Categories
Economics

[1846] Of forward indices, forward!

Is the Malaysian economy in trouble? Or rather, was it in trouble in September?

Judging by the latest lagging, coincident and leading indicators, the answer to the question is not really in the positive.

The Coincident Index (CI), a measure of current economic activity, decreased by 0.1% in September 2008 registering at 123.6 points. Negative change was recorded by Index of Industrial Production (-0.3%), real salaries & wages (-0.2%) and real sales in manufacturing sector (-0.1). The six-month smoothed growth rate of CI remain positive at 0.2% in the current month.

The Leading Index (LI) moved up 0.8% to reach 158.8 points in September 2008 as compared to 157.5 points in the previous month. Two out of the eight existing components posted an increase, namely, real money supply, M1 (0.8%) and number of housing permits approved (0.8%). The six-month smoothed growth rate of LI recorded an increase of 1.2% in the current month.

The recent trend of the LI six-month smoothed growth rate indicates that the Malaysian economy is expected to sustain its slow growth in the month ahead. [Malaysia Economic Indicators – Leading, Coincident And Lagging Indices September 2008. Department of Statistics Malaysia. Assessed December 7 2008]

It was slowing down but not as bad as feared. The Lagging Index for September especially was higher when seasonally adjusted to the year before.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

p/s — The Bank Negara totally needs an RSS feed.

Categories
Economics

[1843] Of Michael Lewis on the subprime mortgage

Michael Lewis of the Liar’s Poker‘s fame writes:

The funny thing, looking back on it, is how long it took for even someone who predicted the disaster to grasp its root causes. They were learning about this on the fly, shorting the bonds and then trying to figure out what they had done. Eisman knew subprime lenders could be scumbags. What he underestimated was the total unabashed complicity of the upper class of American capitalism. For instance, he knew that the big Wall Street investment banks took huge piles of loans that in and of themselves might be rated BBB, threw them into a trust, carved the trust into tranches, and wound up with 60 percent of the new total being rated AAA.

But he couldn’t figure out exactly how the rating agencies justified turning BBB loans into AAA-rated bonds. ”I didn’t understand how they were turning all this garbage into gold,” he says. He brought some of the bond people from Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and UBS over for a visit. ”We always asked the same question,” says Eisman. ”Where are the rating agencies in all of this? And I’d always get the same reaction. It was a smirk.” He called Standard & Poor’s and asked what would happen to default rates if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn’t say; its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number. ”They were just assuming home prices would keep going up,” Eisman says. [The End of Wall Street’s Boom. Michael Lewis. Portfolio.com. December 2008]

This particular article has created a buzz within the econblogosphere. Go and read it.

He also takes a shot at lawyers:

A full nine months earlier, Daniel and ­Moses had flown to Orlando for an industry conference. It had a grand title—the American Securitization Forum—but it was essentially a trade show for the ­subprime-mortgage business: the people who originated subprime mortgages, the Wall Street firms that packaged and sold subprime mortgages, the fund managers who invested in nothing but subprime-mortgage-backed bonds, the agencies that rated subprime-­mortgage bonds, the lawyers who did whatever the lawyers did. Daniel and Moses thought they were paying a courtesy call on a cottage industry, but the cottage had become a castle. ”There were like 6,000 people there,” Daniel says. ”There were so many people being fed by this industry. The entire fixed-income department of each brokerage firm is built on this. Everyone there was the long side of the trade. The wrong side of the trade. And then there was us. That’s when the picture really started to become clearer, and we started to get more cynical, if that was possible. We went back home and said to Steve, ”˜You gotta see this.’”‰” [The End of Wall Street’s Boom. Michael Lewis. Portfolio.com. December 2008]

Oh, oh. It gets better:

Whatever rising anger Eisman felt was offset by the man’s genial disposition. Not only did he not mind that Eisman took a dim view of his C.D.O.’s; he saw it as a basis for friendship. ”Then he said something that blew my mind,” Eisman tells me. ”He says, ”˜I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don’t have anything to buy.’”‰”

That’s when Eisman finally got it. Here he’d been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There weren’t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors’ appetite for the end product. The firms used Eisman’s bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then, was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football: When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesn’t create a second Peyton Manning to inflate the league’s stats. But when Eisman bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create another bond identical in every respect but one to the original. The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower. The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. ”They weren’t satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldn’t afford,” Eisman says. ”They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That’s why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But that’s when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?”

This particular dinner was hosted by Deutsche Bank, whose head trader, Greg Lippman, was the fellow who had introduced Eisman to the subprime bond market. Eisman went and found Lippman, pointed back to his own dinner companion, and said, ”I want to short him.” Lippman thought he was joking; he wasn’t. ”Greg, I want to short his paper,” Eisman repeated. ”Sight unseen.” [The End of Wall Street’s Boom. Michael Lewis. Portfolio.com. December 2008]

Haha! Too funny!

