Categories
Conflict & disaster Liberty Politics & government

[2132] Of isolationist, non-interventionist, libertarian foreign policy

I am not particularly warm to Obama due to his economic policy. Shadows of protectionism and greater government intervention lurk somewhere. His foreign policy however is a cause to celebrate. The Obama that spoke in Oslo as he delivered his Nobel Prize speech is the Obama that I like. His speech on the need of war, of just war, and peace, was moving. Not only was it moving, it makes sense and addresses the nonsense of eliminating war as proposed by some in the anti-war movement. He backed up his assertion by acknowledging the existence of evil in the world. And evil must be confronted.

Obama is right when he said that there is no glory in war. The same sentiment can be felt here in Sydney at the ANZAC War Memorial. The memorial is not there to glorify war but rather, to honor sacrifices of men and women. It is not glorious because the human suffering it brings is immeasurable.

Yet, when a war is fought to defend principle of liberty, when tyranny threatens to rob individuals of liberty for any reason, a war in the name of liberty is unavoidable. Peace under tyranny is insufferable and peace under such condition is not one a free person should aspire. Better conditions are attainable. Of course, these better conditions can be attained relatively peacefully but when all routes are exhausted, it is really hard to condemn the use of force.

How true it is when Obama said that a “non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies.” Negotiation failed. Britain could not pacify Germany under the Nazi by acquiescing to the latter’s occupation of Czechoslovakia. No. Germany wanted more. The only peace Hitler’s sought is a peace incompatible with the idea of freedom. He wanted submission. Thus war was inevitable.

This aligns perfectly to libertarian principle of non-aggression axiom. Force cannot be not used except in self-defense.

Expanding this principle which is meant to cater individuals is however problematic. The easiest is to accept, however flawed such consideration is, a state as a person with rights to some extent. In doing so, it rationalizes the concept of self-defense vis-à-vis the state. That comes with it the idea of state sovereignty, just as individuals are sovereign over themselves.

It is flawed, because it ignores violation of individual rights outside the boundary of the state, where the victims are non-citizens, whereas individual rights, individual liberty require defending, ideally everywhere. The legitimization of use of force only in the name of self-defense in terms of the state necessarily dismisses any call of action for any oppression of liberty in foreign land.

A digression is necessary lest confusion reigns. Such non-aggression axiom for the state does not in any way prevent the state or individuals from criticizing such suppression in foreign land. Rather, the state cannot use force to prevent that oppression.

The logical path to adoption of non-aggression axiom to the state is one of non-interventionist, or even, in a restricted sense, isolationist. It is isolationist because all tyrannic developments in the world outside of the state’s boundary unrelated to the immediate security the state is given a blind eye. The United States did this prior to World War II. While such isolation has its root in the Jeffersonian ideal, which is clearly adversed to entangling alliances, the effect is the same. The same isolationist ideology brought upon the failure of League of Nations. The era of the Great Depression further demonstrated the far-reaching influence of isolation where the devastating Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was put in place in the name of protectionism although the non-interventionist in libertarian context is only one involving force, not trade. Ron Paul explains this beautifully during his campaign in 2007 as a Republican nominee for the office of the President of the United State of America.

Such isolationist position held by the United States only truly evaporated after it was clear to it that it was very much part of the world, when Japan successfully attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. The US has since become a global power with interventionist tendency. Perhaps, too much interventionist tendency.

I am aware of the problem of isolation and non-intervention arising from non-axiom theorem much, much acutely. I struggle with it because while tyranny is the great enemy of liberty, fighting tyranny everywhere can be exhausting, especially if one considers economic reality of scarcity. Furthermore, that does not answer the need, from time to time, to react, especially with legitimate force, against atrocity like what happened in Rwanda or Bosnia. Or, maybe, just maybe, even Iraq.

Iraq is a problem to me. I began with opposition to the war and now but I am unsure if my opposition is entirely right. Saddam Hussein was a dictator and he was ruthless one at that. Former United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair in an interview not long ago said that even without weapon of mass destruction, he would have gone to war anyway.

My oppostion to the war was because of the flawed rationale of the war. Iraq did not weapon of mass destruction — never mind the controversy on the term itself — when the accusation was made. The failure of the United States and its allies under the infamous Coalition of the Willing to find those weapon is enough to demonstrate the folly of it all.

