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Economics Education

[2547] PTPTN debt a cost of affirmative action

Social mobility is crucial to the maintenance of a healthy liberal society. Inflexibility will have elites entrenched within the state apparatus and eventually becoming de facto dictators themselves, unless there is some sense of altruism among the elites. The monopoly of power itself is illiberal in so many ways.

There are ways to address the concern about social mobility and its illiberalness. The provision of education to the masses is one of them.

Education grants individuals the confidence to overcome haplessness. It provides the tools for individuals to rationalize the world and then encourage them to take fate into their own hands. With a good education, individuals will no longer be dependent on holy men’s words or beg the political elites for benevolence. Individuals will have their minds sharpened to make their own decisions. Education permanently grants individuals the motive for self-initiative for secular improvement and that is the engine of social mobility that will later help in creating a dynamic society that is liberal.

It is in this sense that equal access to education — basic education — is important.

The ability to read, write and count open up the doors of opportunity. Without these basic abilities, individuals will be disenfranchised from society. The disenfranchised will forever begin a race hundreds of steps behind, even before the race begins. They will likely form the underclass. Once one becomes an underclass, without intervention, it will be incredibly hard to break out from it. That calcifies social stratum and makes the journey towards an authoritarian society one step closer.

No self-respecting liberal will want to live a society with calcified social stratum. Permanent political monopoly is harmful to a free society. An intervention is required and justified and that intervention is the provision of mass education. That is the liberal rationale for basic education for all.

There is a limit to that rationale, however. Indeed, the rationale for education at the tertiary level changes. At the upper level, it is less about mass education than it is about meritocracy and specialization.

Not everybody has the aptitude for university education. That is why upper-level education has to be more meritocratic than primary- and secondary-level education. Even if it opened all without any filter, many would fail to make it to the end.

Under a meritocratic setup, those without the necessary aptitude must consider other tertiary options besides university education. The continuous pursuit of university education without the necessary aptitude will prove disastrous because there is heavy cost involved in terms of time and money.

To put it in another way, a meritocracy system will try to prevent a person from embarking on a costly journey that may end in failure anyway. It tries to save both time and money of the person and the society.

If one assesses the rationale for education at the individual level, it is mostly all about finance: one pursues university education with the expectation of earning higher wages in the future than he or she would without the same education.

Even without the explicit financial intention, it is generally true that the financial reward of having a degree is potentially tremendous. According to The Condition of Education 2011 published by the National Center for Education Statistics of the US Department of Education, those with a bachelor’s degree on average earn USD40,000 for the whole year in 2009. Those with high school diploma on average earn only USD25,000 for the year. The number will differ in Malaysia but the wage premium still exists.

The danger is that when one gets stuck in the system and fails to earn the degree. Another danger is that the degree earned does not give graduates a sufficient wage premium; not all degree commands the same wage premium. There are many reasons for that and one of them is quality of the degree.

In both cases, both the dropout and the graduate will learn that the cost of their university education will be too high compared to the returns of a university education. The education becomes less worthwhile.

The Malaysian problem is that there is or was a large-scale affirmative action with respect to university entrance. The proponents of affirmative action effectively and foolishly extended the rationale of mass education that is relevant to primary- and secondary-level education to the tertiary level, while ignoring the very different nature of tertiary education.

As a result, too many were encouraged to attend university and other higher education institutions without sufficient meritocratic consideration. Accommodation was made by rapid and significant expansion of places through the establishment of new education institutions. On the sideline, a state-backed mechanism—the PTPTN—was set up to help students to finance their education cheaply, and indirectly, to support private higher education service providers financially.

With the affirmative action and the disregard for meritocracy, quality eventually suffered. That affected the wage premium of those degrees.

This is probably what is happening to those who are unable to repay back their PTPTN loans. After having gone through university and other equivalent institutions and after having financed the cost through borrowing, they discovered the papers they earned did not command the wage premium necessary to make the education debt not a burden.

