Categories
Economics

[2850] The arbitrariness and the superficiality of Malaysia’s $15,000 high-income nation benchmark

In the past week or so, there were several news reports stating that Malaysia was regressing backward relative to the high-income country GNI benchmark of $15,000 per person by 2020. The Economic Planning Unit showed the figure fell to $9,291 in 2015 and to $8,821 in 2016, from $10,677 in 2014.[1]

From the figures alone, it is plain to see that the gap between current level and the $15,000 per capita has increased. The 2020 target was set by the government as the benchmark Malaysia needed to hit to in order to declare the country as a “high-income nation.”[2] Pemandu’s whole reason for existence is predicated on this.

But such conclusion (and the target itself) is superficial and largely a non-issue as far as economic growth is concerned. What is more important in terms of development is the levels of welfare, which is better represented by the purchasing power parity calculation, instead of the Atlas method used to calculate the GNI per capita figures in the US dollar.

There are three reasons why I claim the conclusion is superficial.

First, the $15,000 GNI per capita by 2020 target is susceptible to foreign exchange rate fluctuation. This is despite the Atlas method is designed to minimize the same fluctuation. The ringgit depreciation relative to the US dollar in 2015 and 2016 was just too big for the method to handle. Its inability to control for the fluctuation makes its output less reliable that it normally is. You can see why it does a bad job within the context of 2015 and 2016: the Atlas method controls the forex rate variation by averaging the latest three years of the relevant rates (the method does include inflation differential between countries but it is not nearly as good as the PPP). But even under normal circumstance, the Atlas method is inferior to the purchasing power parity just because the former does not adjust for domestic living costs properly. The PPP may have its own failings but its failings are considerably less serious than the Atlas method.

To understand this point further, we have to realize that for most Malaysians, earning and spending are carried out in the local currency, the ringgit. Only a small minority earn in ringgit but spend in foreign currency, among them the US dollar. So for most Malaysians, it is unclear why the size of the economy translated through the Atlas method into the US dollar is meaningful in determining the state of a country’s development level or its population welfare, apart from the fact that the World Bank uses it and that Pemandu was just following suit.

The World Bank states it is using the Atlas method for operational purposes,[3] which makes sense because the organization lends money to national governments mostly in major currencies and that the repayments are susceptible to the forex fluctuation due to currency mismatch. They need to take the forex fluctuation into account.

Meanwhile, Pemandu and Malaysia use it as a target… because the World Bank uses it for its global lending purposes done largely in US dollar. You can see the problem here. The World Bank’s and Malaysia’s purposes for using the Atlas method are vastly different. It fits the World Bank’s goal better than Malaysia’s. PPP, on the underhand, fits Malaysia’s purpose better than the World Bank’s. It is a case of using the wrong tool.

Second, even if we accept the target and the Atlas method wholly, the actual benchmark for high-income is likely lower than the $15,000 barrier. The $15,000 benchmark itself did not come from the World Bank but projected into the future by Pemandu based on figures from the international body. The latest 2017 high-income benchmark actually used by the World Bank is $12,476.[4] Pemandu had projected the figure from 2010 (if I am not mistaken), assuming the 2010-2020 growth rate of high-income countries to average 2.0% yearly. The reality is that the 2010-2017 average is only 0.2% yearly so far. At the current actual growth rate, the benchmark will be $12,563 per capita by 2020 assuming everything else remains the same. It is still a widening gap, but not as bad as when the $15,000 per capita is the target.

Third, the implications of the conclusion are outrageous, if the Atlas method completely addresses concerns over forex fluctuation: either Malaysia had run into a two-year long recession, or we had an extraordinary population boom during the same period.

But we did not have a recession. We did have a growth slowdown however. The Malaysian economy grew by 5.0% in 2015 and 4.2% in 2016. But no recession, which is a contraction of the GDP by two consecutive quarters.

And we did not have a population boom either during the two years. The size of the Malaysian population in 2015 and 2016 grew 1.4%-1.6% yearly, lower than in the previous years.

Since both did not happen (with inflation was not big enough to matter: Malaysia’s 2%-3% and in the US, 0%-1%), we must question the validity of the Atlas method in measuring the well-being of Malaysians. And by extension, it questions the ability of the Atlas method to determine the status of Malaysia as a high-income nation. The one factor that changed was the forex rate.

But ultimately, the term high-income nation itself is fluffy. There are attempts to give it concrete meaning but would crossing the not too distance line suddenly transform Malaysia into a rich country? It is never as clear as that. While Malaysia has done well compared to a lot of countries in the world, entrance to “first world” is actually harder then merely cross the line defined by the World Bank or Pemandu. Just cross over to Singapore, or visit Japan, or Australia or any of the generally recognized high-income countries. Would Malaysia crossing the GNI per capita $12,475 line suddenly make the us like those countries? Maybe someday, but the barrier will be way above the World Bank’s line.

You know a high-income country when you see one: some classifications are looser than others and many of them are arbitrary. This is the limits of mathematics and economics. So, be careful of turning a soft arbitrary line in the sand as your true north. Managing a country’s development is not like running a business.

