Categories
Economics Fiction

[2226] Of the road to hell…

It begins with a good intention. Everybody deserves to consume fantastical juice. After all, everything is made out of it. It would be a grave injustice to limit its consumption only to those who can afford it.

Invested with executive power, a group of individuals with only the interest of the public at heart intends to make the fantastical juice available to everyone. They — the do-gooders —decide to introduce a policy to subsidize the production of the fantastical juice.

What follows is a production boom that lowers the prices of the fantastical juice to affordable levels. In fact, the fantastical juice sold here is the cheapest in the region.

On the breakfast, lunch, brunch, tea, dinner and supper menus, the fantastical juice is a star. Consumers are happy. The policy becomes popular. The do-gooders are popular.

All is fine and dandy until one little problem pops up: scarcity. They realize the subsidy policy demands a whole lot of resources. The policy is depriving resources from other programs. They begin to realize that good intention is expensive.

It is all the more expensive when the producers are guaranteed payment through the subsidy scheme. Producers of the fantastical juice just keep on producing even when there is no need for more fantastical juice. After all, who does not want free money?

The do-gooders complain, ”Oh those pesky producers. How dare they take advantage of this noble effort to make the fantastical juice available everywhere to everybody at affordable prices? Never trust them. They are only in it for themselves. They leave us no option. We must regulate them.”

And so, the do-gooders decide to have producers of the fantastical juice licensed. Quota is imposed on production.

The producers protest but not too hard. After all, the policymakers still pay them money. ”At least, we are still making profits.” Without the government and the subsidy program, they would have been left at the mercy of the market. ”We might make a loss if there was no subsidy!” They figure, better work with the government than be at the mercy of the greedy consumers.

That stops the cost of the policy from ballooning further. It solves one problem but it creates another: the fantastical juice mysteriously begins to disappear from shelves of grocery stores.

Consumers are infuriated. Consumers demand action.

The do-gooders panic. They need a scapegoat fast. No, they do not need a scapegoat. One cannot make scapegoats out of smugglers. It must be those greedy smugglers abusing a system designed to benefit all. ”We will double officers at the borders and we will triple the penalty.”

They catch those smugglers but fantastical juice still disappears into thin air. At some point, they realize that they cannot continue to blame the smugglers. If they still do so even after greater enforcement, they would send out a message of failure that there is something wrong with the good policy, and that it is not the smugglers after all. That would undo all good work they have done. Support for their policy would plummet with the slightest hint of admittance of failure.

”We need to identify the problem,” demand the do-gooders.

They conduct a thorough study of the supply chain of the fantastical juice and they find it. It is the retailers. ”These retailers are hoarding the fantastical juice and profiteering from our noble effort. They leave us with no choice. We must regulate them.”

And so, the do-gooders decide that only retailers with the special license can sell the fantastical juice. The do-gooders also introduce price control and ensure that there is a fat margin for retailers. This will encourage the retailers to be more honest because if they are caught, they will lose their license and, because of high demand for the fantastical juice, they will lose a guaranteed profit. The elimination of price variation eliminates the opportunity for retailers to indulge in profiteering as well.

The retailers register a protest, claiming that it is not their fault. ”Supply, being inflexible, is unable to match demand. We do not hoard it. We cannot sell what does not exist.”

”Oh, if that is the case, then you are not managing your inventory efficiently enough for the good of the people. There is enough production for the whole country. We will manage the supply for you.”

Just to keep it airtight, only government-owned transporters are allowed to deliver the fantastical juice in the country.

The do-gooders marvel at their new master plan for the fantastical juice. Their proudest achievement is this: the cheapest fantastical juice in the region is still here.

Alas, shortage persists. ”Someone must still be profiteering from this noble effort,” cry the do-gooders.

Being at their wit’s ends, the do-gooders approach several consultants. These consultants point out that the consumers are consuming too much of fantastical juice. ”That is why there is shortage. They are over demanding it.”

The do-gooders are angry. ”Those no good consumers! They are abusing the system! We want to help everybody, but everybody is abusing our trust! We must regulate them!”

And so, consumption quota is imposed on every consumer. With control at every point, the do-gooders match demand and supply to solve the problem of shortage.

At least, theoretically because those with low demand get too much quota and those with high demand get too little quota. To solve the problem, consumers participate in the black market. Consequently, crime associated with the black market flourishes as cartels are formed to profit from the unlicensed and hence, illegal trade.

”Criminals! All of them are criminals!” shout the do-gooders, ”Send in the police.”

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

First published in The Malaysian Insider on July 18 2010.

Categories
Economics

[2168] Of no to the policy of One Price

Prices of the same tradable items in different places tend to converge in a perfectly efficient market. Theoretically, motivated by profits, individuals and entities act as arbitrageurs. They will continue to arbitrage until there are no more profits to be made. That is when prices equalized and that is the essence of the law of one price.

Prices may not actually converge to one price due to several factors however because market can be inefficient. Limited access to information crucial for the purpose of arbitrage may prevent convergence. Transportation cost as well as government intervention in terms of taxation and subsidization are two of several other important frictions. Instead of prices equalizing, a price spread exists to reflect those frictions even as market participants exhaust arbitrage opportunity.

