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Books & printed materials

[2998] Reading Dina Zaman’s Malayland

When communal conflicts hit the Malaysian headlines like how it did during the recent temple controversy near downtown Kuala Lumpur, identities would experience a kind of centripetal force. In this case, the Malay identity gets solidify in the popular imagination as hardliners—politicians and ordinary people alike—rally up the crowd to join in the fight. This is true with the other communities too. When egging for a fight, it is easier to rally up a generalized identity: Malays versus Indians or Muslims versus Hindus. To appeal to emotions, simplify. The controversy has been dialed down, but the ill-feeling still lingers.

How do we fight off that centripetal pull all with the hope of undoing all those riled up emotions?

Within that context, one is tempted to take the idea of centripetal forces on identities and invert it. Instead of generalizing, maybe it is useful to de-generalize and make identity a complicated idea, which it is.

If that is so, then reading of Dina Zaman’s Malayland will prove useful. In it, the author lays out the various Malaynesses that exist in contemporary Malaysia and briefly show interest of these subgroups is not always aligned and in fact almost always diverges. The Malays are not a monolithic community, a fact that is sometimes easy to forget.

The book is not an encyclopedia of Malay subgroups and the author explores what she seems to consider the most influential ones only. She provides actual individuals behind the labels. In that way, the book feels less theoretical and more real.

One criticism that keeps popping at the back of my mind while reading Malayland is its length. There are multiple instances where the author approaches the interesting (such as events that shaped the subgroups) but almost every time that happens, the elaboration does not happen. The path ends abruptly. It is a tease and the readers are left to their own devices to satisfy their curiosity.

But there are different ways to read. Different books require different approach. To approach one in a way it is not meant to be read will left any reader dissatisfied. I think here is where the foreword by Tunku Zain Al-‘Abidin Tuanku Muhkriz is useful in framing the right approach:

The subjects in Malayland show case an even broader set of identities than its predecessor of seventeen years before—Dina’s 2007 book I am Muslim. [Page IX. Malayland. Dina Zaman.]

The purpose of Malayland, if I as a reader could be so daring, is to show the existing diversity within the Malay community. It is neither an encyclopedia nor an academic work, which several critics of Malayland, I feel, implicitly rest their (and mine too) criticism upon. The book is window for those who do not already know of identity diversity and there are many who still do not know while living in a cocoon where their outside world is a caricature of prejudice. For them, Malayland is a hook to change a worldview.

Categories
Economics Society

[2807] Break-up the Bumiputra category into finer details

Race politics dominates Malaysia and our deplorable politics have us Malaysians as Bumiputras, Chinese, Indians and others.

At the center of it all is Malay politics. Yet, public statistics on Malay welfare are imprecise. This is true for household income and expenditure surveys conducted and published by the Department of Statistics. The surveys are the most comprehensive snapshots we have on the welfare of Malaysian households.

It is imprecise because the best we have to describe Malay welfare are not Malay statistics, but Bumiputra statistics.

The way the statistics is presented (or even measured) strengthens the flawed notion that the Bumiputras are Malays. Yet, we know the Bumiputras comprise not just the Malays but also the Orang Aslis in the Peninsula, and the Borneo natives.

Foreigners in particular are guilty of this but more unforgivably, so do the locals. When ethno-nationalist Malays want to back their point with hard data for instance, they would go to the household surveys and cite the Bumiputra figures as proofs, casually suggesting all Bumiputras are Malays with no hesitation as if there is nothing wrong with the statistics.

Our contemporary politics also means the recognition is not merely a pedantic concern. Sarawak parties especially are becoming increasingly important nationally, possibly convincing the federal government to spend more money there.

How can this be relevant? For example, I would like to know change in welfare of those Borneo native households as federal spending increases. It is not enough to claim they would do better because of the spending. We need data and it is certainly not enough with the Bumiputra net cast so widely.

So, as far as the category Bumiputra is concerned, I think it should be broken into its finer components to allow us to see exactly the state of various groups’ welfare.