Yet, if the rationale — made as the main rationale and not as a side rationale as it was thrown in support of the war — had been against the murderous act of Saddam Hussein’s regime, I would probably, under libertarian condition, have supported the war throughout, realizing full well of its violation to state sovereignty. Call it splitting hair but I take great concern on rationale, even if the result is the same. Though I may resign to the convenience of Mao’s black cat, white cat from time to time, the end does not always justify the mean.

Regardless of the issue of state sovereignty, the economic reality of scarcity does bring this into question. We simply cannot fight tyranny everywhere, every time. Going to war to fight every tyranny is unrealistic because it is expensive in many ways including those beyond monetary consideration. One of this consideration is the disturbance of equilibrium. Fighting tyranny everywhere every time may encourage too much lawlessness that brings instability, even if stability means oppression. This, as it should be noted, a contradiction to the idea that there can be no peace if there is no liberty. This in fact, returns us back to non-interventionist policy while, largely, ignoring tyranny outside of our boundaries. Yet, another contradiction. In my humble opinion, while one seeks to smoothen out contradictions, the least problematic contradiction should be the favored one until a solution is found to take away the contradiction and be supremely consistent logically. As far as those oppression are outside of our boundaries and unrelated to us with us having our liberty secured, non-interventionist maybe the way forward.

Perhaps, when Obama mentioned Germany, he was alluding to Iran. The issue of Iran and nuclear proliferation was raised. Making parallel out of Germany and Iran maybe too much because it is always easy to judge something in hindsight. While the story of Germany has past, the story of Iran has not and there is no certainty that Iran ultimately seeks war. For Germany during World War II, non-aggression axiom was violated. Iran has not crossed that line yet, if it would at all. We should not resign to fatalism.

Again, we simply cannot fight tyranny everywhere, every time. At least, not under current global institutions.

In the setup of a state, fighting and correcting wrongs, although not everywhere and every time, is possible in many places and many times through the setting up of a credible judiciary and arms that enforce rule of law in terms of liberal democracy. Perhaps, if the same rationale for the state is expanded to the global level, the same success of the state can be emulated at the global level.

Obama, rightfully, mentioned this in his speech while he also rightfully said he does not have all the solutions. He spoke of institutions. And he gave the United Nations as an example; not a shining example but a success example to some degree nonetheless. There is a possibility that humankind can face the problem of evil more successfully than any god’s had, and not resort to Dr. Pangloss’ ridiculousness. As some phrase that I heard a while ago goes, the affairs of men are too important to be left in the hands of the gods, anyway.

This is a way circumvents the problem of non-aggression axiom for states and confronts the problem of evil by having a third, supposedly impartial party doing so.

This however is a slippery slope for libertarians — and even others — for such argument opens to the path of global government. That, is a monster much harder to fight against when the government is illiberal. Such monster would turn the global anarchy we are in as an utopia.

It would be alright if the global government is a government based on a liberal constitution protecting typical individual rights of men and women and everything in between but judging the world as it is unfortunately, with merely crass majoritarian democracy and the global government, I am uncertain how long such government’s liberal constitution would last, assuming it would begin with a liberal constitution, given the illiberal setup of a majority of states, if these states should be represented to a global legislative assembly without veto power. The farce of the United Nations Human Rights Council is enough a proof to this concern of mine: how could countries which have utmost contempt for individual rights, be the standard bearer of human rights?

If it exacerbates the problem of evil, then it should be rejected.

Categories
Economics Liberty

[2099] Of Ostrom’s Prize in Economics, commons, coercion and libertarianism

Libertarians celebrate two winners of the Prize in Economics of whom one of them is Elinor Ostrom. That is because her works show that commons can be managed efficiently by groups of users rather than the State. I am unsure, however, if libertarians, especially the free market purists quite absorb the full implication after accounting for footnote associated with Ostrom’s works.

Her findings do very little to expunge coercion from solutions relating to large tragedy of the commons. This fact, through my observation, is what many libertarians have missed.