But coming back to the original point, no, we have not regressed in terms of economic development. We have regressed in other aspects, like our institutions, but the economy has grown, contrary to what the imperfect Atlas method tells us. If you really want to make an international comparison, the purchasing power parity model is far superior than the Atlas method, especially at a time when forex fluctuation is great.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — Page 5.The Malaysian Economy in Figures 2016. Economic Planning Unit

[2] — Page 59. Economic Transformation Programme: A Roadmap for Malaysia. October 26 2010

[3] — The income groupings use GNI per capita (in U.S. dollars, converted from local currency using the Atlas method) since they follow the same methodology used by the World Bank when determining its operational lending policy. While it is understood that GNI per capita does not completely summarize a country’s level of development or measure welfare, it has proved to be a useful and easily available indicator that is closely correlated with other, nonmonetary measures of the quality of life, such as life expectancy at birth, mortality rates of children, and enrollment rates in school. [Why use GNI per capita to classify economies into income groupings? The World Bank. Accessed March 23 2017]

[4] — For the current 2017 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,025 or less in 2015; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and $4,035; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $4,036 and $12,475; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more. [World Bank Country and Lending Groups The World Bank. Accessed March 24 2017]

Categories
Economics

[2661] For the gazillionth time, 2009 was a recession year

Idris Jala in his column in The Star today wrote something that I have always found disagreeable (or maybe since 2010 when I first encountered this kind of argument):

In just two years, we increased our GNI per capita by 45% from US$6,700 in December 2009 to US$9,700 in December 2011, a rare feat in today’s world. [Idris Jala. Davos Takeaways. The Star. February 2013]

My issue has always been the 2009 baseline because the year was a recession year. Because of that, a large portion of growth since 2009 originated from recovery, which has little to do with Pemandu and more importantly, it has little to do with structural growth. In simpler words, it was cyclical growth. The base was extremely low by recent standards. Any post-recovery year level will register high growth rate compared to the base. I have written something similar about this nearly three years ago.

To control for that low base, it is imperative to measure it from previous local maximum. In this case, 2008.

Here is a bar chart of yearly growth of nominal GDP per capita for Malaysia as obtained from the World Bank (the difference between GDP and GNI for Malaysia is relatively small. Whatever pattern you see in GDP, you will very likely see the same pattern in GNI as far as Malaysia is concerned, as long as the dimension is consistent, i.e. compare real numbers with real numbers, or nominal with nominal):

Nominal GDP per capita Malaysia

Now, if you measure 2011 GDP per capita in nominal terms since the recession year of 2009 as Idris Jala had done with his nominal GNI figures, 2009-2011 growth would be 37.9% (contrast this with Idris Jala’s 45% claims. Let us assume good faith that the difference is due to honest calculation; population size and actual GNI calculation could be different. The difference between GDP and GNI could contribute to it as well. Data source could be a culprit as well as the Department of Statistics last year updated and improved its time series to include more data, never mind the exchange rate given that it is nominal GDP expressed in USD). It means yearly average of nominal GDP per capita growth is 8.4%.

If you measure that GDP per capita growth based on what I said, 2008-2011 growth would be lower at 18.8%. The yearly average from 2008 to 2011 is 4.4%.

The difference says a lot. It says out of that 37.9% growth, about half of that growth was due to recovery. And that recovery had a lot to do with external demand…

Really, if you look at the chart, meaningful growth, i.e. growth gained after we had caught up with the old level, only came largely in 2011. There was no growth in 2009. We only got back to where we started in 2010. In 2011, we finally grew (the same narrative is true for real numbers as well).

The problem with Idris Jala and company is that they like to use the 2009 baseline as a proof that they are doing good. Based on their narrative, whatever they are doing is reflected in the growth numbers. After all, Najib came to power after forcing Abdullah to come down in 2009. In the same year, Pemandu was established by the new Prime Minister. You see, the correlation is perfect!

But any respectable person will know correlation is not causation. And in this case, Pemandu and Najib are only a coincidental third variable that exhibits correlation because they were lucky to be whatever they were at the most serendipitous time.

For the recent 2012 growth (2012 versus 2011), then maybe something can be credited to Pemandu. For previous recent growth, it just takes too much dishonesty and audacity to say a majority of growth from 2009 to 2011 could be credited to Pemandu. And given the low base effect, measuring growth from 2009 gives an overly sunny growth number that ignores the context of recession.

And of course, in the game of claiming undue credits, the larger the number, the better it is. Be damn with context.

Categories
Politics & government Society

[2574] Declining crime rate may not be enough

The statistics show that total crime in general has been declining since 2009, according to PEMANDU. Yet many members of the public distrust the statistics and insist that they do not feel what the statistics suggest. Others in the wild, wild world of cyberspace, where discussions can be very unrefined, openly call those in authority outright liars, which is not the first time that has happened. Suffice to say those in the government are frustrated at incredulity exhibited by many members of the public towards the official narrative of declining crime.

