Tag: The Malaysian Insider

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Liberty Society

[2407] Between fictitious and true unity

There is a strong emphasis in unity in Malaysia.

It is easy to rationalize why so. The country has been diverse from the very beginning of its modern history. Each group largely lives differently. While difference and diversity can be sources of strength, it can also be a source of conflict.

For all the myths believed by some that race relations nowadays are worse than yesteryears, the worst race riot of the country happened in Kuala Lumpur in May 1963. Another big race riot happened in Malaysian Singapore in July 1964. Conflict between races itself was part of the reasons why Singapore was expelled from the federation in 1965.

Those conflicts have left behind a deep scar in Malaysian society, even as many Malaysians today have never witnessed a race riot first-hand. These old fears are becoming increasingly irrelevant but it is still part of what describes our society. So entrenched is the fear of history repeating itself that many are mindful of the tiniest possibility of a race riot.

To the mindful and those whom are trapped in the 1960s and 1970s still, they believe in the narrative of unity. They believe in unity being the answer to Malaysian divisiveness.

As the wisdom goes, if everybody were united, there would be no reason to quarrel with each other. Nobody would say anything hurtful to the collective ethnic consciousness. In a united Malaysia, everybody would laugh together while waving the Jalur Gemilang happily.

On the surface, the unity narrative is appealing. The ideal provides a stark contrast to the chaotic Malaysia of the 1960s and a period of time after that. Yet, scratch the skin and it will peel to a rotten core.

Their particular unity narrative ignores differing viewpoints. At best, it considers differing positions as foreign. ”It is not part of our culture,” so the typical response goes. Malaysians holding differing ideals are accused as having their mind colonized by outsiders. Imagine in times of globalization, one talks of neo-colonialism. One has to be either paranoid or stuck in time.

When differing viewpoints becoming too intellectually challenging for the simple narrative, threats are issued. When there is nowhere to go within the realm of pure reasons, talk of feelings. File a police reports when feelings are hurt. In the unity narrative, one is not supposed to hurt anyone else’s feeling.

And some fly the flags because for the government demands so. The government even threatened to do something to remedy the failure to fly a piece of cloth back in 2006. In Ipoh in 2010, businesses had to fly the Jalur Gemilang if business owners wanted to renew their licenses.

One can see how pretentious that unity is.

See how it belligerently pushes aside liberty.

It seeks monotony. It rejects colors. It is either you are with us, or against us.

Unity is not mutually exclusive of liberty of course. In fact, true unity can only arise under free environment, where every person is free. It will be hard to achieve unity under such a set-up because individuals in a free society will have difference but if ever dialogue and understanding will overcome the difference, then everybody will unite out of their own free will.

That is the route to true unity. It is tough but it is the unity that is sincere.

The proponents of unity whom are trapped in the 1960s possibly know of this. They probably realize the tough road to true unity. Too cowardly to trust in individual effort to bridge the gap perhaps, they choose the ersatz version.

That version of unity is one that is shown only because there is a big stick somewhere, waiting to be taken out if someone dares say, no, I am different.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malaysian Insider on August 5 2011.

Categories
Politics & government Society

[2398] Bersih and the wider trust deficit

Somewhere in Streatham, south of London earlier this year, I found myself slouching lazily on a couch watching the BBC with a friend and his still lazier cat. On television was the Egyptian revolution ”live”, with protesters and government supporters throwing rocks at each other. Such was the lamentable state of Egypt that used to be the apex of human civilization not once, but twice. Its deeply flawed institutions had reduced Egypt into a state of anarchy.

”Don’t you find this impossible?” I think I asked my friend. ”We know these protesters want Mubarak out but what about his supporters? Are their wishes less legitimate than those protesting on the streets?”

The reply came promptly, ”The importance of a credible election. Credible elections are important in determining popular opinion. Nothing in Egypt has enough credibility or the competence to ascertain the popular opinion right now.”

The Arab Spring is an extreme example but it does highlight the importance of a working electoral system. It highlights the importance of individuals trusting a system to aggregate popular opinion fairly and peacefully.

