So, instead of being encouraged to postpone purchases, they will hoard them instead.

Before I end, I am not saying there is no problem with demand. I still worry that consumption growth is slowing despite the surprisingly strong expansion last quarter. But the possible deflation in February is very much driven by the supply-side, and not demand.

So, do not worry about the deflation.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
p/s — I am tempted to say yet another reason why I was not worried about deflation, but decided the argument is problematic. That argument goes: core inflation is still more than 50 basis points above headline inflation. Since core inflation is more reflective of demand, and since it strips fuel away and therefore free from supply-driven inflation/deflation seen in January, it suggests demand is going well. But I checked the data from 2008-2009 and core inflation was somewhat healthy despite the fact there was a recession. This probably shows core inflation is an imperfect measurement of demand change.

I am putting it at the postscript to catalog my own thoughts on the matter and revisit it later.

Categories
Economics

[1175] Of supply-sider versus demand-sider, round n

Approximately 40 years after the debate began, the battle between supply-siders and the Keynesians (and to some extent, monetarists) continues.

It first came to surface with Bruce Barlett’s article at the NYT:

Today, hardly any economist believes what the Keynesians believed in the 1970s and most accept the basic ideas of supply-side economics — that incentives matter, that high tax rates are bad for growth, and that inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenomenon. Consequently, there is no longer any meaningful difference between supply-side economics and mainstream economics. [How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down. Bruce Bartlett. NYT April 6 2007]

Mark Thoma at the Economist’s View enlightens his readers on the difference between supply-side and New Keynesian schools…:

There is much more to say about all of this, I haven’t even mentioned New Classical models, but that will have to do for now. Summarizing, contrary to what is implied in Bruce Bartlett’s commentary, there are two distinct schools in economics, the RBC school and the NK school, and they have very different policy implications. Not everyone will agree with this, and that is the point I suppose, but I would argue that the mainstream view today is the NK model, though the RBC school has strong advocates and has made important contributions to our thinking (the long-run incentives Bruce Bartlett mentions are a good example). [Bruce Bartlett: How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down. Economist’s View. April 6 2007]

…while DeLong gives a little bit summary of what is going on the next day:

Mark Thoma quotes large chunks of Bruce Bartlett’s views on supply-side economics… [A Very Good Conversation on Supply-Side Economics. Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Brad DeLong’s Semi-Daily Journal. April 7 2007]

Then, it is Paul Krugman at Economist’s View, defending Keynesianism:

The key thing is that good Keynesianism, as embodied even in undergrad textbooks of the time, was *perfectly OK*: Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978 edition, offered a description of what disinflation would look like that matches the experience of the 80s reasonably well, and the textbook does not seem all that dated even now. The idea that we needed a new doctrine to get our heads straight is just all wrong. [Supply-Side Economics: Paul Krugman Responds. Economist’s View. April 11 2007]

James Galbraith on his opposition to supply side and monetarism:

Brad DeLong’s summary of Bruce’s summary of our vulgar Keynesian policy beliefs is, here, reasonably close to the mark, except in one respect. No one in my circle doubted the capacity of monetary policy to crush the economy if pushed sufficiently far. Rather, we believed (accurately, as events would prove), that monetary policy worked against inflation *only* insofar as it brought on a brutal recession. We did not accept the monetarist/supply-side claim, which was presented at the start of the Reagan administration in official projections, that the trick could be pulled off without a recession. We were, of course, perfectly right about that.

Second, as a matter of economics, we thought that the combination of supply-side economics and monetarism was fundamentally incoherent — and we were well aware that the supply-siders and monetarists disagreed with each other more violently than they disagreed with us. As an anti-monetarist and one of the very few Democrats willing to criticize the sainted Paul Volcker, I found myself in rough alliance with the supply-siders more than once (and I have a few handwritten notes from Jack Kemp in my files somewhere). [Jamie Galbraith Speaks for the “Vulgar Keynesians”. Economist’s View. April12 2007]

Watch those comments at the Economist’s View.