Category: Economics

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2751] When should we cut fuel subsidy?

Ten months into 2014, I have now resigned to the fact that my projection for the annual inflation rate in Malaysia is too high, with the actual rate being relatively benign. The reason I had put it so high — it was in the region of 3.5%-4.0% compared to what it would likely be, which is 3.0%-3.5% — was that I had expected a drastic subsidy cut early on. It did not happen until yesterday. Even yesterday’s cut is not enough to salvage my projection. I have of heard drastic, crazily complicated plans to revamp the subsidy system that would definitely help me be right, but that has either been postponed, or canceled. While I like to be right, I hope the convoluted system will be canceled. I hope the government would just stick with subsidy cut-cash transfer policy.

Politically, subsidy cuts are always a hot potato. It attracts criticisms from a whole lot of people.

Me? While I have criticized certain cuts from time to time, I am generally supportive of it for various reasons. I have been a long-time supporter of transforming subsidies into cash transfer. This time around, I do not have much reason to oppose the cut. Government influence, at least from the GDP perspective, is coming down, suggesting less government spending with the wider economy in mind.

So, I think I would like to engage on two criticisms directed at the recent cut. One questions the cut on the basis that crude oil prices are coming down. Another goes, subsidy cannot be cut until there is a viable public transportation system in place first.

On oil falling prices, I have said it in the past and one person has brought it up on Twitter (where I spend most of my time these days neglecting this blog, my column, my book project … and work… maybe by just a bit), that the best time to eliminate fuel subsidies is when prices are low, like right now. Acting when prices are low is acting from a position of strength and not out of desperation. If the argument that says we should not cut subsidy when prices are falling down is a good one, then when exactly should we cut it?

Is it never?

If the answer is not never, consider the counterfactual. If prices are higher, would that be the best time to cut subsidy then? Under the scenario of the rising prices, the effect of subsidy cuts on consumers and the economy at large would likely be greater than when cutting it when prices are low, because at that time, the situation would have been more desperate and would probably demand steeper cuts. There would likely result more shocks to the consumers that make the pain of higher cost more acute than it should be. As I have written on Twitter in a snappier way, “[you] criticize the cuts because oil prices are coming down. If prices were going up, would you be happy with bigger, more desperate cuts?”

From government finance perspective, I think cutting it earlier makes more sense. It means more saving for the government to finance other stuff earlier. If we are to wait for the government to cut subsidy only when prices are rising some time in the future, then the saving would probably be lower. The saving can finance the cash transfer program, among others.

Besides, a responsible policymaker wants a countercyclical policy. You do stuff that are painful but necessary during the good times, not during when times are bad. Look at the effect of austerity. The criticism of European austerity is exactly because of the poor timing of its austerity program.

On the point that we should wait until the public transportation system is good, I think this is a costly wait-and-see game. It is also partly a chicken-and-egg issue.

I label it as a wait-and-see game because the last MRT line is scheduled to only be completed by 2020. Keep in mind that construction on the two other lines has not started yet. Even then, I am unsure the public transport system would be reliable with comprehensive coverage. Do we want to keep the subsidy regime running until we are completely sure the transportation system is completely up and running in donkey-years’ time? That is a lot of money, never mind who knows what will happen with crude oil prices until then.

I also box this particular criticism against the cut as a chicken-and-egg problem. I would even argue it is a case of Catch-22. We need the money to invest in public transportation, but we do not have the money to do so if we keep up with the subsidy regime. We need to break the loop and not engage in such mind-numbing logic. At the very least, the cut in the subsidy bill and in the deficit ratio could help bring yields on government debt down, allowing the government or the relevant government-linked bodies to borrow at a cheaper rate to fund infrastructure project.

“But,” you say, “we are going to have the GST!” Yes, but I think every saving helps. “But,” you go on, “what about corruption-wastage-leakage in government spending? Sure, I share your concerns there but I think that requires some political changes but that requires some effort. In the meantime, until that happens, it should not prevent us from doing other stuff. It is not a mutually exclusive problem and it is not a sequencing problem either.

Ultimately, I see the argument on public transportation as one that prefers to do nothing.

