Tag: default

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Economics Politics & government

[2672] If nobody could default, why would anybody go bankrupt?

Let us take for granted the assertion that a government cannot default on its debt obligation if all of its debts are denominated in the local currency. For the more macroeconomic inclined, if a country controls both its fiscal and monetary policies, it can never default on its debts.

Taking the axiomatic approach notwithstanding the concerns which I put up earlier this week, there is an important political implication on the political rhetoric employed with respect to discussion regarding government finance.

These days, it is all too common for one side of the political aisle to accuse that the other side’s proposed or current policy will bankrupt the country.

Supporters of Pakatan Rakyat will accuse the cash transfer program BR1M and the likes are irresponsible populist spending. Add those leakage and outright corruption and the country is well on its way to bankruptcy. Given the current size of government debt, they said, bankruptcy can be far off over the horizon.

Against Pakatan Rakyat’s accusation of bankruptcy, supporters of Barisan Nasional can certainly use the no-default assertion. The assertion immediately blunt attack on the size of debt the government maintains at the moment.

What becomes problematic is when the supporters of Barisan Nasional in turn say free education and higher fuel subsidy as proposed by Pakatan Rakyat are unrealistic spending and that it will bankrupt the country in no time.

If you believe in the no-default axiom, then how can Pakatan Rakyat or in fact anybody bankrupt the countries with irresponsible or corrupt policy?

Now, I am not defending the policy of Pakatan Rakyat as proposed in its manifesto. I disagree with a good number of its economic promises. But there has to be consistency in the rhetoric used.

I can understand that it is hard to keep consistent rhetoric throughout since nobody truly works inside a hive colony with the queen controlling everyone’s mind. Each person can be independent to the whole political organization and its official mouthpiece. Each person can try to defend his or her side of the divide on their own. With insufficient coordination, contradictory rhetoric can happen. It does happen.

However, that does not make the no-default and bankruptcy arguments any more consistent with each other.

Categories
Economics

[2670] Be careful with the no-default narrative

There is a narrative going around in Malaysia that a government which has a majority of its debts denominated in a local currency can never default on its borrowings. For the purpose of clarity, it is the case where a national government has control over both its fiscal and monetary policy.

I have trouble with that narrative. In case of locally-denominated government bonds, it does certainly make default less likely than the case of foreign-denominated borrowings. But, that is of no guarantee of no-default.

A government for instance can certainly refuse to service its debts even if it is more than capable of fulfilling its obligation. Outright refusal happens very rarely and this is world, it is probably an absolutely disastrously crazy thing to do but I only highlight it to show that a government can default at any time and in this case, voluntarily. The debate about the debt ceiling the United States is an example of voluntary default; without further borrowings, the United States may have to default on its loans payment although it definitely can close down some of its government services before having to resort to defaulting.

Notwithstanding voluntary default, in the case of locally denominated government bonds as a sufficient condition for the outcome of no-default is dependent on the ability of the government to raise more debts to service its preexisting financial obligation when there is revenue shortfall. It depends on several matters. That includes the willingness of the central bank to monetize government debts, its willingness to commit seigniorage or the willingness of the private sector or anybody else which includes foreigners to purchase the government debts.

The most relevant factors to consider are the willingness of the central bank to monetize government debt or to commit seigniorage (money printing).

A fiercely independent central bank can easily refuse to do both, especially when the central bank has a commitment to price stability. In normal times, debt monetization and seigniorage do contribute to inflation in a big way. Without the central bank and without the power of a monetary authority, the government will default.

So, the truth is that a government cannot default of its locally-denominated debts if the central bank cooperates with the government. And if the central bank does decide to cooperate, there is cost to that cooperation.

In talking about that no-default guarantee especially within Malaysian context which both sides of the political divide do misrepresent and wrongly contextualize economic issues in supporting convenient political positions, the cost of the no-default scenario is not discussed.