This can be linked directly to the issue of PTPTN and education debt. First of all, the financing option provided by PTPTN is cheap and it is effectively a subsidized financing option. On top of that, the cost of education at public universities is also cheap. The deputy prime minister was reported as stating that between 85 per cent and 95 per cent of tuition fees at public universities is borne by the government. The tuition fee itself is heavily subsidized.

Yet, graduates are having trouble repaying those cheap loans. When they are having trouble repaying, then it is likely that they are not earning enough. That in turn implies that their wage premium does not justify their investment in a university education. Further down the line, it suggests that those graduates should not have obtained their university education in the first place, if one assesses the issue strictly from a financial lens.

But they did obtain their university education, thanks to affirmative action. The graduates financed the cost of university by borrowing from PTPTN, an instrument of affirmative action. Now, what they have found is that the very instrument that enabled those graduates to become graduates is the very instrument that debased their papers, making the education debt a burden.

If that is still unclear, then let this be written: the debate about PTPTN debt in Malaysia is really a debate about the cost of affirmative action in the education system.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malaysian Insider on May 7 2012.

Categories
Economics Education

[2279] Of PTPTN exacerbates its problem

Not all borrowers are the same. Some are goods borrowers who repay their loans mostly on time. Others do not.

Under typical market operations, the good borrowers get to pay lower rates as compared to the bad ones. This mitigate the risk of default and it discourages too many bad borrowers from borrowing. If everybody pays the same rate, then too many borrowers will likely default. That is happening to the National Higher Education Fund Corporation (PTPTN) in Malaysia, essentially.

PTPTN is having a serious loan recollection problem. As stated earlier, RM22 billion worth of loans have been lent out since 1997 but only 9% of its have been paid back.

Now, here comes something outrageous. PTPTN is waiving loans given to top performing students.[1] The intention is noble and it does provide students with an incentive to perform, provided that they know a waiver is possible.

Unfortunately for PTPTN, good students are likely to be the ones who are good at repaying their loans. I do not have the data to back this up but it is a reasonable assumption to make. Good students excel partly because they have good ethics. They are disciplined given all else the same. Paying back one’s loan is always good ethics. On time repayment requires discipline. Bad students have less discipline and maybe, less ethics as well.

At the same time, good results will likely allow good students to land some good jobs with good wages, which makes them all the more capable of paying back their loans. The same might not be true for the bad ones.

So, if the good students are left off the hook to leave PTPTN with bad borrowers only, then PTPTN will exacerbate its situation.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — TEMERLOH: The National Higher Education Fund Corporation (PTPTN) has written off RM59mil in loans to 2,162 students who obtained Class One Honours from January to July. [PTPTN writes off RM59m loans to top students. The Star. November 24 2010]

Categories
Economics Education

[2272] Of PTPTN’s gapping fiscal hole

The Malaysian government-setup National Higher Education Fund Corporation (PTPTN) is apparently in trouble. It finds itself in a big fiscal hole. With a mandate to provide Malaysian students at local tertiary institutions with cheap source of education financing, PTPTN lends at 1% to students but borrows at much higher rates from financial institutions, according to The Malaysian Insider.[1] If things keep going on its current path, something disastrous ought to happen.

Not only is the rate differential outrageous, borrowers are not paying back their loans. Talk about double whammy. The same report paints a scary picture: since 1997, RM22 billion worth of loans have been made but only 9% of it has been paid back.

PTPTN’s way of doing it is not working. The financial loss if left unmitigated will leave PTPTN unable to fulfill its role in the future. But it is unlikely that the government will let PTPTN fail. So, the whole setup is a recipe for a large bailout in the future.

Before it hits us all in form of yet another government bailout, a solution has to be found.

One solution to this ugly situation is for PTPTN to increase its lending rate above its borrowing rate. No brainer, right? This might create a problem though: if it charges a rate higher than market rates, what would its raison d’être be? Potential borrowers might be better off borrowing directly from the very institutions that PTPTN obtains its loans. But maybe, due to PTPTN’s size and the implicit guarantee it enjoys from the government, it can borrow at a lower cost from the market, as compared to what individual borrower can. That may make a hike not to necessarily remove PTPTN’s purpose.

