Tag: Malaysia

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ASEAN History & heritage Politics & government

[2766] 50 years outside of Malaysia

The number 50 is psychologically special to almost everybody. Notwithstanding the debate about the age of Malaysia, whether it was 50 years old or 44 in 2007, we too had a huge celebration for our golden anniversary. Down south this year, Singapore is approaching its 50th anniversary as an independent state.

The Singaporean anniversary is less ambiguous than Malaysia’s. There are fewer ominous existential questions being thrown around unlike in Malaysia when from time to time, we hear secessionist sentiments coming out from Sabah.

There is a myth in Malaysia that Singapore seceded from our federation. In truth, it was Tunku Abdul Rahman who pushed the island-city out with a vote in Parliament in Kuala Lumpur sealing the decision.

Unilateral secession is impossible legally. Furthermore, Singapore itself did not want to leave and this was very clear through Lee Kuan Yew’s writings. Jeffrey Kitingan, unfortunately, recently repeated the secessionist myth as he pandered to Sabahan nationalists for his own political fortune by saying secession is a state right, showing again and again that history can be forgotten and worse, twisted to fit the preferred narrative.

That is not the only myth: some Malaysians still think there are 14 states in the federation somehow forgetting that Singapore is no more a member state. It is as if the vestiges of the Malaysian Singapore still linger and that these Malaysians have yet to come to terms with the 1965 separation.

The fourteenth stripe and the fourteenth point in the Federal Star of the Jalur Gemilang now have been redefined to represent the federal government and the three territories, instead of Singapore as was previously. Our coat of arms no longer has the Singaporean red and white crescent and star underneath the four colors of the old Federated Malay States. In its place is the red hibiscus, what seems to be the forgotten Malaysian national flower.

Regardless of the myths, Singapore and Malaysia did go separate ways and that has been the source of contention between the two. The issues range from water supply and train land in the heart of Singapore to ownership of rocky outcrops in the middle of the sea. Some have been resolved amicably but the general rivalry persists even as the Causeway ties have improved since the almost irrationally nationalistic days of Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew.

One can speculate what would have happened if Singapore had remained within the federation. This question has been raised as Singaporeans reflect on their 50 years of independence but I think the more interesting one is whether there would be a time when Singapore would rejoin Malaysia.

As much as I believe international borders with its passport and visa requirements are suffocating in this modern world, I think that is a very distant possibility. Malaysia is unprepared for Singapore just as we were not prepared for a Malaysian Malaysia in 1963. I do not believe the pro-Bumiputra policy will go away even if power does change from Barisan Nasional to Pakatan Rakyat in Putrajaya. The Bumiputras are the majority in Malaysia and there will always be pressure to appease them. It is the uncomfortable truth of electoral politics that makes idealists sigh.

Just look at the squabbling in Pakatan between PAS and DAP that has degenerated to race and religion. You can also read Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s speeches and wonder what exactly he is saying about hudud, for instance, out of fears angering either the liberals or the more conservative Muslim majority.

Meanwhile in Barisan, the slightest hint of liberalization is being fiercely opposed by the conservative sides in Umno. When discussing the Transpacific Partnership agreement, one of the top objections to the negotiation is how it would affect the Bumiputra, and really, the Malay, business community. Prime Minister Najib Razak is already facing a civil war within his party for the liberalization he did and other less admirable factors that include the mismanagement of the country.

Ultimately, there is a common theme across Barisan and Pakatan and that means it is more of a systemic Malaysian issue. Adding Singapore into the equation would not help and could even make it worse.

Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan recently said in a speech, it is ”impossible for us to ever be part of Malaysia again unless Malaysia abandons its basic organizing principle.” That principle will not go away any time soon.

But we have Asean and in many ways both Malaysia and Singapore are already integrating. Both citizens can travel across the border without much hassle, if you discount the congestion at the Causeway. Some Singaporeans are already living in Malaysia as the government is promoting Nusajaya and Johor Baru, to put it bluntly, as the suburbs of the world-city Singapore.

And the Asean Economic Community due for implementation this year would deepen integration between the two, which is already one of the most ”• I would think it is the most ”• integrated national economies in the region.

Realistically the AEC would take time but the trajectory is clear. That I think is a reasonable future for both Malaysia and Singapore: a closer confederation of South-east Asian states.