For this reason, the effort at electoral reforms by Bersih is important. Some of its demands add transparency in the electoral process and transparency goes a long way in creating credibility.

Bersih, of course, is about electoral reforms but the question of confidence in institutions is really part of the larger trust deficit problem in Malaysia. The problem of trust deficit is this: a considerable portion of Malaysians distrusts the government. And they are not libertarians. Rather, they are part of the everyday people.

It does not matter whether that portion makes up the majority of Malaysian society or not. The point is that they are big enough that they cannot be ignored, or banned just like that. There is no place for an ostrich if the country plans to solve the deficit.

For Malaysia, distrust in public institutions will not degenerate to the deplorable level seen in the Arab world recently anytime soon. It is an exaggeration to say otherwise. That is a long way down the canyon. Yet, various other not-so-ideal things can happen with the lack of confidence in public institutions.

When the public distrusts the courts, the police and everything that is commonly understood as the typical uncontroversial functions of the state, the government will have a hard time doing its job.

Take distrust in the police, for example. Crime cannot be the responsibility of the police alone. Crime fighting requires co-operation from the public. In an overly distrusting environment, is there a reason for a person to aid the police? Be a witness for the police? Is there a reason for the person to report the occurrence of crime to the police? Is there a reason for the person to believe the police will protect them?

All that will see individuals investing in their security, taking resources away from more productive activities. They make redundant activities typically funded by taxes.

This is already happening. Drive around Petaling Jaya and other neighborhoods and one can see what effectively are gated communities. Residents are pooling their resources to hire private firms to secure their property.

It shows they are distrustful of the police. Or at least how they do not believe that the police are competent enough to serve them, the taxpayers. What, one might ask, is the point of paying taxes to support the police force when one has to employ private security firms to keep one’s house safe?

And just to be naughty, if there was enough trust between the public and the government, the government would not have to spend millions of public funds for public relations exercises. That money can better be spent elsewhere. Yet, in times of great skepticism, what would be wasteful during normal times could become a necessity to keep the government running.

It is good to keep a healthy dose of skepticism against the government and the state in general. Yet, there is some optimum level of skepticism before destructive cynicism sets in.

Quite unfortunately, the current government of Malaysia — the Abdullah and the Najib administrations alike — is too good at inculcating public cynicism against itself. Given how the government tries hard to erode the independence of public institutions, the government is undermining public confidence in public institutions.

Bersih is a modest effort at trying to ultimately restore credibility to public institutions. In its little way, it is an effort to tackle the wider trust deficit.

The Najib administration, however, disagrees and demonizes Bersih instead. Maybe that is not at all surprising. The flawed institutions of status quo benefit the incumbent. The administration and its fiercest supporters are happy with the status quo. In jargon-speak, they have captured the public institutions.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malaysian Insider on July 16 2011.

Categories
Politics & government

[2392] Vague principles, contradictory policies

Some ideas are vague for a reason. In Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, the majority is afraid of commitment and responsibilities. It is simply impractical to have clear opinions or positions. Consistency arising from those opinions and positions is a barrier to success. One has to be pragmatic to be successful. Vagueness allows such pragmatism. To put it bluntly, it creates contradictions.

That is not too far off from the truth in our world. That is not too far off from the political culture in Malaysia. There are vague positions and from those ambiguities, contradictions.

1Malaysia is an example. Despite all efforts to explain it by far too many sides, 1Malaysia is still an ambiguous concept. It appeals to the idea of inclusiveness and equality, yet those with distaste for these very liberal ideas are the ones promoting it. There are of course true blue egalitarians within Barisan Nasional who are also promoting 1Malaysia but when both racialists and egalitarians are able to appeal to 1Malaysia in contradictory terms, the concept itself cannot escape the accusation of being ambiguous.

In the early stage of 1Malaysia, one particular idea was floated around to justify its vagueness. It was ”strategic ambiguity.” It stated 1Malaysia was made ambiguous on purpose so that it could be used to appease all sides. All sides can take ownership of 1Malaysia by applying to it their own definition.

