Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2844] Evolution of corporate ownership in Malaysia

Terence Gomez is embarking on a massive project investigating quantitatively the influence of government-linked companies in the Malaysian economy. The dominance of government in business and in the economy is no mystery. What is special here is that he is analyzing the numbers more comprehensively than many had done before. He is currently focusing his research at the federal level but if I remember correctly, he plans to delve into state level bodies, looking into bodies like Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor, which are much less known than those like Khazanah Nasional.

Together with Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Gomez in 1997 wrote the go-to book — Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits — exploring the ownership of corporate Malaysia in the 1990s and its links to politics, namely Umno. To understand political financing during the Mahathir era, this is the book to read.

The scale of Gomez’s latest project on ownership is larger than anything available before. There have been work done on corporate ownership in Malaysia after his 1997 book but they provided only partial view of the whole story while nibbling at the edge.

Gomez in his lecture, which I attended at the University of Malaya earlier this year (and later at an event organized by the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs; Ideas is funding of the project) made the connection between previous ownership literature and showed how the majority ownership changed from the 1950s to the 2010s, the present time.

He is continuing the work pioneered by James Puthucheary, who back in the 1950s went through official colonial and Malayan documents to understand who owned what in the economy. Through that, he corrected the idea that the Chinese had controlled the economy when in fact it were the Europeans. Gomez mentioned Lim Mui Hui’s work as the other important literature in the 1970s tracing capital ownership in the Malayan-Malaysian economy in the early days of the New Economic Policy period.

Gomez in his lecture showed just as Puthucheary demonstrated decades ago that the British and other European bodies controlled the majority of the top Malayan companies in the 1950s. This changed in the 1960s and the 1970s when Chinese tycoons rose up in the list. By the 1980s and the 1990s, due to the implementation of the New Economic Policy and Mahathir’s industrialization drive, the list was dominated by Malay industrialists. The ownership list was also more diverse than it ever was, with Genting, Berjaya and YTL were among the biggest then.

But in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, something fundamental happened. Most of top Malaysian companies were owned by the government and no longer belonged to private individuals or groups. There were bailed out or acquired by the government through the Government-Linked Investment Companies. Gomez listed the usual seven: the Employees Provident Fund, Kumpulan Wang Persaraan, Permodalan Nasional, Lembaga Tabung Haji, the Armed Forces Fund, Khanazah Nasional and the Ministry of Finance Incorporated. Many of the Malay industrialist companies like UEM were now owned by the government.

Not all of those seven government-linked investment companies are the same. The EPF, for instance, is not strictly a government company, in the same Khazanah is. But nevertheless, the EPF does have an extremely strong presence in the Malaysian economy, in both the equity and the debt markets.

In a different talk of a more casual style, historian Khoo Kay Kim claimed the Germans controlled the Malayan economy before the First World War. Their influence diminished after their lost the war and was replaced by the Japanese during the interwar period. I have not read a proper document to ascertain the claim but I have read from various sources that Japanese companies were active in Malaya prior to the Second World War.

Gomez’s work has implications beyond economics. Control over of these government-linked corporations and entities enables political control and enhances political power, just has the Umno’s ties to various the 1980s-1990s Malay industrialists had kept the party’s machinery going. But unlike then, when those funds were private money from private companies (public companies privatized), the government today does enforce spending or procurement requirement to benefit certain parties. While Gomez did not cover 1MDB, the 1MDB corruption scandal, provides the starkest example of public resources being used directly and illegally to finance Umno’s (and even its president’s personal) requirement. The connection is starker and more corrupt now than ever before.

The evolution of corporate ownership in Malaysia simply does not inspire confidence, and the completion of Gomez’s work will truly show how big the beast has become.