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2745] We need to ration our water

There seems yet another water crisis on the horizon, or here even. But walking around, it is hard to know that for sure. Out there in the streets well out of the dams and water plants, building management are instructing their workers to water the grass even after the rain, keeping it green and all. I spotted one worker watering a tree with a huge trunk for several minutes, while reading his phone. Car owners are washing their cars with generous amount of water. AirAsia plans the largest water balloon fight in Malaysia in November this year, right in the middle of Petaling Jaya, somehow trivializing the water assets negotiation in Selangor. AirAsia calls it Burst Asia and tickets are selling for RM48.

Yet, from the news we are learning water at various dams are below the critical levels previously seen earlier this year when rationing took place. The authority is pumping water from old mining ponds into our water supply as a solution. There are accusations that the ponds are contaminated with heavy metals. Whether it is true or not, it is clear this is a sign of desperation with the authority trying to augment the dam water in Selangor. If that does not signal desperation, then the sudden turn of events in the past months with respect to the Selangor water assets negotiation has to be one. After all, the basis for the Pahang-Selangor water tunnel and the controversial Langat 2 water plant revolves around future water shortage. There are those who claim the current shortage is a made-up crisis, especially among those in the current Selangor state government. They claim sabotage, saying somebody is trying to make the state government look bad. I do not know about those saboteurs but there is a water crisis, regardless of its sources.

Water prices meanwhile remain cheap. It has not changed for some time now. The Selangor state government refuses to raise it, supposedly for the benefit of the people, claiming the water companies are not doing enough to warrant a tariff hike. While these water companies are indeed slacking off, breaching their contracts and there is even a smell of corruption in the air, prices remain low and controlled too tightly to encourage judicious use of water. The free water policy by Selangor also does not seem to help. Sure, the free water policy says water is free of charge up to a certain level but the idea of free and saving do not go along well with each other. The policy encourages consumption, not saving.

So, there is a water crisis on the supply side but it does not seem to be so, looking at the consumption side.

Why?

It is because information does not flow from supply to the demand side. Prices do not correspond with water supply and so consumers, whether residential, commercial or industrial, act normal. Prices are prevented from functioning properly.

To correct the situation, we need to float the prices, or at least hike it up. Unfortunately, there is no political will for that. In fact, the current political establishment is hostile to any hike. Selangor Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim has guaranteed there will be no rationing. And lest people make him a scapegoat, that is a Pakatan Rakyat’s policy. Their credibility is dependent on a no hike outcome.

Given that political constraint, the next best thing is to resort to non-market solutions. That involves water rationing unfortunately.

There has to be a signal sent to the demand side, telling these consumers, “hey guys, there is a water crisis here. You might want to slow it down a notch.” Without that signal, consumers will act as if everything is alright. If it goes as things are going, there might be none to ration at all later. So, we need to send a stronger signal to the consumers. News reports alone are not working.

I know several people have written in support of rationing. Add me into that list.

I do believe water users in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur will tolerate rationing better than having no water at all.

Categories
ASEAN Economics Politics & government

[2742] Good luck Mr. Jokowi

I have not been following the Indonesian presidential election closely in the sense that I am unfamiliar with detailed policy proposals from both candidates, Jokowi and Prabowo. I remember from some time back that Jokowi specifically offered little detail, leading to the criticism that he has no idea what he is doing and betting on his clean, humble image to win. But I think I have heard or read some proposals along the way. But what I do know is that there is a difference between the two candidates and Prabowo comes out as nationalistic, protectionist candidate, which I think is bad for Malaysia and for Asean integration.

Malaysia and Indonesia are having it relatively good in the past year or so. There have not been too many ugly and petty spats around the accusation of cultural theft. Others are more serious, like the abuse of Indonesian workers in Malaysia and the haze. I should not mention the haze because looking outside right now in Kuala Lumpur, it is pretty bad. Normally I can spot the Petronas Twin Towers from here but right now, it is all white. Walking outside is unpleasant. It is hot, humid and acrid. It is impossible to tolerate the condition. In the past,  Malaysians (and Singaporeans) had been quick to blame their largest neighbor but I think both have to come suspect and possibly realize that the perpetrators of the opening burning in Sumatra and elsewhere (including in some parts of Malaysia) are Malaysian and Singaporean-held plantation companies. And besides, we consume the very products produced by the plantations there. I do not mean that Indonesia is blameless, but solving it requires regional cooperation to address it.