That and its vagueness mean 1Malaysia is both everything and nothing, neither here nor there. Its ambiguity means it is not opposable. Given the feudalistic culture that prevails in Malaysia, in BN and in UMNO in particular, there is an imperative to support it just because it came from the top.

With nothing to oppose and everything to accept, it was good for BN and UMNO in a time when both are just emerging from a relatively disastrous infighting. They needed a rallying call. A vague call seemed fine.

Perhaps in its pretension that BN is a perfect replica of Malaysian society, they might have thought that what works for BN might work for Malaysia. The Malaysian society is more diverse than BN however. And because many Malaysians are outsiders to BN and are less enamored with feudalistic culture, they are more demanding in knowing why they should be on board with 1Malaysia. At least, for those who care, anyway.

After persistent ambiguity, many have become disinterested in defining 1Malaysia. They have moved on. At the same time, 1Malaysia sees relegation from a grand ambition contributing to national identity to a mere economic programme troubled by inconsistency.

Today, in fact, 1Malaysia is all about the Economic Transformation Programs and nothing else. It is about projects. It is about buildings and infrastructure. It is about cold hard cash.

But because the programmes are ultimately derived from the vague 1Malaysia, it suffers from contradiction. The ETP are market-driven but both embrace government intervention; price controls are everywhere. The ETP is privately sector-driven but these drivers are government-linked companies: Menara Warisan comes to mind. The best epitome of inconsistency is the term ”market-friendly affirmative action.”

Again, 1Malaysia in the end is about projects and cold hard cash. There is no principle governing it. Anything goes.

To prove that this is really a prevailing political culture rather than merely one belonging exclusively to BN, members of Pakatan Rakyat themselves are not doing well in terms of ambiguity. The ”negara berkebajikan” introduced by PAS is the latest example.

What is it exactly? So far, the buzz has it that it is Islamic, it is not an Islamic state, it is not the welfare state concept and it is different from the system practised by the BN-led federal government. There is little clarification on why it is Islamic, why it is not an Islamic state, why it is not the welfare state and why it is different from BN policy. Apart from several key terms, it is ultimately vague.

To be fair, PAS must be given time to articulate the idea, especially since the idea is creating a competition to the political centre. Nevertheless, the fact that concept was released before its articulation makes it susceptible to the same criticism directed against 1Malaysia. Unless the articulation lifts the veil of ambiguity soon, ”negara berkebajikan” will be a potpourri of contradictions, much like 1Malaysia.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on July 6 2011.

Categories
Politics & government

[2381] UMNO is turning into the old PAS

If one had opined that PAS was more of a centrist than UMNO 10 years ago, nobody would have believed it. It would have been an outrageous opinion. Yet today, it is no longer so foreign a prospect.

The recently concluded PAS internal election is the latest evidence of the party’s march to the centre. That election saw both the promotion of the so-called professional group to the leadership of the party and the adoption of a more realistic stance with regards to the Islamic state agenda.

The participation of PAS within Pakatan Rakyat has a lot to do with the reconfiguration of the party towards the political centre. While the criticism of ideological difference against the coalition as a whole remains valid, the alliance itself is the great engine that is pulling all of its members to a middle ground. That middle ground is proving to be the Malaysian centre.

This is should be contrasted with trends within Barisan Nasional, or really, just UMNO.

Regardless of the sincerity of the accusation, UMNO and its allies insist that PAS is committing a political betrayal. They claim PAS is abandoning the Islamic state ideal and ejecting the ulama from party leadership. Rather than acknowledging the developments as simply a move to the centre, they are more comfortable accusing PAS of kowtowing to DAP.

Betrayal or not, as with any move to the centre, those on the fringes will have less hold on the party. That will fuel some discontent.

UMNO-owned Malay daily Utusan Malaysia wants UMNO to appease the fringes. Assistant chief editor of Utusan Malaysia Zaini Hassan has gone as far as suggesting that UMNO should have its own ulama wing, perhaps thinking that particular man oeuvre could outflank PAS.

He forgets that times have changed.