So, we do not need Singapore in Malaysia. We just need to have both countries to be active in Asean.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
First published in The Malay Mail on February 14 2015.

Categories
ASEAN Liberty

[2668] The Sulu and the Philippine claims of Sabah are undemocratic and unlibertarian

I have a fundamental objection to the Sulu and the Philippine claims of Sabah. Calling it the claim of Sabah is somewhat inaccurate because if the Philippine claim is wholly based on the Sulu claim, then by right the claim only covers roughly the eastern half of Sabah. Nevertheless, the objection that I have is not based on nationalistic sentiment. It is based on democratic and libertarian values.

Know this. The claim by the two parties are undemocratic and certainly unlibertarian. It is both undemoractic and unlibertarian because it completely bypasses the will of the people in Sabah.

The Sulu claim especially is made by a pretender to the throne of the Sulu Sultanate, a monarchy which practically has been extinct for a long time now. The claim by the monarchy highlights how it is undemocratic and unlibertarian.

The term libertarian that I use here is almost democratic and almost committed to a liberal democracy.

Libertarians come from the tradition that the state derives its legitimacy from its people. After all, the most important component of any society is the individuals who form it. Libertarians seek to secure freedom of individuals and the best way to do so within the framework of the state is to make the state answerable to its citizens.

The Sulu claim certainly does not fit into the libertarian framework. If the claim is realized by the Sulu Sultanate, then it will be clear that it is the sultan who will be in power. The Sultan, after all, is running the show, ordering the doomed incursion into Sabah. Any political power will originate from him and that is unacceptable to any libertarian.

Of course, the new Sulu power in Sabah can institute democratic infrastructure to turn the direction of the origin of power more libertarian and that will solve the democratic and libertarian concern. But the fact remains the claim has its origin from a very autocratic nature.

If one compares the Sulu claim to Malaysia’s, it is clear that the Malaysian claim is more libertarian. This is not to mean that Malaysia is a libertarian utopia but relatively, Malaysia is far above the rung compared to the Sulu Sultanate.

The most libertarian argument for Malaysia is that the Malaysian claim is not really a Malaysian claim. It is a Sabahan claim. The people of Sabah decided to be part of the federation of Malaysia and as a federation, all states within Malaysia is responsible toward the security of Sabah. In the face of armed adventure embarked by the Sulu Sultanate, the self-defense action by the Malaysian security forces is legitimate from the libertarian perspective, especially from the libertarian concept of non-aggression axiom. The axiom can be problematic at times by in the case of Sabah, its application is straight forward.

And this brings us to the Philippines, which for all intents and purposes is the successor state to the extinct Sulu Sultanate. What makes the Philippine claim more legitimate from libertarian perspective when compared to the Sulu claim, is that the Philippines, like Malaysia, is a democracy. Both democracies may not be perfect and there are flaws in the system but principally, they are. There are democratic institutions and there are guarantees of individual rights although the guarantees do not go as far enough as a libertarian would like and there are deplorable violations of those rights.

Of course, comparing Malaysian and Philippine democratic institutions to Sulu’s, which do not exist, is unfair because they have not been given a chance to develop it. Nevertheless, the setup highlights the origin of power. For both states, the origin of the power comes from the people, not some autocrats like a sultan.

That however does not make the Philippine claim very much more agreeable from the Sulu claim. The Philippine claim still bypasses the people of Sabah. So, the only libertarian (and democratic) way of solving the claim is by going back to the people. Let us have three options. Malaysia, independence or the Philippines. I have a feeling that the first two options will be more popular to the last one.

And then finally, the Malaysian setup is far more likeable to libertarians than the Philippines. Malaysia is a federation and the Philippines is a unitary state. Sabah has considerable autonomy within Malaysia. Even then, there are accusations that Kuala Lumpur is meddling in the affairs of Sabah. Imagine the Philippines with its unitary state mentality. That would be ugly not just to libertarians, but more so to Sabahans and the Philippines.

Categories
History & heritage

[2589] How old is Malaysia again? A layman generalization attempt

Since it will be August 31 soon, I think I want to further develop my thinking about the 55 versus 49 years old debate, i.e. how old is Malaysia?

I have shared opinion on the matter a number of times over the last, probably six years. I was September 16, before there was September 16 (kidding, don’t shoot me). Now, I want to generalize my framework on the matter.

