Tag: John Stuart Mill

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Liberty Politics & government

[2126] Of Mill and best and brightest in government

I admire John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. In it, the author succinctly describes the limits of the state and individual liberty. His defense of individual liberty against the transgression of the state and the majority is impressive to me, who is already familiar with core points Mill articulated in On Liberty even before learning Mill’s name. While all points are well-argued and logically derived from reasonable premises, I am hesitant to embrace a few of his conclusions. One of those conclusions revolves around talents and government.

Near at the end of On Liberty, Mill makes the case against government interference in the market. The context in which he frames the argument is the enhancement of the capacity of the government, or rather the state, to do evil. In order to limit this capacity, he disagrees in having the best and the brightest individuals be employed as part of bureaucracy of the state.

The idea of having the best and the brightest as part of the civil service is quite relevant in Malaysia. Various individuals in Malaysia have suggested that the civil service should attract the best through various means, including, and possibly, mainly by offering most competitive salary. Apparently, the same argument was raised in England at least before 1859, the year On Liberty was first published.

Mill’s opposition is beautifully put in a way that uses the benefits proponents of such mechanism celebrate as the mechanism’s weakness. He writes that these highly talents individuals would make the bureaucracy highly capable and beyond criticism of the public. Why? Paraphrasing Mill, the public will become ill-qualified “to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy“. This sort of shield from criticism brings about authority to the bureaucracy to embark on programs which may or may not be useful. Furthermore, with the freedom from criticism, the bureaucracy will be comfortable in where it is and not improve.

According to Mill, if the bureaucracy is to be on its toes, they must be entity or individuals capable of raising criticism against the bureaucracy, “independently of the government“.

Perhaps, most eloquently, the more well-stocked the government is with the ablest of all mankind, the capability of evil by the state “would be greater“, delivered more “efficiently and scientifically“.

This as well as other points made against the idea of big government made in On Liberty are persuasive. I am doing an injustice by summarizing his idea here. The best way to fully appreciate the robustness of arguments made by Mill is to read the book.

Regardless of that, I think Mill may have taken a step too far down the street in forwarding the proposition on talents and the state.

I do not see how having the less capable becoming part of the bureaucracy can necessarily be beneficial to free individuals. Such bureaucrats, holders of public office and perhaps politicians may as well introduce policy based on unenlightened policy that incongruous to culture of liberty, considering that there is a relationship between being a liberal and education level.

Capable if not the best of talents will be needed to introduce and enforce policies, including those which are the most liberal. Without these talents, others out of the government would be able to outwit the state in matters such as protection of individual liberty and fraud, which is the function of a state in liberal tradition. A state that is unable to perform such function effectively is a worthless state.

Besides, Mill in On Liberty is concerned with capability of the bureaucracy to improve. Criticism is important but only capable talents can effectively bring about improvement to the bureaucracy. If improvement is a concern, surely capable talents need to be hired as part of the system to act upon the criticism.

More ominously is that the argument, while maybe attractive in a world where there is only one state and no external threat, does not account for a world with multiple different states. In a world where there are other hostile states, having incapable individuals running the bureaucracy may be disastrous. States compete with each other to forward its interest that may not coincide with the agenda of promotion and conservation of liberty. Wars do happen and incapable bureaucracy increases the likelihood a state — we are interested in liberal state — capitulating to tyranny originating from external forces.

The argument cuts both ways really. The trick is to ensure there are the brightest in and outside of government. The brightest in government will be tasked to introduce and to carry out good policies while the brightest outside will be free to criticize those inside apart from pursuing their own interests in the free market.

Therefore, I think Mill’s proposition should not be accepted unconditionally. The position taken by Mill should only be accepted when a majority or sufficiently large fraction of the best and brightest are already hoarded by the government. It should be a matter of degree, not of absolute.

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Liberty Personal

[2038] Of oppressive public opinion, as described by Mill

I had trouble writing not too long ago. This is one of few reasons why my column at The Malaysian Insider was published late after Monday in the past few weeks. I constantly found myself writing several paragraphs only to delete it, deciding that I wanted to write something else instead. At first, I figured it was just typical writer’s block.

As I typically do when I find myself in that situation, I took time off to clear my head; in place of writing, I will turn to reading.

I had been trying to finish On Liberty by John Stuart Mill. I had spent too much time on it. Despite being a short piece, despite the fact that I am familiar with his ideas and despite that many of his ideas are the basis of my ideals, his style of writing proves difficult to follow. It requires a kind of concentration that casual reading just will not do.

If I sound as if I am complaining, please rest assured that I am not doing so. On the contrary, the effort demanded bore fruition for me for four reasons: it clarifies Mill’s idea for me, it strengthens my belief in individual liberty, it clarifies my own thought on the limits of government as I prepare to read Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia and it answers why I had trouble writing.