This is essentially the reason why there is noticeable price differential for the same tradable goods sold in eastern and western part of Malaysia. With the South China Sea separating Malaysia into two parts, it is only natural for prices to differ between the two regions. Even under the price and supply control mechanism that exists in Malaysia, a kilogram of sugar for example, is sold 10 sen cheaper in Peninsular Malaysia than in Sabah and Sarawak. Transportation cost is a considerable barrier preventing actual convergence.

This is a source of discontent for some. Member of Parliament for Kalabakan, Abdul Ghapur Salleh of UMNO said in November 2009 said, “We’re talking about 1Malaysia, but we don’t even have one price” while alleging that the price differential is more insidious in nature — discrimination against Sabah and Sarawak — rather than simple economic friction.

It is unclear how exactly he wants effort at standardization to proceed but the approach by the federal government is clear. In the same month, Minister Koh Tsu Koon supported the idea of standardized prices across Malaysia and proposed that transportation cost be shared by all; in other words, introduce subsidy. Nearly a year earlier, Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Ministry wanted to do the same: subsidize transportation cost. In Sarawak itself, perhaps a harbinger preceding a possibly wider similar nationwide policy, the same ministry plans to subsidize transportation cost with the intention of standardizing prices of essential items sold in urban and rural areas under its “One Sarawak, One Price” campaign.

They are turning the law of one price on its head. Rather than letting market forces find its equilibrium where a particular price fits a particular landscape through a narrow band, the government intends to impose unnatural standardized prices for all situations everywhere to force convergence. The government intends to introduce more inefficiency to standardize prices.

The discontent over price differential is overrated. Two economists — Lee Chin and Muzafar Shah Habibullah of Universiti Putra Malaysia — published a paper in 2008 showing that prices of tradable goods between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak are converging. Furthermore, the recent liberalization of cabotage policy — a protectionist policy that contributed to persistent price differential between eastern and western part of Malaysia — will likely further strengthen the natural convergence trend.

Convergence aside, to iterate the idea of how the difference is natural, the price differential has nothing to do with discrimination between the two parts of Malaysia. It is a reality that there is a large body of water separating the two parts of Malaysia. It is likely that if the transportation cost is brought down either through liberalization or improvement in technology, prices are likely to equalize, all else being equal.

The price differential due to transportation cost or distance has nothing to do with the idea of unity as much as it has something to do with the idea of discrimination. In the United States for instance, gas prices in Michigan and in California are very different. Even in the same state, prices of gas in one town can be different from another town a mile away. That does not make the person who pays higher price as less American than the other person who pays lower price for gas.

This idea can be expanded to Peninsular Malaysia. The government should not standardize prices within Malaysia. This is not to say just prices between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, but within those regions as well. What a free Malaysia needs is not a Price Control Act, but a Competition Act or antitrust law to fight collusion among businesses in order to encourage competition — the most effective method at encouraging convergence and low prices — without suffocating entrepreneurial spirit.

On top of that, maybe, just maybe, the move of having manufacturers based in Sabah or Sarawak is a cheaper and a more profitable option compared to the option of transporting goods from Peninsular Malaysia or from abroad even after accounting for various other effects like clusterization.

If the subsidization program goes through, it removes that incentive and hence, the possibility of developing industries in eastern Malaysia. If a business owner could transport his or her goods free from western to eastern Malaysia, why would the business owner locate his or her factory in eastern Malaysia? There are better ports, roads, financial services — practically everything that matters in business — in Peninsular Malaysia than in Sabah and Sarawak. The subsidization program would continue to industrialize the Peninsula while leaving Sabah and Sarawak farther behind in terms of development.

Besides, the Prime Minister recently said that private initiates and market forces have to be given freer rein while subsidies be phased out. The standardization of prices across Malaysia through subsidization of transportation cost by the government clearly contradicts that. Is this a proof that there is no coordination within the government? Or does words mean nothing to the government?

For the answer to be no on both accounts, the policy of “One Price” must be rejected.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

A version of this article was first published in The Malaysian Insider on February 22 2010.

Categories
Economics

[2130] Of sugar prices today and 20 years ago

Sugar price per kilogram in Malaysia in 1989 was RM1.20, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Sugar price per kilogram in Malaysia today is RM1.45.

If sugar were the only commodity in the world for Malaysia, it would suggest that average annual inflation rate for the past 20 years was no more than 1%.

Based on consumer price index obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), average annual inflation rate for Malaysia within the same time period was slightly above 3%. It is probably safe to assume that salary, over the same period grew at the same rate, with mobility of a person with respect to the so-called corporate ladder fixed.

If every assumption stands, it is clear that sugar has been growing cheaper in real price terms. Since it is subsidized, it has been growing artificially cheaper in real price terms.

I wonder what is the total size of sugar subsidy bill for the past 20 years. According to various articles in The Star, last year’s bill stood at RM720 million. It has to be in the realm of billions. How about in present value? In terms of opportunity cost?

It should be a mind-busting figure.

What a wasteful policy.