After all, is it not ironic that for all the centrality of Malay politics, statistics on Malay welfare is not available on its own? We can know the income of the median Chinese and Indian households but we cannot know the median for Malay families. To belabor the point, what we know instead are Bumiputra statistics, which are at best a proxy to the state of the Malays. And we know it is a proxy because we know the Malays make-up the majority within the group. How big a majority? Interesting question, is it not?

And we also know how mean and median behave mathematically. Change in population will change both easily.

I have a lingering suspicion that the Malays are doing better than the reported Bumiputra average/median. My suspicion is based on the fact most Malays live in the Peninsula while the statistics show the Peninsula as a geographic group does better than the Malaysian Borneo (even when certain states such as Kelantan can do worse than Sarawak). The only way to conclusively address the suspicion is to look at the Bumiputra components cleverer than what we have been doing so far.

At the very least, regardless of my suspicion, improvement in reported welfare statistics with the Bumiputra category split into its constitutions can lead to better public debates and better policies. Without the split, we are forever condemned to debate from imprecise premises.

Categories
Politics & government

[2482] A big coup for DAP?

Mohd Ariff Sabri Abdul Aziz and Aspan Alias are joining the DAP. This is big because it is yet another big step in widening the party’s appeal to the larger Malaysian demographics.

Let us face it. The DAP is mainly seen as a Chinese party. The characterization may be unfair to some extent because there is significant number of Indians in the party and there are definitely Malays in it. But the party derives its support mainly from Chinese areas and I do not think that can be dismissed easily. Even if it was untrue, the typical Malays who can be counted on to vote for UMNO and Barisan Nasional see the DAP a Chinese party. As the cliché goes, in politics, perception matters.

This is a problem because if the DAP needs to survive in the long term, it cannot merely depend on Chinese voters and other non-Malays/non-Bumiputras. The Chinese demographics is not inspiring from the perspective of electoral politics. It is shrinking due to both the relative prosperity of the community vis-à-vis the general population (number of child per couple/per person drops as prosperity increases; happens almost everywhere) and emigration. To secure its future, the DAP needs to be more Malaysian and that means more diversified support base. That also means non-urban voters.

There are efforts to do that. In the several months after I returned to Malaysia, I managed to observe the DAP machinery during the Sarawak election, thanks to Tony Pua. As I have written previously, despite the seats in Kuching having a heavy Chinese characteristic, the banners were written in multiple languages for the first time. Those multilingual messages at times can be dizzying and but is the cost of inclusiveness. And of course, this has been the norms in the Peninsula.

And of course, there are Zairil Khir Johari and Tunku Abdul Aziz Tunku Ibrahim. While their presence and effort are valuable to the DAP, there are just not enough Malays to translate those presence and effort into heavy political influence. Furthermore for Tunku Aziz, I do not think the increasingly competitively vicious political atmosphere will do good for the gentleman that is him. I am taking risk in saying this because I know both of them personally and I do appreciate their opinion of me but both of them are urban Malays whom a majority of Malays are unable to relate immediately.

Ariff Sabri Aziz and Aspan Alias are the different kind of Malays. Both are, or were, UMNO members and relatively influential at that. Their participation in the DAP immediately eats into UMNO’s base by virtue of their value as insiders. Secondly, they do communicate in Malay and that is a big plus point. They are widely read and that makes their entry into DAP all the more important. I do not know much about Aspan Alias but Ariff Sabri Aziz’s former connection to no less than UMNO President Najib Razak says a lot about how big a coup this is.

Yet another point to share. Zairil and Tunku Aziz have been accused as DAP or Chinese stooges, being token Malays and all that. With the presence of more influential Malays who are unlikely satisfied to become merely passive members, together with those already in the party, one has to wonder, is that accusation valid in the first place? One has to ask, why exactly are the Malays joining the DAP?

Categories
Liberty Politics & government

[2049] Of Malay as a community is not pro-ISA or anti-ISA

Pewaris, widely reported as the foremost pro-Internal Security Act  group as the Act comes under heavy opposition on August 1, the date when massive protest is expected to take place in Kuala Lumpur. The ISA is a controversial piece of legislation that allows detention with trial.