Even if a hike is only logical, politically, it is very hard for PTPTN to raise its lending rate. The current government will receive a backlash from the hike, especially since the Prime Minister has given signals that the national election might be held soon. Nevertheless, the government has proven that it is willing to increase fuel price. If the government is willing to face voters’ wrath with respect to fuel price, how much larger wrath, with respect to PTPTN, can rate hike be?

Another potential solution is for PTPTN to borrow directly from the government if it has not done so, rather than borrowing directly from the market while relying on explicit or implicit guarantee from the government. The government can typically borrow at a much lower rate than anyone else can in the market. Once the government obtains the funds, the high lords in the Treasury can probably lend a soft loan to PTPTN at a very generous rate. This might lower down the repayment burden of PTPTN by lowering its borrowing cost. This of course works better if PTPTN raises its lending cost as well, assuming collection is not a problem. Having the government involved in this way is really no different from the way it is currently done. If PTPTN fails, the cost will likely be borne by the government anyway. As a result, the level of government intervention is unlikely to change.

The first two solutions have one problem unaddressed however and that is recollection. I do not know why it is a problem. The financial institutions obviously face the same problem but they do not suffer it nearly as badly as PTPTN. Something about government bodies, I guess.

Third possible solution is for the government to provide free tertiary education for those the deserve it. The government will borne all the cost. The repayment comes in the form of higher tax revenue that may come from increased economic activities due to higher average education level of the public in the future. At the moment, given PTPTN’s weak recollection mechanism, PTPTN is effectively giving these former students free money anyway.

The fourth is for the government to cut its potential loss and close down PTPTN. Let that market do it instead. This is my preferred solution, for the obvious reason. Declare PTPTN bankrupt and have the lenders take over PTPTN’s assets and liabilities. They will collect what PTPTN cannot.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — KUALA LUMPUR, Nov 12 — The National Higher Education Fund Corporation’s (PTPTN) practice of borrowing money from financial institutions at higher interest rates to lend to students at very low interest rates has led it to its current deficit crisis.

The Malaysian Insider understands that PTPTN admitted to taking out 10-year loans from financial institutions to bankroll students who then have up to 20 years to repay them when it briefed the Public Accounts Committee on Tuesday. [Interest rates mismatch ails federal students’ loan provider. Yow Hong Chieh. The Malaysian Insider. November 12 2010]

Categories
Economics Education

[1747] Of PTPTN now is an inter-temporal subsidy

Borrowers obviously will celebrate if they see a reduction in their repayment obligation. When the National Higher Education Fund Corporation (PTPTN) reduces its service charge or really, interest rate, from 3% to 1%, already I read borrowers singing high praises to the body. The reduction of rate also turns the financing facility into a subsidy, small as it may be.

Even with the traditional inflation rate between 3% and 4% that Malaysia had enjoyed earlier, 1% interest rate has the PTPTN suffering negative returns. The borrowers meanwhile get to pay less in real terms. Accommodating inter-temporal consideration which is typical in calculation present values, clearly the borrowers are being subsidized.

Now, while I am vehemently anti-subsidy as I have consistently demonstrated in past postings, my opposition towards subsidy is based desire to eliminate certain kind of negative externality as well as a desire for freer market. When it comes to positive externality however, I can be quite supportive. The public benefit derived from well-educated citizens are far higher than any private benefit enjoyed by individual borrowers, assuming all else is constant.

Indeed, subsidization of education creates positive externality. As a result, I am willing to have a subsidy supporting students. This willingness of course has it own qualifications but I shall leave that topic for another day.

One potential issue with the lowering of the interest rate is the disincentive to pay the installments on time. Compared to previously, the penalty of not paying any installment is smaller now. This may encourage borrowers to delay their payments, preferring to incur minor penalty to manage their own cash flow. As a result, PTPTN may have trouble managing its cash flow.

Finally, the across the board cut seems too blunt. I prefer to turn the PTPTN into a convertible loan, rewarding the best students with subsidy, or if you like, scholarship. For those whom are less successful, let them take the full brunt. Under this scenario, I think we would introduce a strong incentive for students to succeed.