Categories
Economics

[2637] The necessity of fiscal austerity, sometimes

This is an excerpt from an old article by Raghuram Rajan. The excerpt is a point on the necessity of having a fiscal austerity program during crisis times even when it is ideal to have it spread over time. It is not a new point, but it is worth to be highlighted as a reminder on why some things are as they are right now.

…Fiscal austerity is not painless and will probably subtract from growth in the short run. It would be far better to phase reforms in over time, yet it is precisely because governments did not act in good times that they are forced to do so, and quickly, in bad times. Indeed, there is a case to be made for doing what is necessary quickly and across the board so that everyone feels that the pain is shared, rather than spreading it over time and risking dissipating the political will. Governments should, however, underestimate the pain that these measure will cause to the elderly, the youth, and the poor, and where possible, they should enact targeted legislation to alleviate the measures’ impact. [The True Lessons of the Recession. Raghuram Rajan. Foreign Policy. May 2012]

Categories
Economics

[2636] Greek buyback program is not ideal

As part of the bailout agreement between Greece and the Troika, the Greek government has agreed to reduce its debt. This is the context behind the latest Greek buyback program, where the Greek government is looking to reduce EUR20 billion worth of debt. While I typically like debt reduction exercise by the public sector, I am unsure how this particular effort at this particular moment is ideal.

The main issue I have with the program is that Greece has no cash of its own. At least they do not have enough. On top of that, the government suffers from primary deficit and that means the government is unable to finance its operations. So, it is dependent on bailout money, provided by the reluctant Troika which includes European governments, which includes even the more reluctant Germany, the country that is really footing in the afterparty clean-up bill.

So, that is a bailout financed by public money of a different country.

The problem here is that the money will be used to buy back debt from private creditors. As you can see, it is a transfer of wealth from public coffers to private individuals and firms. There is something repulsive in doing so.

The factor that may mitigate that sentiment is that a majority of those private shareholders are Greek banks. In some sense, a large chunk of the bailout money used in the buyback program will help strengthen Greek banks and indirectly, the Greek economy. A majority of holders of Greek sovereign debts, apart from the Greek banks, are European of origin. So I suppose the buyback does help stabilize the European market too.

Anyway, while these private bondholders suffered a large haircut recently, the buyback program will mean that these holders will book in some profits according to the Wall Street Journal.[1]

Another factor is that because the offer is slightly above market price of those debts, the price of Greek sovereign debt has increased and that reduces its yield. In other words, that allows for cheaper financing for Greek government. But I do not think anybody will be crazy enough to buy Greek sovereign debt any time soon.

Regardless the mitigating factors, I prefer one thing more than the buyback: more debt haircut but this time on the public side.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
[1] — Greece’s debt agency launched a multibillion-euro offer to retire roughly half the debt the country owes to private creditors, part of the latest effort to trim a towering debt burden. Bond markets reacted positively after Greece signaled it would pay a slight premium to buy back that debt, but the higher price and the limited size of the offer raise questions about whether the country will be able to cut its debt as much as its European and international creditors hope. [Alkman Granitsas. Neelabh Chaturvedi. The Wall Street Journal. Greece offers to buy back debt. December 4 2012]

Categories
Conflict & disaster Society

[2635] To boycott Israel, we first need ties

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be an emotional matter to many Malaysians. While there are diverse opinions on the conflict, the pro-Palestinian sentiment is firmly in the majority in Malaysia. Each time the conflict between Israel and Palestine flares up, the pro-Palestinian side will egg the public on to do at least two things. One, they will organize a demonstration in front of the United States embassy on Jalan Tun Razak in Kuala Lumpur.

The other is a boycott against products sold in Malaysia that the pro-Palestinian side believes has something to do with Israel. McDonald’s has been on the receiving end of the call to boycott, but in a brilliant public relations move involving free burgers, I think the boycott died prematurely.

The truth is the demonstrations and boycotts generate more heat than light. It does nothing practical and significant to affect the situation in Israel and Palestine.

The reason for that is this: Malaysia has no traction with Israel because Malaysia does not maintain any significant relations with Israel. There is no real direct leverage that any Malaysian can use against Israel in the conflict.