Still, apart from the unpleasant smell, we are not at each other’s throat and I think that is partly because of the reconciliatory tone, or rather, non-aggressive approach taken by the political leadership of both countries, Malaysia and Singapore. I suppose, it is also because the current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has no incentive to appease the more populist crowd who love a chance to slam Malaysia. He is approaching his term limit after all. But even earlier in his term, I think he preferred discussion rather than Sukarno-style rhetoric when dealing with Malaysia.

I do not believe the relatively good period of Malaysia-Indonesia relations will last very long if Prabowo becomes the new Indonesian President. Prabowo appears very nationalistic and I think he would be easy for him to ride on those anti-Malaysian sentiments, especially if things do not go according to his plan in Indonesia. It will always easy to shift the blame to foreigners than focus on the actual problems at hand.

Prabowo also appears to be a protectionist. Having a nationalistic and protectionist President is probably bad news for Malaysia and for Asean integration. It is bad news for Malaysia because there is a lot of Malaysian investment in Indonesia, from plantation to banking. Indonesia is already trying to limit exports of raw material, hoping to develop its own industries. Prabowo looks like the person who would go further for a more comprehensive protectionism across industries. Indonesia is also behind in Asean Open Skies initiative, while most others have agreed and even done opening up.

Also, having Prabowo campaigning with fascist theme is not all too hot for a libertarian like me. Having a fascist Indonesia will take pressure off Malaysia to liberal further. As in right now, I think Indonesia has some democratic and liberal credential to nudge Malaysia in the right way, in a small way. I suppose it is like the one of those Newton’s laws: bodies of mass attract each other and Indonesia is a very large body compared to Malaysia. Having a big, bad fascist right next door is like having a big, bad, black hole across the narrow sea.

Asean wants to integrate closer by 2015. It does not appear that all the goals set will be achieved within target but having its largest members dragging its feet or even regressing will make integration harder than it already is.

This is not to say Jokowi is all free-trade liberal. But I think Jokowi is more even-minded when it comes to Indonesia’s role in making the AEC a success.

I am a regionalist and I am so because I see global effect at closer integration is going nowhere. So, I would like to see the Asean initiative moves forward. Also, as a Malaysia, it is really tiring arguing about petty stuff. I think only Jokowi can do good on both fronts.

So, good luck Mr. Jokowi. I hope you will win the Indonesian election.

Categories
Economics

[2738] The growth of the Malaysian labor force explained, maybe

I am pretty taken aback by the expansion of the Malaysian labor force in the past year or so. The rise has made me skeptical about the utility of the labor market numbers to ascertain the health of the economy. Whenever I look at it, I tell myself, wait until it normalizes. When? If you look at the first chart below, it seems like soon because for the “outside of the labor force” number, it is sort of reverting to its old mean.

The number of workers increased by more than 0.9 million people in 2013 alone and you can see in this in the first chart below. That is about 7% of the total labor force. It is huge. Concurrently, there was a drop of number for those outside of the labor force:

20140611 Msian labor force

I did not really know why it increased in a big way in a very short time frame. Previously, I had read three points explaining the drastic increase. None was satisfying enough to me, but it explained something nonetheless.

The first was the minimum wage. The argument goes that the implementation of the minimum wage caused a lot of people joining the labor market (technically, joining means looking for jobs, not necessarily getting them). The drop in the number of those outside of the labor force strengthened the minimum wage argument (see the red line in the first chart). It made sense, until you realized the unemployment rate itself did not remain elevated for too long. It spiked back in October-November 2013 at 3.5% but it then stabilized at around 3.0%-3.1%:

20140612ueMalaysia

It would make sense that the unemployment rate did not change much, if all of those attracted to minimum wage jobs would find placement immediately, but I am having problem believing that. Sounds way too outrageous. And data on this is a bit hard to find to prove anything conclusively. (p/s – looking at the data again, the spike in unemployment rate of 3.5% happened when the number for those outside of the labor force was at its lowest. So, the minimum wage may have some explanatory power. The V-shape can be explained by discouraged workers, who entered the job market only to find it was harder than expected to find a job, and left it altogether soon after. This makes the minimum wage narrative very promising but getting a hard number to test it out is hard.)