At the market opening in the U.S., everything—every financial asset—went into free fall. ”All hell was breaking loose in a way I had never seen in my career,” Moses says. FrontPoint was net short the market, so this total collapse should have given Moses pleasure. He might have been forgiven if he stood up and cheered. After all, he’d been betting for two years that this sort of thing could happen, and now it was, more dramatically than he had ever imagined. Instead, he felt this terrifying shudder run through him. He had maybe 100 trades on, and he worked hard to keep a handle on them all. ”I spent my morning trying to control all this energy and all this information,” he says, ”and I lost control. I looked at the screens. I was staring into the abyss. The end. I felt this shooting pain in my head. I don’t get headaches. At first, I thought I was having an aneurysm.” [The End of Wall Street’s Boom. Michael Lewis. Portfolio.com. December 2008]

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[1841] Of Mankiw sounds angry

In response to Krugman calling those which advised the Bush administration as hacks and those appointed to fill up the vacancies in the Obama administration as grown-ups…

Seriously, isn’t it amazing just how impressive the people being named to key positions in the Obama administration seem? Bye-bye hacks and cronies, hello people who actually know what they’re doing. For a bunch of people who were written off as a permanent minority four years ago, the Democrats look remarkably like the natural governing party these days, with a deep bench of talent. [The grownups are coming. The Conscience of a Liberal. November 22 2008]

…Mankiw replies with a hint of rising temperature:

Like Paul, I am impressed by the new economic team. I know best the three economists coming from academia–Larry Summers, Christy Romer, and Austan Goolsbee–and they are all first-rate. They are excellent choices.

But are they really in a different class than those in the previous administration? Based a standard ranking of economists’ academic accomplishments as of October 2008, here is where these three stand (out of more than 18,000 economists), together with the rankings of all the CEA chairmen appointed by President Bush:

11. Larry Summers
21. Greg Mankiw
35. Ben Bernanke
99. Eddie Lazear
132. Glenn Hubbard
249. Harvey Rosen
391. Christy Romer
653. Austan Goolsbee

Judging by this objective criterion, it looks like the two adminstrations are drawing economists from roughly the same talent pool.

Of course, if one defines “grownup” as a person who agrees with Paul Krugman, and “hack” as a person who does not, then one might come to a different conclusion. [Redefining “grownup” and “hack”. Greg Mankiw’s blog. November 27 2008

After reading Professor Mankiw’s post, the press seems to have hyped-up Obama’s economic team. The team comprises of great economists but c’mon. There has always been good and great economists in many different administrations, as shown by Mankiw.

Categories
Economics Environment Science & technology

[1840] Of missed chance for fuel efficiency improvement?

It has been said that necessity is the mother of all inventions. That is certainly true with regards to the introduction of fuel-efficient vehicles in the 1970s. There are several factors that ushered in an era of engines with greater fuel efficiency but one of the most important was the then record-breaking crude oil prices caused by events in the Middle East.

By the 1980s in contrast, there was an oil glut but improvements gained in the previous decade stayed in spite of the downward trend in global crude oil prices. The same trend was again seen in the 2000s. Crude oil prices went up and then down but I fear that we might have missed the wave for fuel efficiency improvement, no thanks in part to intervention by the state in many parts of the world.

In one way or another, many economists have never really doubted that global crude oil prices would come down even when oil prices were going through the roof not too long ago. The rationale behind the idea is closely related to the mainstream growth model which stresses the importance of technology in improving output based on the same input in a status quo scenario. In other words, when prices increase sufficiently high, there is an incentive to look for new and better ways to solve old problems.

The availability of substitutes further strengthens the idea as consumers switch from consuming crude oil to other resources.

And then there is the gospel of economics. With all else being equal, quantity demanded goes down given higher prices.

Therefore, the fall of crude oil prices was never a question of if; there was only a question of when. Some people laughed at this, just as the executives at Shell in the early 1980s laughed. They probably did not even smile when the oil glut set in soon and lasted for about two decades.

In 1980, the famed Simon-Ehrlich wager was entered between entomologist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon. The wager was made to settle a dispute on whether commodities prices would on average be higher in the future while discounting for inflation.

Ehrlich hypothesized that humanity would face a severe shortage of resources in the long run. Simon believed otherwise. With prices as a signal of scarcity, Ehrlich bet the prices of five commodities would increase in 10 years’ time; Simon bet in the other direction. It was a battle between Malthusian and mainstream economic ideas.