Categories
Economics

[2768] Just a debt redefinition and deplorable reporting

And so, in the media, it is reported that Malaysia’s external debt (some were more careless by giving the impression that it was total debt, just to make a sexy, alarmist headline for the clicks) increased by more than three folds. This is one of those deplorable reporting:

Malaysia’s external debts grew by more than three-fold in less than a year, from RM196 billion at the end of 2013 to a whopping RM740.7 billion in the third quarter of last year. In a written reply to William Leong (PKR – Selayang), Finance Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak attributed the spike to “new definitions” for external debts in 2014. Almost two-thirds of the increase was due to foreigners holding on to Malaysian bonds, now considered as part of the external debts. Leong warned that this is the scenario currently taking place with debt-laden 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) where a huge chunk of its RM42 billion debt is allegedly being held by foreigners. [Eileen Ng. The Malaysian Insider. Malaysia’s external debt tripled to RM740 billion last year]

From there on comes various accusations by a whole lot of laypersons, at a time the government is already under severe attacks for the fiasco that is 1Malaysia Development Berhad. I am not a fan of this government but in this particular case, the focus is misplaced and the criticism on external debt is based on a misunderstanding. The supposedly massive rise in the external debt is a non-issue, unless you are a wonk excited about the most technical of things. This is what it is, a technical matter.

The truth is that there is really no increase of that magnitude in Malaysia’s debt, totally, externally or internally. Malaysia has always owned all of those debts. What happened was that the term “external debt” was redefined to include all debts held by foreigners. Previously, the term was used to describe all Malaysian debts denominated in foreign currencies, regardless of ownership. The former is big, the latter is small. If you need a Venn diagram to understand them, here it is (the graph does not exactly correspond with the definitions but it is good enough to highlight the difference in definitions):

Malaysia's new external debt definition

This redefinition exercise had been recommended by the International Monetary Fund for the longest time and Malaysia only recently decided to adopt the proposed nomenclature. This in fact was announced last year, as early as March. When I first learned that last year, I made a joke that somebody would scream murder. Indeed, a year later, here we are. MP William Leong definitely fell into the layman’s trap, and a whole lot of others too.

There was only an increase if you used one definition at one point and then switched to another definition at the next point, and pretend the two definitions refer to the same thing. This is wrong. You need to compare points from the same definition for the growth figure to make sense. The supposedly dramatic jump-growth as reported in the media is just a garbage figure of no value. It was calculated by including a significant, large structural break.

While the media is utterly in the wrong and clueless even as they wrote the word “redefinition” in quotation marks as if it is a meaningless term, the Ministry of Finance is the cause of this misunderstanding. While it mentioned the redefinition exercise, the ministry compared the old definition with the new one and voila, a drastic increase just because they naively calculated the growth rate, despite, knowing a redefinition had occurred. So, it is a horrible answer, as horrible as the way the Finance Minister is handling the 1MDB issue. The media was just playing the role of a loudspeaker here, with no thinking in the middle.

I repeat. There is no increase as reported. If you keep the old definition and apply it forever, you will find any change from that will not come anything close to the sensationalist headlines featured by Malaysiakini and The Star all the way to, disappointingly, The Edge, which I consider as the most economic-financially literate Malaysian publication. I like The Edge but a mistake is a mistake. If you use the new definition and then stretch it backward, there will be no big change as well. Just keep the definition consistent if you want to calculate the growth.

Finally, there is really nothing sinister about the redefinition.

The reason for the redefinition has something to do with the evolution and the maturity of the Malaysian debt market. Twenty or thirty years ago, Malaysia did not have a big bond market and it was relatively unimportant to the economy, especially compared to today. So the old definition made sense then, in some ways. But since the 1990s, the Malaysian bond market has expanded rapidly to become one of Asia’s biggest. Foreign ownership of government debts also shot up as foreign investors searched for relatively safe assets. The debt market has become so large, that the newer definition becomes the more attractive one to use.

As in a lot of stuff out there, which definition to use really depends on your purpose. Just understand the data before using it.

So, ladies and gentlemen, please do not get too excited here. On this front, there is nothing to see really. Go, instead, to the next stage right across the road. Yes sir. A much more entertaining play called 1MDB is running there. Get your tickets. Sit back, and… be angry with 1MDB and not with the technicalities of debt redefinition.