Expressing support for the Act, even when the Act is abhorrent to the concept of individual liberty, is a person’s right to do so. Whether it is oxymoron or not, one has to be mindful that the transgression of liberty happens when there is actual trangression. Expression alone does not transgression.

But the Act is in force and indeed, the Act transgresses liberty. That justifies opposition to the Act.

Here, however is not the place and time where I want to discuss the subject of liberty in foundational terms. Rather, I would very much like to touch how the positioning of Pewaris and other pro-ISA group, as taken by them or described by the mainstream media is ultimately misleading.

It is with alarm that I note that it is typical for the press to describe these pro-ISA groups as Malay groups.[1] Being pro-ISA and idenfitied as Malay groups, inevitably, it implies, on purpose or accidentally, that the position of the Malays are pro-ISA. It further implies that these groups represent the Malays as a whole.

Clearly, this is absolutely false. While the pro-ISA groups may be dominated by, if not all of their members are, Malays, it no whatsoever way says that these groups represent the Malays as a whole. These groups are not even elected by all the Malays. A large majority of Malays are likely not members of the groups too.

For the press to identify these pro-ISA groups as Malay groups, it appeals to the flawed idea that the Malays as a community are a monolithic group. Opinion of individual Malays on the matter is clearly not uniform on the matters. The clearest proof is the presence of Malays in the anti-ISA groups. Another proof: I am a Malay and I am unfriendly to the ISA.

The press needs to stop calling these pro-ISA groups as Malay groups to stop the unnecessary confusion and the unnecessary implication that the Malays are for ISA.

More accurate description or qualification will be required if the press continue to insist on associating these groups with the Malays. ‘Pro-Barisan Nasional Malay groups’, ‘Pro-UMNO Malay groups’ are two phrases that comes to my mind as better alternatives to term ‘Malay groups’.

The Malays, as a community, does not have one mind about being for or against ISA. Individual Malays however may.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — One example:

GEORGE TOWN: Some 50 people from two Malay non-governmental organisations (NGOs) staged a peaceful protest in support of the Internal Security Act (ISA) at the ground floor foyer of Komtar here.

The Persatuan Putra Pulau Pinang and Pertubuhan Al-Ehsan Malaysia members held banners in support of the ISA at 10am and dispersed some 30 minutes later following police advice. [Two Malay NGOs want ISA to remain. The Star. July 29 2009]

Yet another example:

KUALA LUMPUR: Representatives from an umbrella body of Malay and Muslim non-governmental organisations lodged five police reports Sunday over several issues which they claimed endangered Muslim and Malay unity.

The Heritage Associations, Malay Cultural Organisations and Related Bodies Cooperation Network (Pewaris) urged the Government to act against groups which are asking for the abolition of the Internal Security Act (ISA). [Malay, Muslim NGOs lodge police reports. Zulkipli Abdul Rahman. The Star. November 23 2008]

Categories
Politics & government

[2017] Of PAS-UMNO unity must remain dead if PAS is to live

The proposal to form a so-called unity government between PAS and UMNO finally finds its rightful place — in a dustbin. Nothing guarantees any PAS member from rummaging through the trash to rejuvenate the idea however. If the dream still lingers, I am here to offer a dire possibility. If PAS-UMNO unity comes true, PAS may break up as internal and external forces pull the political party in different directions.

Why is it a possibility?

PAS-UMNO unity will significantly affect the status quo balance of power. It will grant BN a proper majority in Perak. Selangor will suffer from a hung assembly. Other notable changes include the weakening of the opposition in many states and the absence of one in Perlis.

In sum, PAS-UMNO unity will be a major setback for Pakatan Rakyat.

That scenario has one caveat: it assumes all PAS members will remain united if the party defects from Pakatan Rakyat to work with UMNO. Given the kind of rift caused by the PAS-UMNO unity talks, that is a big assumption.

It is not every day one can expect Nik Aziz Nik Mat as the leader of PAS to tell off one of his prominent party members — Nasharuddin Mat Isa — to quit the party and join UMNO after Nasharuddin spoke warmly of the possibility of PAS-UMNO unity.