What I suffered was not writer’s block at all. The problem was fear of reprisal from readers and individuals whom I have come acquainted with, be they friends, activists or politicians. Even since I become a columnist at the popular The Malaysian Insider, relatively, I have become more widely read. Forgive me if I am blowing my own trumpet but the following has to be written to provide context to my problem because being relatively widely read means I get the opportunity to meet more persons than I would otherwise.

I most treasure those relationships. With this in mind, I tend moderate my opinion so that whatever I say or write does not overly affect any good relationship I have.

At first, this was a small problem but it gradually, and unexpectedly, grew in weight that it began to adversely affect my ability, or rather, my willingness to write, offering criticism or simply different perspective. I did not realize that until I came around a chapter in On Liberty which touches on the effect of public opinion on individuality.

Opinions of these acquaintances have become what Mill calls public opinion. This public opinion quietly had suppressed my opinion simply because I care too much about what these people think of me. I, uncharacteristically, was afraid of becoming different.

Furthermore, the greater audience, compared to the one I had when I was simply writing for my blog, had caused me to be cautious about the issue that I chose to touch on. For instance, I have not written anything about religion for a very long time now. I know that my opinion on religion can get me into trouble, since I maintain an irreverent position with regards to it; Many among the Malaysian society are conservative when it comes to religion; their opinion too can be identified as what Mill calls public opinion.

These fears unconsciously encouraged me to commit to self-censorship, allowing the so-called public opinion to prevail over what I consider as better opinion in the public arena. The so-call public opinion then win the battle not because it is the best of all arguments, but because of numbers. There is only one me and there are countless of them,

The following from Mill’s On Liberty woke me up from falling into the trap of conformity:

There is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also of moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and the intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon. Now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement has set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conducts, and endeavour to make every one conform to the approved standard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.

As is usually the case with ideals which exclude one-half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional”¦ [John Stuart Mill. Chapter IV: Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual. On Liberty. 1859

Those fears of mine threaten to suppress my individuality. I will not tolerate that.

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Liberty

[2016] Of salutary effect on the calmer and more disinterested bystander…

I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religous or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to. [On Liberty. Chapter 2. John Stuart Mill. 1859]

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Liberty Photography

[2003] Of reading Utilitarianism under a tree

I have not been posting pictures for a very long time. The reason for that is a certain photography shop — ah, hell, I will just name it; Foto Flash — is taking a very long time to send it to Nikon and service my DSLR.

In the meantime, I have to settle with my old trusty Fujifilm A303. That is a very old point-and-shoot camera; it is the camera before I migrated to D40.

This is the first photo by A303 after more or less 2 years, I think.

Some right reserved.

This is not an entertaining book due to its long proses but it is enlightening anyway. I do not however agree with some that Mill writes, especially with bias towards religion. Somehow, he makes exception for his religion what he outlines for others.

Regardless, I will be in Penang next week and I need my DSLR. If Foto Flash does not return my D40 in time, I may be in need of a new DSLR. At the moment, I am looking at D60. To do that, I might sell my D40 to subsidize my upgrade.

I will be leaving for Australia in the first or the second week of July. So, I need to get it off my hand rather quickly. I am thinking of selling my D40 in between RM1,000 and RM1,500. That is between half and 3/4 of the price I bought it for. Along with it are the charger, the CD, the manual and the kit len. If you are lucky, I might throw in a tripod for you too.

So, anybody want to buy my D40?

Categories
Books & printed materials Liberty

[1985] Of Mill alluding to externality and solving it through utilitarianism

John Stuart Mill in his introduction to On Liberty writes:

It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage which could be derived to my argument from idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is a rule; to make his answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet, there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amendable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgement-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgement of his fellow creatures. [On Liberty. Chapter 1. John Stuart Mill. 1859]

First of all, wow. Look at that. That is one paragraph. But at least, it is more readable than Kant’s impossible Critique of Pure Reason.

Secondly and more importantly, it is beyond doubt this particular paragraph of Mill is filled with utilitarian idea. He justifies compulsion by society on individual by doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Gee, what am I talking about. This is Mill after all.

I am not quite sure if I agree with Mill when he writes there “are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform.” This may refer to externality but reading the whole paragraph within the context set by the introductory chapter by Mill, his idea may go beyond mine. While do believe certain negative externality requires action — for instance carbon emissions with respect to climate change — Mill mentions common defense, which may or may not mean conscription. I do have certain distaste for free riders; yet, I do have problem utilizing compulsion in against free riders. Mill suffers no such issue by reverting to utilitarianism.

Nevertheless, I am relieved to read that a “person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former.”

Indeed.

Mill writes further immediate after that paragraph. and it is more agreeable if I might add. I am reproducing it for the benefit of the readers here:

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. [On Liberty. Chapter 1. John Stuart Mill. 1859]