Here is a microeconomic contract theory puzzle with the incentives do not quite line up perfectly.
According to the Financial Daily today, the MRT project delivery partner (a joint venture between MMC Corp and Gamuda) will be punished by the project owner if the cost of the project exceeds 15% of some base. Any cost overruns beyond that limit will be borne by the PDP instead of being passed to the project owner, which really is the government.
In StarBiz today, it is reported that any cost saving will go directly to the government.
This makes me wonder, will there be any saving? What incentive is there to discourage the PDP from running 14.99% above the agreed base. Is it not rational for the PDP to eat up any saving that might exist, leaving nothing for the government?
But I guess we can take comfort that a cost overrun is a likelier outcome than any saving. After all, the last time a similar project was carried out in Kuala Lumpur more or less 10 years ago, the cost ran out of order so much that the developers had to be bailed out by the government.
Some comfort, eh?