To Israel, Malaysia is just that little trading country far out on the other end of the world that has little to do with Israel. Malaysia probably does not even exist to most Israelis, maybe apart from that one time when former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad claimed that the Jews ruled the world by proxy at a summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference hosted in Kuala Lumpur in 2003.

If Malaysians truly want to have some traction on Israel, then perhaps Malaysia needs to find some leverage on Israel. One of those leverages may involve having an official relationship with Israel, which includes significant trade ties.

The power of a boycott is that it gets to where it hurts when it works, which is the pocket. At the moment, however, there is really no way a boycotting Malaysian can hurt Israel. A successful boycott at the very best hurts those who have ties with Israel and not Israel itself. That has the potential of making more enemies than friends. And influence comes from making the right friends.

As always, the boycotts and demonstrations against Israel are really directed against the United States and anything related to the US. The rationale is that the US is Israel’s greatest ally. Yet, making an enemy of the US is not the best thing to do for Malaysia given how China looms to the north and countries in Southeast Asia sorely need a power to balance Chinese influence in the region. Never mind that the US is one of Malaysia’s biggest trade partners. That means there are a lot of jobs in Malaysia created by US-related corporations.

Look at the boycotters’ favorite target: McDonald’s. Who do they employ? They are mostly Malaysians. In fact, who owns the McDonald’s franchise in Malaysia? Malaysians. So, the ones who would have been hurt by a boycott launched by the pro-Palestinian camp are Malaysians first. Israel itself is probably somewhere down the list, receiving the least brunt of all, if any.

With significant economic ties with Israel, perhaps Malaysians with strong opinions on the matter can do something more practical. With such links, the threat of a Malaysian boycott has a real and direct impact on Israeli interests. With interests in Malaysia which are susceptible to a Malaysian boycott, maybe then Israel may want to take Malaysian voices more seriously.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malaysian Insider on November 28 2012.

Categories
Economics Society

[2634] Any Malaysian welfare system may encounter some problems 30 to 50 years from now

An ageing population is a major economic problem to a number of developed countries. It is not ageing itself that is the issue or even slower economic growth. An aged society usually has an advanced and rich economy. Further economic growth does not mean much if the society is already extremely rich. The problem comes when there is a social welfare system that depends on the young to support it. With an aged society, the system would have to distribute its resources to the aged majority with the young minority supporting contributing to the system.

Malaysia does not the demographic problem yet because the country has a very young population. The median age is approximately 26 years old. In fact, Malaysia’s baby boomer generation has just entered or just about to enter the Malaysian labor market. With a high proportion of productive population, Malaysia is set to grow in a meaningful way in the long run.

Population growth, specifically labor force growth, is important to the sustainability of a social welfare system, including the Employees Provident Fund. The EPF is a retirement fund for those working in the private sector in Malaysia. It is not a comprehensive welfare system but it is still susceptible to demographic changes nonetheless.

At the moment, words on the streets have it that the EPF has more money than it can invest in Malaysia: there are not enough Malaysian sovereign bonds for EPF to buy (this probably leads to a conclusion that I dislike: the Malaysian government can comfortably raise more debt, especially in this environment of low yield without much economic repercussion). That is a testament of how favorable Malaysian demographics is at the moment.

This is the latest population profile for Malaysia from the Department of Statistics:[1]

You can see the baby boomer generation in the lower part of the chart.

What may be of concern — some far distant future, probably in 30, 40 or even 50 years — is when the Malaysian baby boomers begin transitioning into their golden years. I give the 30 to 50 years range because the current boomers are below the age of 30; remember the population median is 26. Assuming that they will retire at 60 years, you will get an estimate. My guesstimate is somewhere between 30 and 50.

Already the 0-4 years old, 5-9 years old and 10-14 years old cohorts are individually smaller than the 15-19 year old and 20-24 years old cohorts. The profile of a boom is clearer when one compares the population profile in year 2000 against that in year 2010.