Categories
Economics

[2515] Watch out for those CDS

For those who have been following the Greek crisis, they know that March 8 is the deadline for the bond swap that is essential in ensuring an orderly default of Greek bonds. Just 12 days later, Greece is due for repayment that without any haircut to its bondholders, there would be a chaotic default.

The bond swap plan is essential in keeping Greek public finance under control, however arbitrary the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio is. According to the Debt Sustainability Analysis paper dated February 15 leaked during the Greek debt negotiation, a 5% reduction in bond swap participation will increase the debt-to-GDP ratio by 2%. And the baseline assumes 95% take-up rate to reach 129% debt-to-GDP ratio. The magic number is 120% and in order to achieve that ratio, the take-up rate has to be high.

Here is the problem. Some bondholders may have bought credit default swaps in anticipation of a technical default some time back. It is in their best interest to not participate in the Greek bond swaps and trigger the CDS. Participation in the swap will not trigger the CDS.

The deal with the CDS is tricky. I myself am a bit unclear if holding  the precarious Greek bonds until maturity and default will actually trigger the CDS. A broker told me just now that there are so many CDS with varying conditions that it is impossible to know just which CDS will trigger. Ultimately, what is unclear is which is better: the haircut bonds or the payout from the CDS?

I am betting some will in event of plain old default and that will be the reason for some to reject of the bond swap deal. Big enough a rejection and we will find ourselves in a financial whirlwind all over again.

Categories
Economics

[2476] Postponing the European crisis to 2013

I am in the opinion that the expected sovereign debt and banking crises in Europe have been postponed to the end of 2012 or early 2013. There are two reasons why I think so.

The crisis in Europe is essentially two-fold. One is due to government debts. Two is the risk of default by European banks. The two sides are interrelated but it is useful to separate them.

The sovereign debt crisis has been postponed thanks to the establishment and the expansion of the European Financial Stability fund. The EFSF would not be exhausted until the end of 2012 even if all debts repayment or refinancing by the infamous PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) is financed through facility. The potential rating downgrade of sovereign debts of stronger economies, namely Germany and France, may hurt the likelihood of success of on the EFSF front but I will wait until that actually happens.

I am taking this position because by December 2012, total principal and interest payments made by the PIIGS government is projected to be EUR700 billion. That is below the total size of the EFSF.

The following graph shows principal and interest payment obligation of all the PIIGS government cumulatively. Looking at it, without the more permanent European Stability Mechanism which is supposed to kick start in the middle of next year, trouble will come only around February or March 2013.

The banking crisis meanwhile has been postponed until next year thanks to the soft loan facility provided by the European Central Bank. It has been reportedthat banks in Europe will require EUR700 billion next year to pay up their debts. Since the facility offered by the ECB is at the moment limitless (there will be a limit because already the total loans made by the ECB attract considerable question), the problem on this front too has been postponed to 2013.

This of course says nothing of recession and economic recession is another issue altogether.

Categories
Economics

[2455] Rising expectation of defaults

More on CDS and the European crisis.

U.S. banks increased sales of insurance against credit losses to holders of Greek, Portuguese, Irish, Spanish and Italian debt in the first half of 2011, boosting the risk of payouts in the event of defaults.

Guarantees provided by U.S. lenders on government, bank and corporate debt in those countries rose by $80.7 billion to $518 billion, according to the Bank for International Settlements. Almost all of those are credit-default swaps, said two people familiar with the numbers, accounting for two-thirds of the total related to the five nations, BIS data show. [Yalman Onaran. Selling More CDS on Europe Debt Raises Risk for U.S. Banks. Bloomberg. November 1 2011]

This should be read in the context of the 50% Greek haircut, although that haircut itself is in question after the Greek government decided to have a referendum on the bailout and its conditions instead of executing it outright. Because of the referendum, CDS holders, especially speculative holders, may yet win their bet.

But even if they win, this might be a repeat of AIG. A Pyrrhic victory, one might say.