Tag: Iraq

[1449] Of Happy Thanksgiving

Post author By Hafiz Noor Shams
Post date Thursday, November 22 2007
1 Comment on [1449] Of Happy Thanksgiving

I ate my turkey at Subway. Sad, huh?

Anyway, for fun reading:

At my friend’s house, a mansion with an army of Iraqi cooks, gardeners and security guards, the Iraqi staff gathered in the kitchen to watch the ajanib cook Ali Sheesh. All men, they lounged against the counter, chain-smoking.

”You will never cook Ali Sheesh in time,” said the tallest, with amused condescension. ”You must cut him up. Otherwise he will not cook before midnight!”

His friends nodded, laughing. They offered other instructions: We should sautÃ© Ali Sheesh first; we should season him with sabaa baharat, seven spices, and layer him in a large pan; we should boil him and add rice. We had no idea what we were doing: we would poison the guests!

Finally my friend had had enough of their mockery. ”How do you know how to cook a turkey?” she demanded.

The ringleader drew himself up, looking down at us, offended. ”I have seen it,” he said, with finality, ”on ”˜Mr. Bean’!” [Baghdad Thanksgiving, 2003. NYT. November 22 2007]

Ali Sheesh is turkey, in Iraqi Arabic.

Tags Iraq, Thanksgiving

History & heritage Liberty

[1395] Of October 3 1932 in Iraq

Post author By Hafiz Noor Shams
Post date Wednesday, October 3 2007
3 Comments on [1395] Of October 3 1932 in Iraq

The Daily Kos writes a primer on events leading to October 3 1932.

Three-quarters of a century ago today – October 3, 1932 – British imperialists who had ruled Iraq on paper since the spoils-dividing Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 (and in reality since their victory in Baghdad against the Ottomans in 1917) gave up everything. Except for their military bases, their imposed oil contracts and their right of future intervention.

During their 383-year reign in the region that today we call Iraq, the Ottoman autocrats established three provinces that reflected divisions reaching back 900 years to the Islamic conquest of Mesopotamia: Kurdish Mosul, Sunni Baghdad, Shiite Basra. In their far briefer rule, the British first administered two provinces, Baghdad and Basra, getting Mosul from the French a few years later. [An Iraqi Anniversary Unlikely to Be Celebrated in Baghdad. Daily Kos. October 3 2007]

75 years later, English is still the language of the occupier except that that quaint spelling style is no more.

That asides, it is interesting to find out that the suggestion to internally break Iraq into 3 parts is not without precedent: the Ottoman did it once.

Tags Iraq, Ottoman Empire

Conflict & disaster

[1340] Of drawing parallel between the partition of Iraq and the Balkan states

Post author By Hafiz Noor Shams
Post date Sunday, August 19 2007
No Comments on [1340] Of drawing parallel between the partition of Iraq and the Balkan states

The New York Times today draws a parallel between the Bosnian conflict and Iraq. The article visits one of the solutions that could end inter-communal violence in Iraq and that solution is partition, just like what happened to Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The article further states three reasons why the Balkanization of Iraq might not be as successful as the Balkanization of the Balkans.

Number one:

The first crucial condition for the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia was that it was already carved up. When negotiators gathered at Dayton, the raging violence had succeeded in paring, pushing and repulsing Catholics, Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims into mostly coherent enclaves. War created a sustainable map on the ground. The task facing diplomats was to get it in ink.

Such a map is far from drawn in Iraq. Although two million Iraqis have fled the country and another two million are displaced within Iraq’s borders, up to five million more — 20 percent of the prewar population — would have to be moved to create an ethnically coherent place. [Divided They Stand, but on Graves. New York Times. August 19 2007]

Number two:

The second unmet condition is that by 1995 in Bosnia, all three sides had fought themselves to utter exhaustion. In Iraq today, polls show that average citizens are exhausted by the war, but militia-style fighters loyal to the three sectarian factions remain fully tooled for combat — just warming up for advanced bloodletting. Foreign fighters and foreign weapons continue to flow into Iraq over its porous borders. [Divided They Stand, but on Graves. New York Times. August 19 2007]

Number three:

Which underscores the third condition not visible in Iraq. A genius of the Dayton process was that the outside powers arming and inspiring the Bosnian violence — Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian dictator, and Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian strongman — were at the table along with their Bosnian proxies and Muslim representatives.

With their signatures on the accords, the flames of outside agitation were extinguished.

By contrast, the Bush administration has been unwilling or unable to cajole Iran and Syria into a full diplomatic partnership to end the anti-government and anti-coalition attacks in Iraq. There appear to be few prospects of expanding direct dialogue, especially with Iran. [Divided They Stand, but on Graves. New York Times. August 19 2007]

I have shared my sentiment against turning Iraq into a 3-state federation. Nevertheless, daily reports of violence in Iraq has forced me from being against, to nearly neutral of the prospect of a federation, or even partition.

Tags Balkans, Iraq, war

Conflict & disaster Liberty Politics & government Society

[1189] Of is that unity in Iraq real?

Post author By Hafiz Noor Shams
Post date Tuesday, April 24 2007
2 Comments on [1189] Of is that unity in Iraq real?

When I first read over the news about the occupying force in Iraq was constructing a wall between Sunni and Shiite Arab areas in Baghdad in hope to reduce violent contact between the two groups, I felt a hint of disapproval toward that plan, as much as I felt against the proposal to turn Iraq into a three-state federation. Yet, the continuing violence between the two groups does make a case for the erection of walls in the city. Existing walls have proven to reduce the number of attacks:

Although the strategy of using barriers to safeguard areas of Baghdad is not new, the Adhamiya plan to enclose the neighborhood entirely was promoted as an advanced security measure. About two years ago, the American military erected a wall along the section of the Amiriya neighborhood that borders the airport road. While hardly foolproof, it reduced the number of attacks on American convoys on the route. [Frustration Over Wall Unites Sunni and Shiite. NYT. April 24 2007]

The separation barriers roughly run along the periphery of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is another supporting case of how it could reduce attacks. Nevertheless, it divides community, cutting friends and relatives from each others. I am therefore am undecided on the issue of separation barriers in Iraq.

While undecided, I am happy to read that there are those from both Sunnis and the Shiites Arab communities that oppose the walls. It does show that both communities are willing to work together toward an end, regardless of creeds. Perhaps, there is hope for Iraq after all.

The ability of the Arab Iraqis to trust the Kurds might be another signal of hope:

Arabs see them as a neutral force, the Americans say.

“The reason why people are willing to trust the 1-3-4 is because they’re Kurdish,” said Capt. Benjamin Morales, 28, commander of Company B of the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, the partner unit of Captain Hamasala’s company. “They don’t care about Sunni or Shia.” [In Twist of History, Kurds Patrol Baghdad. NYT. April 24 2007]

Yet, I doubt if this is a clear cut sign that Sunni and Shiite Arabs in general could live together. I feel so because the opposition to the walls might be fueled by common dissatisfaction against a force rather than true respect:

The American involvement in the wall’s construction has united Iraqis of different sects. Sunni political parties, as well as some Shiite groups, strongly oppose the wall. Shiite groups fear that though Sunni Arab neighborhoods are the ones being cordoned off this week, next month it could be Shiite areas as well. [Frustration Over Wall Unites Sunni and Shiite. NYT. April 24 2007]

Much like Keadilan.

The uniting factor is more of ad hoc in nature, rather than permanent. It is ad hoc because it is superficial. I do not believe commonality based on hate would produce lasting alliance. Once that commonality is removed, what other intransient factor would peacefully hold the communities together?