There is still possibility that the baby boomers may have more children to produce yet another population boom sometime in the future. Yet, with rising income which tends to lead to smaller families everywhere in the world, I doubt it. And average Malaysian income is set to rise (at least in the next few decades notwithstanding business cycle) — please, not because of Pemandu — it’s the population boom dividend!

I may be wrong still — we will see that within the next 40 years’ time — but I think we are seeing our only population boom. If I am proven right, then the EPF might have trouble servicing the retirees in 40 or 50 years’ time, unless Malaysia suddenly develops a greater appetite for immigration.

The problem of EPF will be the least of our concern if Malaysia institutes the so-called 1Care scheme which aims at creating a more comprehensive healthcare system, which includes universal insurance coverage.

The problem however is beyond the horizon of the current leadership, in both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat, judging by the populism of the day.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
[1]Population and Housing Cencus, Malaysia 2010. Department of Statistics.

Categories
Economics

[2633] What is the benchmark of failure for austerity?

Has austerity failed?

In the sense of expansionary fiscal contraction, it has. Expansionary fiscal contraction, in short, suggests that government contraction will immediately expand the private sector. That particular interpretation of fiscal austerity has clearly failed to bear out in countries under crisis. It is like the argument that says reducing taxes will increase government revenue, which is untrue if the economy is on the left side of the Laffer curve.

I do not believe in expansionary fiscal contraction. Other parts of the economy have to grow more than the fiscal contraction caused by austerity if the economy is to expand. In times when taxes go up and public spending goes down, especially in an economy dominated by the public sector, an immediate expansion will be impossible.

But the hypothesized result of expansionary fiscal contraction is a narrow benchmark to measure austerity on. Maybe it is a poetic justice to measure harsh policy harshly.

But the success of austerity can be measured against future growth instead of current growth (or rather current contraction). The idea of austerity is to swallow the bitter pill and get well after that. The point of putting government finance in order is to ensure that the government will not go bankrupt or unable to finance its operations.

Swallowing the bitter pill means the same operations that the government would be unable to finance if it had not switched gears would be cut down to a more reasonable level given the condition of public finance. What makes the cut down bearable is that it usually comes with aids: money for government under severe financial pressure. It means instead of cutting down services drastically under no austerity-no aids condition, the austerity scenario with aids prevents the bankruptcy scenario from happening altogether, with less severe cut.

The cut in public spending in times of recession will be painful and that much is clear. Yet, pointing out that austerity is painful is not enough as a benchmark to say that austerity has failed. There has to be a comparison and the comparison is, how more painful austerity is compared to a scenario of bankruptcy?

There is every reason to believe that the latter scenario (the bankruptcy scenario) will be more painful than the former (austerity). If cutting a significant level of services under the austerity program is painful, imagine a complete collapse of services when the government goes bankrupt. Austerity is the bitter pill to avoid a worse fate.

It is worth stating that austerity is the last option. It is required when countries run out of its economic wits. Despite criticism macroeconomics has suffered in the past few years, I think we still know enough that there are wide options of tools (monetary policy anyone?) before we will be left with severe austerity program.

So, how much pain avoided then should be the benchmark of success for any austerity program. The avoidance of government collapse is another benchmark of success because a collapse is exactly what austerity should aim to prevent.

So, has austerity failed?

When somebody pronounces the failure of austerity, I am almost always wanted to raise my hand and ask, “what is the benchmark of failure?” I suspect those who pronounce the failure believe that pain itself is a failure. If that is the benchmark, then I will disagree with it as I have explained earlier: pain alone is not enough; we need to ask if austerity is more painful than no austerity.

This however does not mean austerity should be done in one shot. There is only so much pain anybody can bear before a society collapses or like in the case of Germany, turns to fascist and other extremists for cure. The point of austerity is to prevent that collapse.

That does not mean austerity should be done in one shot. I prefer an austerity program distributed over time, with a combination of aids, debt relief, low interest rate, long repayment and fiscal reform of government under austerity program.

The alternative to austerity is expanded government spending but in many countries under pressure, they do not have the financial resources to do just that. And there are few countries that are willing to throw money into a blackhole called “helping others” without any fiscal reform associated with a typical austerity program.