Ehrlich’s hypothesis is not at all insensible but prices of commodities are hardly the best indicators to prove his case. Technology improved in those 10 years. Lesser materials were required for the same activities. Moreover, the availability of substitutes moderated and even prevented the predicted prices increase. In the end, Ehrlich lost the bet.

We are witnessing the same trend at the moment. Global prices of crude oil as well as various commodities have gone up and down. However, the factors which played a part in bringing the prices down may differ from the previous 1970s episode. Instead of technological improvement, based on various newspaper reports, lesser economic activities seem to be the culprit.

Prices of crude oil began the relentless upward march around 2003 only to fall dramatically in the middle of year 2008. People did respond to the situation while prices were high. There is proof that people were switching to smaller vehicles. In Malaysia in September 2008, for instance, sales of compact cars experienced an increase amid dearer retail fuel prices. Electric vehicles meanwhile saw themselves being moved from the fringes of society to almost mainstream in developed economies such as the United States

Despite all that, there is not enough convincing evidence which asserts there is an overall widespread improvement in fuel efficiency. In many ways, these changes are merely transient in nature unlike technological improvements. These changes are transient because they probably would revert once prices go down again. These are cyclical rather than structural changes.

Structural changes unlike cyclical ones have lasting effects. Within the context of fuel efficiency, the changes come in the form of technological improvements which cut across the board.

Because of this, global crude oil prices may return to record-breaking levels once the economy recovers from its flu.

The period of expensive crude oil was an opportunity to improve fuel efficiency of vehicles but unfortunately, the creative destruction associated with free market did not happen as widespread as it had in the 1970s. Then, the introduction of more fuel-efficient Japanese vehicles in the US almost brought the Big Three — General Motors, Chrysler and Ford — to their knees. Vehicles with bad fuel economy were made obsolete and rejected. While the Detroit-based manufacturers are again in trouble, it is not very clear if the main cause is the creative destruction we saw in the 1970s.

The structural changes probably failed to occur due to the fact that almost half of the world population enjoyed fuel subsidies until only recently. The subsidies shielded the consumers from the effect of high global crude oil prices. The disconnection between individuals and the free market prices effectively removed the demand for greater fuel efficiency and conservation in general.

Just as high crude oil prices forced countries to reduce or abandon subsidies, the economic downturn set in to bring fuel prices down. Even when we finally got the chance to meet reality, the impetus for structural improvement in the economy was robbed from us in the nick of time.

The quest for greater fuel efficiency can be grounded on many reasons but for me, the greater reason revolves around the need to reduce carbon emissions in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Climate change is perhaps the largest tragedy of the commons we have ever seen. It is not at all comforting that a lot of these emissions occur in developing countries with fuel subsidies.

Carbon emissions is one of the reasons why I oppose fuel subsidies. In addressing the tragedy of the commons, technological improvements in fuel efficiency or even downright new sources of energy are crucial. We had the chance to undergo a period of creative destruction but that opportunity has come and gone, for now.

The next time the opportunity knocks on our doors, we must seize it.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

A version of this article was first published in The Malaysian Insider.

Categories
Economics

[1839] Of Taylor advocates better economic policy

Economist John Taylor suggests that a good fiscal stimulus contains three factors:

– Permanent. The most obvious lesson learned from the first stimulus is that temporary is not a principle to follow if you want to get the economy moving again. Rather than one- or two-year packages, we should be looking for permanent fiscal changes that turn the economy around in a lasting way.

– Pervasive. One argument in favor of “targeting” the first stimulus package was that, by focusing on people who might consume more, the impact would be larger. But the stimulus was ineffective with such targeting. Moreover, targeting implied that increased tax rates, as currently scheduled, will not be a drag on the economy as long as increased payments to the targeted groups are larger than the higher taxes paid by others. But increasing tax rates on businesses or on investments in the current weak economy would increase unemployment and further weaken the economy. Better to seek an across-the-board approach where both employers and employees benefit.

– Predictable. While timeliness is an admirable attribute, it is only one property of good fiscal policy. More important is that policy should be clear and understandable — that is, predictable — so that individuals and firms know what to expect. [Why Permanent Tax Cuts Are the Best Stimulus. John B. Taylor. Wall Street Journal. November 25 2008]

This is written to oppose fiscal stimulus based on temporary tax cuts. Recent experience on temporary tax cut provides empirical evidence why temporary tax cuts do not positively significantly affect the economy.

He further wrote:

The theory that a short-run government spending stimulus will jump-start the economy is based on old-fashioned, largely static Keynesian theories. These approaches do not adequately account for the complex dynamics of a modern international economy, or for expectations of the future that are now built into decisions in virtually every market. [Why Permanent Tax Cuts Are the Best Stimulus. John B. Taylor. Wall Street Journal. November 25 2008]