Later, 10 PAS members of Parliament went out to support Nik Aziz and to oppose any pro-UMNO activity within PAS.

The action of the 10 MPs is particularly revealing. For the more liberal members of PAS, or the Erdogans as they have come to be known, they have every incentive to not associate themselves with a pro-UMNO PAS. Many of the Erdogans contested in areas where voters come from diverse backgrounds. These Erdogans understand that they won on March 8, 2009 because they appealed to inclusive politics. They campaigned by convincing voters that PAS is for all and not just for the Muslims or the Malays, i.e. exclusive politics.

To have PAS working in concert with UMNO — as Onn Yeoh writes in The Edge[0] — amounts to betrayal of these voters. The very notion of unity between PAS and UMNO is based on the idea of exclusive politics, running contrary to the kind of campaign the Erdogans ran in the last general election. By the next election if the Erdogans are still part of a pro-UMNO PAS, these voters will not vote for the Erdogans. Hence, the future holds very little prospect for the Erdogans.

These Erdogans can of course undergo a rebranding exercise to adjust to exclusive-based politics that a PAS-UMNO coalition is expected to play. Notwithstanding the very appropriate accusation of hypocrisy that may come, these Erdogans will face stiff competition from the real conservatives within PAS as all compete for smaller pool of seats any exclusivist politician can expect to win. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect UMNO to surrender their seats to PAS in order to accommodate the Erdogans-turned-conservatives.

If PAS-UMNO unity happens, the only way for the Erdogans to secure their future is for them to demonstrate their commitment to inclusive politics and, inevitably, Pakatan Rakyat. This may translate into having the Erdogans or more generally the pro-Pakatan Rakyat members of PAS to either eject pro-UMNO members out of PAS, leave PAS in favor of PKR or even form a new party that DAP and PKR can work together under the banner of Pakatan Rakyat. In any case, the result will leave PAS utterly broken.

Only through this can they hope to secure their political future. The existing seat distribution formula within Pakatan Rakyat can continue to be used to accommodate these Erdogans, as long as they remain loyal to the coalition even as PAS finds itself in cahoots with UMNO.

For DAP and PKR, the stake is simply too high that both parties cannot allow PAS to defect so easily. It will in the best interest of PKR and DAP to embolden the Erdogans to mount a revolt against any movement towards PAS-UMNO unity, possibly leading to a breakup as described earlier.

The breaking up of PAS will limit any gain made by UMNO. It may prevent Selangor — the jewel of the crown — from experiencing a hung assembly. If Pakatan Rakyat is lucky, the maneuver can even prevent BN from gaining the coveted two-third majority in Parliament.

For PKR especially, there is an extra motivation to break PAS apart in case PAS-UMNO unity becomes a reality. PKR may enjoy an influx of high-quality members from PAS, especially if the pro-Pakatan Rakyat members of PAS decide to leave the party and not form a new party. PKR may need high-caliber individuals to strengthen its ranks and the Erdogan MPs do just that, if ever the Erdogans have a reason to part from PAS.

But, at the end of the day, the most preferable solution for DAP and PKR is to have PAS as a committed member of Pakatan Rakyat. Both DAP and PKR will want work to keep PAS within the young three-party coalition to build on the existing momentum. As we have seen, this is exactly the path taken by DAP and PKR.

As long as the most preferred option works, there is no need to resort to the second most preferred option. This is something everybody who wishes to see a strong PAS must understand.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on June 24 2009.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[0] — The much-hyped, but now abandoned, unity-government concept, first touted by PAS President Datuk Seri Hadi Awang in March, and welcomed by all and sundry within Umno is a betrayal.

From Pakatan Rakyat’s perspective, it is a betrayal of voters’ trust. Malays who voted for PAS did so because they preferred it over Umno. Non-Malays who voted for PAS didn’t do so because they wanted PAS but because they rejected Umno. In either case, PAS teaming up with Umno is the last thing these Malay and non-Malay voters want. [Unity govt a betrayal all around. Oon Yeoh. The Edge. June 22 2009]