Idris Jala, the head of PEMANDU, cited an article entitled ”Cockeyed optimists” in The Economist some time ago. The message of the article, among others, is that perception lags behind actual crime statistics. The article referred to the United Kingdom to support its claim. In short, Idris Jala was defending the statistics amid widespread disbelief. He tried to rationalize the seemingly contradictory signals inferred from the reported crime statistics and public perception of the level of crime within the society, and he hoped others believed it. If he had not hoped, he would not have shared his rationalization in the first place.

Eugene Tan, a PEMANDU director, was clearer in delivering the same message. ”Changes in perception do not immediately follow changes on the ground. And even when people fear crime less and perception changes, the change is slower than the actual reduction of cases,” he reportedly said.

Crime may be falling. Or at least the reported official crime statistics are declining. And it may be true that perception lags behind crime rate.

Or it may be that falling crime rate itself is not the real concern. Maybe, the actual issue is that the public tolerates only so much crime.

It can be that is a maximum level of crime that the public can endure while maintaining their composure. If total crime is above the level in general, then the public will complain loudly about the performance of the authority in tackling crime. If total crime is below that level, then maybe it will ease the public.

If it is indeed true that there is a ceiling that the public tolerates, then the question is not whether the total crime has been falling. The whole new hypothesis makes the point on declining crime statistics somewhat redundant. The trend itself becomes of little comfort to the public and is of little value in improving public sentiment with respect to crime and overall safety of self, their loved ones and property.

Instead of focusing on whether the crime rate has fallen — conditional on the truth value of the assumption of comfort ceiling — the relevant concern now takes a slightly different form. The question now is whether total crime has fallen low enough?

Taking the continuing public dissatisfaction within this new context, then the answer seems to be no. It appears that there is still some way to go before the public is satisfied with the level of crime within our society.

So, the alternative way to convince that public with issues regarding general crime is to identify the ceiling, compare the total crime to the ceiling and work towards pushing total crime below that.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malaysian Insider on August 3 2012.

Categories
Economics

[2531] PEMANDU and its real significance to private investment

PEMANDU claims “confidence from the ETP saw private investment hit RM94 billion and RM131 billion worth of GNI generated in 2011.”

A bold claim.

Let us see the trend of private investment in the last 11 years.

Do you see anything special about 2010 and 2011?

What I see is only a reversion to mean. What I see is that there is something in the economy that causes that. That something is bigger than PEMANDU.

Note also that in 2009, there was a severe recession. What that means is that there was a temporary disruption, and the subsequent recovery was just a reversion to mean (i.e. delayed investment planned before the recession, or just typical investment that happens as the economy goes along that requires no further incentive), not because of PEMANDU.

Yet PEMANDU claims that it is the cause.

You know when PEMANDU can make that claims of theirs? When those points are significantly above the line. That will probably happen in 2012 or 2013 with the construction of the MRT. Until then, no.

The figures for private investment can be verified by consulting the Bank Negara’s Monthly Statistical Bulletin.

Categories
Politics & government

[2468] They drive, they measure, they are tempted and they can

It does not inspire confidence when the same entity that is driving a program is the one that measures the success of the program as well. There is a conflict of interest there.

Imagine a soccer team up against another team and imagine the referee is a team member of the former team. It is safe to bet that the referee will rule in favor of his or her team. Similarly, if you are running a program to lower crime rate and you are also the one measuring the success of the program, there will be temptation to report your progress in an overly generous way, especially when your progress is not too good. More than temptation, you can actually give undeserved good marks to yourself if the temptation gets the best of you. In order words, you are the prosecutor, the judge and the jury all at the same time.

I see PEMANDU’s National Key Performance Indicators through the same lens. The NKPIs basically measure some areas where PEMANDU or the government wants to see improvement in. While I do appreciate that these tools do increase transparency and makes debates on some matters more objective than it was in the past, the measurements themselves are not entirely trustworthy. PEMANDU has the incentive to look good. What guarantees the indicators reported are not tempered with?

To compound the issue, PEMANDU is not exactly an independent or even an impartial party. It answers to a minister. I suppose it helps that Idris Jala is an unelected minister with probably an entirely professional background. That is an argument of him being isolated for the myopic politics. But then again, myopia is not a trait exclusive to politics. It is well documented in businesses, and everywhere else.

And the fact is that he ultimately answers to the Prime Minister, whose career is entirely dependent on politics. The success of PEMANDU will be one of the key factors in increasing the odds of reelection of  Barisan Nasional. So, it is in the Prime Minister and Barisan Nasional’s best interest to have PEMANDU succeed, or really, appear to be successful. PEMANDU wants to look good. The Prime Minister wants to look good. The government wants to look good. Well, everybody wins by looking good.

We have not even begin to consider the KPIs under the case of various ministries, which are even more suspicious. KPIs, at least the ones I have witnessed elsewhere, are always negotiated. The negotiation ensures that the KPI is not a kind of out of this world so that it is not impossible to achieve but at the same time, not too easy to make it meaningless. Now, consider a bunch of politicians that want to get reelected. It is in their collective interest to set easy KPI that can be achieved even without a mad dog chasing them behind.

So every time when somebody comes up to me and shows me some indicators to prove that PEMANDU has been successful in some area, I quietly note the conflict of interest at the back of my mind.