On purists, I know, I know, I have been accused as a purist myself but if I am a purist, then you are in for a big surprise at how other people can be purer in this thinking that me. These purer purists, if I may say so, are more anarchist than libertarian, with their hostility against the State bordering madness. I may sympathize with these anarchists however but I am convinced that the state of anarchy is unstable and in fact, detrimental to individual liberties. I am becoming more convinced of that position as I finally begin to read Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, further settling in the minarchist pool of libertarians.

Many, I have seen, tend to celebrate one conclusion of Ostrom’s work but tend to ignore the other consequence that comes from the footnote to the celebrated conclusion. Most unfortunate, that footnote does not eliminate the case for intervention. Such intervention or really, coercion, may not originate from the State but by groups of individuals nonetheless.

A group of individuals should really be no different from the State if there is coercion. Coercion is really the key here and it is not whether it is the State or not. This is what most libertarians, when discussing this, have overlooked. To miss it is to miss the entire point of libertarianism.

When it comes to commons, I have long accepted the need for government, or any kind of intervention for that matter, for fear of tragedy of the commons occurring. I first accepted it when I first learned of it as an undergraduate in economics. Concern for tragedy of the commons, is perhaps, the only remnant of environmentalist thinking that remains with me.

That is the reason why, if I want to differentiate myself from other libertarians, I identify myself as a green libertarian. The green symbolizes my concern for market failures, which is what tragedy of the commons really is.

Market failures here are not as left-wingers tend to define it, which is more of rhetoric wrongfully attacking free market principles through mischaracterization and misleading definition but rather it refers to the economic definition, which is when there is a large difference between public and private costs, or more concisely, when there is externality. Examples include emissions of carbon or harvest of the ocean. It is for this reason too that I am largely supportive of Pigovian taxes: I definitely would like, for instance, to see fuel subsidy in Malaysia be replaced with carbon tax.

While I am admonishing libertarians here, I too made a mistake of celebrating Ostrom’s work prematurely, thinking that it solved my problem. I am well aware how hard it is to reconcile my concern for market failure with free market libertarianism that I hold. So, I was happy to see Ostrom seemingly offering a solution to me by stating users of commons do spontaneously organize themselves to prevent tragedy of the commons. Alas, upon further reading, I realized that I initially failed to comprehend the full conclusions by overlooking the footnote. And I do think libertarians who are celebrating Ostrom are misreading her conclusions by not reading the footnote too.

Traditional solutions to tragedy of the commons do not fall within the compound of pure free market libertarianism that completely intolerant of government intervention save for the classical liberal purpose of the state and that is the protection of individual negative rights. Such solutions typically involve the allocation or assignment of rights to users of resources of commons. In other words, to price such rights to internalize externality and then auction to it to achieve allocation efficiency.

In commons with multiple claims on it, some entity — government or some local body — has to be the final arbitrator for allocation of rights purpose and that will require coercion. These rights may be in form of permits that expire regularly or outright privatization (privatization is attractive but it does present complications; for instance, how do you privatize the atmosphere with respect to climate change? Clearly, enforcement of such rights is impossible, at least with current technology). Ostrom simply discovers that local groups may be better managers of the commons than government. She does not specifically say that it is will be done voluntary.

Yes, these local bodies can be voluntarily formed by users of commons. Self-organization out of spontaneous order which of voluntary in nature can be achieved but as stated in a write-up by the Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences[1] and Ostrom’s article in Science Magazine[2], size of users and engagement time length matter, among others, affect the success of having such spontaneous order. There are multiple other factors but I am in the opinion that these two are the most important. The bigger the size, the harder it is to agree on voluntarily act to prevent exhausting the commons and make everybody worse off. The shorter the period of engagement, the harder it is to reach to an agreement.

The issue on number of users is really a matter of cost. As in the case of climate change, which is really the biggest common of all, bringing 6 billion individuals together is clearly unfeasible. Consider also the fact that even with hundreds of representatives sitting together in one hall, an agreement is hard to achieve. The planned climate summit in Copenhagen organized to find a replacement for the failing and expiring Kyoto Protocol is widely expected to fail.

On top of this, monitoring activities are costly. Monitoring is important because there is a strong incentive to — out my lack of creativity in selecting a word — cheat in the case of tragedy of the commons. Monitoring and enforcement are important in discouraging cheating.