The second was the legalization of undocumented migrants. This was my favorite explanation, until recently. There was an amnesty program for these workers that began in October 2011 and ended in September 2013. Jason Ng at the Wall Street Journal reported about 0.5 million workers were legalized.[1] The figure sounds right except the program ran for 2 years. Why would the labor force size increased significantly only in 2013? Was it the case of last minute legalization? Was all of the 0.5 million registered only in 2013? There was a renewed effort by the government in July and August 2013 to get all those undocumented foreign workers to register with the authorities but I think it would take guts to say yes and be all confident about it. Also, the increase in labor force was 0.9 million, which is far, far higher than the number of amnesty given out. So, there is a hole there. And… it cannot explain the drop of those outside of the labor force. The legalization, I think, should not affect that number. They are already working and their legalization would only increase the labor size. For these workers, it is merely a transfer from the underground economy to the “above ground” economy, not from outside to inside of the labor force.

The third possible reason was a population boom and this is my least favorite because it is a bit convoluted. If you look at Malaysia’s demographics, there is a bulge for cohort aged 20-24 in 2010.

Malaysia demographic projection by Department of Stastistics

There were close to 3 million of them and the year 2013 was about the right time these people graduated out of schools. But here is the thing. There were about 1.1 million students in Malaysia’s higher ed institutions, doing diplomas, bachelors and higher level degrees. It cannot be there the 0.9 million graduated in just one year. There is also a V-shape that cannot be explained by graduating students because it suggests these graduates leaving the labor market after joining them, which I do not think it is the case.

So, the three possible explanations come short in their own ways.

I was researching on something else recently until I re-discovered that Malaysia raised its mandatory retirement age in July 2013, from 55 years old to 60. I remember reading about this a long time ago but it completely went through my head within the context of labor size. That is an embarrassing thing to admit because it was such a big thing that I forgot. So, the raising of the retirement age sounds like a promising possible factor behind the increase in labor force. First, there were about a million of them. That is a good number because again, remember, the increase of the labor force in 2013 was about 0.9 million. Now, it is likely that not all of them are in the labor force. This is a number that needs some researching.

There is a problem with the explanation, though I think it is not as bad that it completely rules out the retirement age point. The problem the retirement age factor faces is not as big as those faced by the amnesty and population boom factors. The problem is that the labor force size markedly increased around January 2013, six months earlier than the implementation of the new retirement age. This requires a bit of a research but a possible explanation is that those nearing the old retirement age in 2013 just before the implementation date were given the choice to continue working. A sort of grace period for them. Since the retirement age act was gazetted in December 2012, the market knew of the details pretty early in the game. This can easily explain the rise of the labor force. The new retirement age might even attract those outside of the labor force who had retired to rejoin, and this can explain the descending slope of the V-shape for those outside of the labor market. I am unsure how to explain the rising slope however.

So, here is my explanation for the drastic increase in the labor force.

The retirement age increase drastically reduced the outflow of labor from the market for one time. The inflow of remained about the same, or maybe slightly bigger than before because of the amnesty program, minimum wage introduction and the (minor) population boom.

Summary? The raising of the retirement age is the main cause of the drastic increase in the labor force.

The new problem now is to explaining why the labor force has contracted since it peaked in October 2013 and why the number for those outside of the labor force rose after September 2013.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — About 1.3 million of an estimated two million undocumented foreign workers had registered with the amnesty program, which started in October 2011 and ended in September of last year, according to government data. However, only about 500,000 received legal documentation, while around 330,000 were repatriated. The program that ended on Monday was an extension of the one that ended last September. [Malaysia Gets Tough on Illegal Immigrants As Amnesty Program Expires. Jason Ng. The Wall Street Journal. January 21 2014]

Categories
Economics

[2737] Tiered fuel subsidy regime won’t work. Cash transfer is better

I rarely agree with Rafizi Ramli on policy matters. His advocacy for free tertiary education is an example; I think there has to be cost to education and if help is required, it has to be selective based on needs, not through blanket means which can have disastrous effect on public finances. His suggestion for the auctioning of approved permits for imported vehicle is another; auctions it will make things more transparent but it will not cut car prices down. But I do agree with him on some other issues and his position on the tiered vehicle-fuel subsidy regime as proposed by the government is reasonable.