In the past, the Islamization race between UMNO and PAS always ended up with PAS being the loser. PAS did not budge even as UMNO encroached on the traditional domain of the former. That allowed UMNO to win centrist votes and gain some voters who could have voted for PAS.

That little trick might not work again after the latest PAS election.

With PAS slowly nudging towards the centre and UMNO to the opposite direction, the Islamization game has only one participant, and that is UMNO. With enough momentum powering both sides, UMNO might find itself taking the relatively more extreme position compared to PAS. This means UMNO is at risk of becoming the loser this time around.

If both parties stay on their course, UMNO will turn into the conservative party that PAS was. Meanwhile, PAS the centrist should be very happy with that.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on June 14 2011.

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2375] Reducing the political cost of liberalization

A price-control mechanism has its economic cost, on top of that associated with the current subsidy regime in place in Malaysia. There are also some political costs to the control. In tight times when commodities are becoming dearer, any government that dares to reset retail prices upwards invites public wrath.

There was talk of an early general election, but the rumor machines now suggest that the election will be held only later. The Barisan Nasional-led federal government needs room to maneuver before renewing its mandate.

The prime minister is under pressure to seek a mandate of his own. One has to remember that Najib Razak is running on the 2008 mandate secured by the highly unpopular Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Not only that, the prime minister also needs Barisan Nasional to do better than it did in the last general election. He must get the two-thirds majority in Parliament to prove that his government is better than the one led by his predecessor.

That is one of the ways the political cost matters. The political cost can affect cold but rational economic calculations. This is especially relevant for those whose conviction is measured by their appetite for adventure, or lack of adventure rather. That makes it important to reduce the political cost of liberalization lest the liberalization agenda, however disappointingly incomplete it is in its current form, be left high and dry.

The local political cost that exists is unfortunate because global economic reality largely ignores local political reality. In many cases, the increase in retail prices is inevitable amid rising world prices of various commodities.

The factors fuelling the hike are real: growing population, growing affluence and therefore growing demand. That is the current long-term trend. Mere business cycles neither erase nor change long-term trends by much.

There are some institutional issues affecting local retail prices as well. Without hurting the trustworthiness of the government, these problems have to be solved.

Liberalize the market instead of granting monopoly power to specific firms. Make the market open instead of having deals made in the shadows. Stop signing contracts that are grossly lopsided at the expense of public money. All that can lessen the degree of the hikes in the long run.

Yet, local issues just like short-term fluctuations are unlikely to drown out long-term trends. Until new technology, new culture and new alternatives prevail over old ones — or if total world population drops — prices will generally go up to clear the markets.

Because of the dissonance between local political and global economic realities, the political cost should be reduced so that both run parallel to each other. The political cost is a disincentive to good economic policy.

Democracy coupled with entitlement culture is a recipe for irresponsible populism. This is especially true for the fuel subsidy regime where the subsidy fixes the price ceiling and in effect subsidizes everything between retail prices and world prices. Under this arrangement, the government risks hypothetically unlimited expenditure. The higher the world prices, the larger the subsidy bill.

So, how does one reduce the political cost?

The government can stop being the fall guy. To do so, the government needs to stop managing prices. Relax the control. Let prices float. Let the market take charge instead. Let those closest to the ground — the actual buyers and sellers — determine the prices.

Using the fuel subsidy as an example, the relaxation can exist together with fixed per unit subsidy regime rather than the current unfixed per unit subsidy. In this way, the subsidy burden shouldered by the government will remain constant given a consumption level. Any increase or decrease in retail prices will be due to market forces only.

This particular arrangement will reduce the political cost faced by a liberalizing government by making the link between prices and primary market participants clearer. Prices will no longer be linked to the government. With the government out of the way, then perhaps the government will receive less flak.

The question of subsidy reduction itself will not even surface because increase in world prices will not increase the subsidy bill given the level of consumption. Indeed, a typical model will suggest that an increase in world prices might actually decrease the total subsidy bill due to decreased consumption.

In the end with less flak, perhaps the liberalization agenda can go farther down the road without unnecessary undue erosion of political capital.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on June 2 2011.