On time length, it is a matter of repeated game. To make it more explicit, it is a repeated prisoner’s dilemma where cooperation is clearly a better option for both to failure to cooperate but there exists strong incentive to not to cooperate. Repetition of that game with the ability to communicate could bring about cooperation but again, that is highly dependent on the size of participants. Ultimately, achieving cooperation may take too long a time before the system collapses.

Further strengthening the argument, status quo effect is strong. Look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such conflict can be modeled as hawk and dove model, which is essentially another form of prisoner’s dilemma. They could cooperate and skip the deadly conflict, but they do not. In a game like this, it is crucial for trust to be built at the very beginning.

Trust simply takes a long time to rebuild once broken, if it is to be rebuilt at all, if the first step proved to be disastrous. This, known as tit-for-tat game, is one of the basic important lessons of game theory, in my humble opinion.

Given that, solving the problems of the commons through voluntary means, are likely hard if not impossible. Thus, intervention is still required to introduce market instruments like quotas, permits or taxation. Intervention may originate from the government, or some local groups but it is an intervention nonetheless, with not too implicit coercion demanding certain positive action, positive as defined by Isaiah Berlin when he differentiated between positive and negative rights.

If Ostrom is to be celebrated, then it is decentralization from government to local groups. That however should be mistaken as solving the problem of tragedy of the commons by voluntary means. Someone or something has to assign rights to users to commons. That means, the element of coercion, unfortunately, is still present.

That certainly does not solve my problem of reconciling concern for tragedy of the commons and free market libertarianism.

To summarize: it is a common and somebody or someone has to take control and assign rights to solve the problem of externality, i.e. tragedy of the commons. It does not have to be the government and local groups may be better manager but something or someone has to act as the assigner. And the footnote to Ostrom’s works indicate that it is hard to do so voluntary, save for, I think, localized commons. In the end, the element of coercion exists.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — See Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009: Economic Governance. Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. October 2009

[2] — See A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Elinor Ostrom. Science Magazine. July 24 2009.

Categories
Humor

[2096] Of and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize is…

Obama and committee members of the Nobel Peace Prize can go and take a hike.

I am so appalled by this, that I am filing this under Humor.

Categories
Economics

[1806] Of holy macaroni! Krugman wins the Prize in Economics!

Totally unexpected!

Oct. 13 (Bloomberg) — Princeton University professor and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman won the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on trade theory. [Princeton’s Paul Krugman Wins Nobel Economics Prize (Update3). Simon Kennedy. Benedikt Kammel Bloomberg. October 13 2008]

And what did the good professor say in his blog?

A funny thing happened to me this morning… [An interesting morning. The Conscience of a Liberal. October 13 2008]

Categories
Economics

[1414] Of Prize in Economics for what design?

Adam Smith’s classical metaphor of the invisible hand refers to how the market, under ideal conditions, ensures an efficient allocation of scarce resources. But in practice conditions are usually not ideal; for example, competition is not completely free, consumers are not perfectly informed and privately desirable production and consumption may generate social costs and benefits. Furthermore, many transactions do not take place in open markets but within firms, in bargaining between individuals or interest groups and under a host of other institutional arrangements. How well do different such institutions, or allocation mechanisms, perform? What is the optimal mechanism to reach a certain goal, such as social welfare or private profit? Is government regulation called for, and if so, how is it best designed?

These questions are difficult, particularly since information about individual preferences and available production technologies is usually dispersed among many actors who may use their private information to further their own interests. Mechanism design theory, initiated by Leonid Hurwicz and further developed by Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, has greatly enhanced our understanding of the properties of optimal allocation mechanisms in such situations, accounting for individuals’ incentives and private information. The theory allows us to distinguish situations in which markets work well from those in which they do not. It has helped economists identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes and voting procedures. Today, mechanism design theory plays a central role in many areas of economics and parts of political science. [The Prize in Economics 2007. Nobel Prize. October 15 2007]

Honestly, when I heard of it on Sunday, I thought they were awarding an economic prize to intelligent design: I said WTF?

And honestly again, though the concepts might sound familiar, I had never heard of the field before.