With (x,y), x is the payoff to the incumbent while y is the payoff to the challenger. Numbers are cardinal.
The challenger plays the first round. The incumbent plays the last round.
By martial law, I mean to indicate incumbent’s refusal to let go of power, eventually involving some kind of conflict greater than mere tongue war and successfully retaining power through the conflict.
By new government, there is a peaceful transition of power.
p/s — this model does not consider any discount from the conflict on the society. Such accommodation would likely change the payoff of the second round, making the model more complex.
This model stands on only one assumption: holding power is better than not holding power.
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Assuming martial law and a new government have equal probabilities, the average payoff to the opposition is 1.5, which exceeds the payoff of the status quo. So the only question is…how probable is it that the current administration would not declare martial law? :p