He does not think well of it and I think the proposed system is horrible.

As reported in the papers, low-income consumers will enjoy full subsidy, mid-income consumers will get a quota of subsidized fuel and those in the high-income brackets will have to pay the unsubsidized price.[1]

Rafizi argues those enjoying full subsidy can resell their fuel to other groups at a price higher than the subsidized level but below market price. I think so too. The government can make such transfers illegal but being illegal does not mean it will not happen. And I cannot imagine the authority spending considerable resources to hunt down on a whole lot of Malaysians trying to benefit from such loophole in the tiered system. Rafizi has explained it rather well and so, if you want more explanation I suggest you give his blog a read.[2]

Because of the major loophole, I am not so convinced there will be any savings from the restructuring at all. In an efficient market faced with such tiered regime, people will buy subsidized fuel through the low income group (the new middle man) only. So, the cost of the government maintaining the proposed much-more-complicated system can be as expensive as, if not more than, the current simplistic blanket subsidy system. It can be as expensive because the quantity of subsidized fuel purchased will not go down in an efficient market. It can be more because you have to keep a more complex control system for the system to really work. If you want to fight post-sale transactions, then you will have to consider enforcement cost, on top of the actual fuel subsidy cost itself.

We do not live in an efficient market but I can easily imagine a lot of people doing it, if not all. This is already happening for subsidized diesel that companies enjoy from the government. The smuggling of fuel to outside of Malaysia is another proof that it is already happening. These two examples are example of tiered markets.

And remember, the beneficiary of the proposed tiered system is the lower-income households. They need the money. They have a strong incentive to resell their subsidized fuel to others who do not have access to it. Others in the mid-income brackets can be as saving-driven as others. There is an uncaptured producer (or is it consumer?) surplus there and it makes sense to internalize that surplus. The only who will not care are the super-rich who cannot be bothered with the hassle (unless they organize a smuggling business themselves, eh?).

It helps the low-income households, but that is such an expensive and a complex way to do it.

I prefer the plain old subsidy cut to the tiered subsidy (though I think Rafizi disagrees with this). Plain old subsidy cuts guarantees savings.

And if we want to help the low-income households, I prefer cash transfer, like I have always for the longest time. We already have the BR1M program. Just improve on the infrastructure. Cash it directly into the bank accounts of these low-income households. If they do not have an account, create one for them. Address the abuse and corruption instead. No need to get overly creative on this matter.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reservedMohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — KUALA LUMPUR: Only those with a monthly income of below RM5,000 and cars with an engine capacity below 2,000cc will be entitled to unrestricted purchase of subsidised petrol under the new petrol subsidy system, according to a report by Sin Chew Daily yesterday. The report said the target is to launch the new system in the third quarter of this year. Those who earn between RM5,000 and RM10,000 per month will only be able to purchase 300 litres of subsidised diesel and RON95 petrol per month, the Chinese daily said in the report. Those with a monthly income of RM10,000 and above will have to purchase RON97 petrol, which will be based on market prices and without any subsidy. [Fuel subsidies to be means tested, says Sin Chew. The Edge. June 3 2014]

[2] — Berdasarkan maklumat yang dilaporkan setakat ini, saya khuatir sistem subsidi baru petrol dan diesel ini akan mewujudkan pasaran gelap yang menjual petrol dan diesel seperti berikut:

1. Kumpulan yang dibenarkan membeli petrol dan diesel pada harga subsidi boleh membeli secara kerap dan menyimpan petrol dan diesel ini;

2. Mereka kemudian menjual kepada ejen pasaran gelap yang membeli petrol dan diesel ini pada harga yang lebih tinggi;

3. Ejen pasaran gelap kemudian menjual petrol dan diesel ini pada harga yang lebih rendah dari harga pasaran kepada syarikat, pengusaha atau pun orang persendirian yang mahu mendapatkan harga petrol dan diesel pada harga yang lebih rendah. [Sistem Subsidi Baru Petrol & Diesel: Risiko Penyelewengan Dan Kesan Berganda Kenaikan Harga Barang. Rafizi Ramli. June 3 2014]