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Economics

[2143] Of stimulus may bite back in 2010

Economics has been labeled as some sort of a discipline that predicts the future. The application of various models and efforts at testing its various hypotheses that sometimes result in the affirmative may have contributed to that reputation but it is not about predicting the future. Rather, it is about finding lessons from the past, learning from it and applying it for future endeavors. More humbly perhaps, it serves as a cautionary tale.

In this spirit, what one may expect in 2010 in terms of the national economy?

Many things obviously, and it is beyond me to list it in an exhaustive manner. Given my mischievous agenda against the state in general, I will focus on only a few. That, and based on standard economic theory, two parts of the economy may deserve some attention in light of what happened last year. Two components of Malaysia’s gross domestic product are investment — specifically private sector investment — and net exports or really, exports.

Why?

Economic theory suggests that increased government spending adversely affects net exports and ambiguously affects overall investment after some time. For those who keep tabs on the local economy, the fact that the government launched two massive measures to stimulate the economy should be common knowledge. In promoting it, the government touted it as unprecedented. It is exactly because the size is unprecedented that the concern is legitimate, possibly in a way that is unprecedented too.

The same theory highlights that government spending places upward pressure on interest rate and the exchange rate.

With additional government spending on top of normal spending, it is reasonable to hold the position that the current interest rate is higher than would under a situation without such spending. Higher interest rate means higher cost of borrowing and that itself is a disincentive to invest, especially for the private sector, even if the effect on overall investment is ambiguous. The fact that the government financed its additional spending by borrowing locally further strengthens the phenomenon of crowding out the private sector. With the government expounding on the idea of having the private sector as the driver of Malaysia’s economy, the divergence between the government’s past actions as well as its theoretical consequences and the government’s words creates a noticeable dissonance — but the sun always rises in the east and so, what is new, eh?

The same effect on interest rate is applicable to the exchange rate. In doing so, it makes Malaysian exports more expensive compared to a situation without the stimulus and foreign goods cheaper. It depresses exports, given all else the same. The likelihood of depressed exports is even more worrying given the economy of Malaysia’s trading partners.

For instance, in the United States, which is a major destination for Malaysian exports and really, the world, there is fear that once its stimulus spending runs out some time in the second half of 2010, its recovering economy would go to the other direction, possibly reflecting the artificial nature of economic recovery based on government spending. Should the US economy take a nosedive again, Malaysia’s exports will take a hit, as it had earlier. It would be a double whammy for the exports component.

The importance of the exports component to the Malaysian economy cannot be overemphasized. Despite rhetoric heard these days of the need to move away from the export-driven model, there is no realistic way to make contribution of domestic demand to Malaysian economy a close rival to foreign demand for domestic goods without devastating the local economy. The chasm between the two is just too great to close. This is not to say that improvement of domestic demand is unwanted but Malaysian consumers are simply unable to consume as much as the export markets, even if Malaysia would suddenly become a high-income country tomorrow. Anybody who harbors a dream to remove the centrality of exports and trade at large to the Malaysian economy vis-à-vis domestic demand must be fast asleep.

If the US economy contracts again this year, the political pressure on the Najib administration for yet another fiscal stimulus would be great as Malaysia’s own ongoing fiscal stimulus measures expire. Already there are calls for a third stimulus in Malaysia. Needless to say, further government spending will exacerbate issues associated with the investment and exports components.

This may further discourage investment by the private sector and there may be an urge for the government to take a more active role in the economy.

Granted, at the moment, there is an effort to liberalize the economy. Yet, the reduction and the expansion of government happen in different parts of the economy, bringing about unclear net government intervention in the market as a whole. Economic theory suggests that the government of the economy portion will expand. Further involvement through stimulus spending will tilt the arrow towards the appropriate side.

Critics of this line of reasoning tend to point out that there is excess capacity during an economic downturn and hence, the negative impact of increased government spending is only a theoretical worry to be shrugged off. They forget that, as with most economic policies, there is a lag between implementation and effect. In the very short term, the impact of crowding out caused by government spending is non-existence. Notwithstanding other arguments against fiscal stimulus such as the relative ineffectiveness of fiscal stimulus for a small open economy such as Malaysia, they can hold on to their criticism in the heat of the crisis. In 2010 and farther into the near future however, the lag will catch up to make the issue less theoretical and more real as each day passes.

How the Najib administration will address that lagged impact will be an interesting economic problem. If the global economy — really the US economy — continues to improve, it will give a boost to Malaysia’s exports component. In doing so, it may solve the problem associated with the lagged adverse impact of the economic stimulus measures. Out of prudence, however, that is a bet deserving of hedging.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on January 1 2010.

Categories
Economics

[1176] Of appreciating ringgit to slow down export too

In November 2006, I mentioned how the Mundell-Fleming model works by applying it to the then-current economic situation in Malaysia. Among many points that were mentioned in that post is the connection between government spending and net export. The rationale is, greater government spending drives up the interest rate and encourage capital inflow, which later, appreciates the Malaysia ringgit. The appreciation hurts export as local good become relatively more expensive compared to foreign goods.

For the past two or so weeks, the issues of too much net capital inflow to Malaysia as well as increasingly large foreign reserve are popping up and has fueled rumor on further liberalization of the Malaysian ringgit. Though the current appreciation is definitely not exclusively caused by government spending, I have no doubt that the thumb prints of government spending through the Ninth Malaysia Plan is somewhere the Malaysia economy.

Further, about a month ago, the executive director of Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), Mohamed Ariff criticized the idea of having too big foreign exchange reserve:

THE size of foreign exchange reserves held by central banks the world over is often viewed by analysts, investors and policy-makers as a key indicator of macroeconomic strength. This notion is pitifully assailable, not only because inter-country comparisons are fraught with pitfalls, but also because the bigger-the-better argument does not hold water.

[…]

A robust domestic economy would also shift the focus from preoccupation with exports, current account surpluses and large reserves to internal dynamics that would drive imports closer to exports and the balance of payments closer to equilibrium with current account balance and stable external reserves. [When larger reserves may not really be good. NST. February 9 2007]

It would be interesting to observe the Malaysian export trend in the next few months if the ringgit appreciates further. I however am convinced that export will slow down, induced, in part, by both stronger currency and weaker demand in the US.

Another thing is, at the Wall Street Journal Asia:

A mild slowdown in the U.S. could actually further the government’s efforts to rein in growth. It might also encourage Chinese companies to focus more on serving domestic consumers than overseas ones—another shift China’s leaders are trying to promote. [China’s export engine survive a U.S. slump. WSJ Asia. April 10 2007]

In other words, China might actually look forward for a slowdown in the United States to cool down its economy. But admittedly, the article suggests that a minor slowdown in the US would not hurt China too much. That however does not change my mind that China could not be Malaysia’s savior if an US slowdown occurs, for reasons stated here.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

p/s — on Saturday morning, I came across this:

PETALING JAYA: The year-on-year slide in Malaysian exports for the month of February cannot be attributed to the strengthening trend of the ringgit, said Second Finance Minister Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop.

Nor Mohamed was reiterating economists’ view at the beginning of the month that the weakening in exports was due partly to shorter working days and a decrease in overseas purchase of items such as electrical and electronic products, transport equipment as well as petroleum products. [Minister: Drop in February exports not due to strengthening ringgit. The Star. April 13 2007]

Fair enough.