The debate does matter in terms of historical accuracy and its logical implications are huge (honestly though, in the immediate every day, the debate is pedantic but fun nonetheless). For instance, if you understand Malaysia to be born in 1963 and that Malaysia does not exist prior to September 16 1963, then Malaysia was never colonized. What were colonized were the lands that modern Malaysia now encompasses. I think this is a strict observance of definition but many are not really interested in such strict observance.

In fact, many would ridicule that strict observance. When historian Khoo Kay Kim said that Malaysia was never colonized by the British because technically, the lands that came to form Malaysia under the British were protectorates, many thought he was crazy. But technically, he was right though those lands for all intents and purposes were colonized.

So, to many, Malaysia was colonized in the past. Not too many differentiate the history of modern Malaysian state (the 1963 federation) from the history of its member states. Really, if you read history from the perspective of the land instead of the state as an institution, there is no difference between the history of Malaysia and the history of its member states. I do think the history of the land is the lens which most Malaysians see the history of Malaysia.

The proper way to understand history is to consider each state on its own terms but at the same time, take the history of the land as continuous, whatever states that existed in the relevant period (also, history is “borderless“, i.e. one cannot apply modern boundary into the distant past in the reading of history). This allows for consistent and technically precise understanding of history but also allows for the appreciation of history in its widest, complete context. Call it the state-land dichotomy; same-same but different, or so the Indochinese would say.

While it is a dichotomy, the understanding of both is crucial. One obviously cannot understand modern Malaysian history without understanding pre-1957 history of the land.

For instance, how does one understand modern conservative Malay psyche that is a major factor in contemporary politics without knowing the history of Malay sultanates?

Also, history of foreign lands are important as well. But that would digress from my point and so, Iwill stop here as far as foreign lands are concerned.

So, according to the state interpretation, Malaysia is 49 years old. According to the land interpretation, Malaysia the land is, well, I do not know how old Malaysia is. It cannot be 55 years old because the land existed in 1956. In fact, this land has existed since time immemorial.

The third interpretation, which probably an amalgamation of the dichotomy into one, is that all those states or institutions that existed are intertemporally related states that should be taken collectively as the same state from modern point of view (as seen from the current state, which is taken as the successor of previous related state).

This has been the argument that supports the idea that Malaysia is 55 years old. But there is inconsistency here. If these institutions are really the same, why accept 1957 as the beginning? What about 1948 when the Federation of Malaya was formed? What about 1946 during the Malayan Union? There are other dates but it all leads to the same question: when did the first institution was formed? Do we need to go to all the way to Srivijaya’s time? All the way to the beginning of Kedah? I see third interpretation as eventually approximating the land interpretation.It will not have the time immemorial conclusion but it will go far enough into history that it really does not matter to contemporary life.

I know monarchists do take this interpretation in some way, by basing the “Malaysia” institution as the office of the Agong. Since the office of the Agong was established in 1957, then Malaysia is 55 years old. That intepretation does logically lead to the number 55, but I do not subscribe to that. I do not see how the office of the Agong is the state. The state does not take its power from the Agong. The office of the Agong is merely an institution within the state.

Perhaps, the question is not how old the state is but rather, it is a question of independence: how long has the current state been independent? This sidesteps the reference to 1948 or earlier dates. Unfortunately, it suffers from controversial Malayan bias: Sabah and Sarawak (and Singapore) attained independence in 1963.

But whatever it is, something happened on August 31 1957. The Federation of Malaya, formed on January 31 1948, became independent.

Categories
Economics Environment

[2137] Of 40% cut in carbon intensity may not be something to shout about

Bernama wrongfully reported that the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, put up a conditional offer to cut 40% of Malaysia’s 2005 carbon emissions by 2020.[1] The same goes with the New Straits Times, except it did it more badly by not directly quoting the Prime Minister.[2] This is sloppy reporting. The truth is that it is a conditional cut of 40% to Malaysia’s carbon emissions intensity in terms of GDP within the base and time frame mentioned. Regardless of the inaccuracy, is the cut impressive?

The size of the cut seems big but cutting carbon emissions intensity is a lot easier than cutting outright carbon emissions; a cut in emissions is more expensive than a cut in carbon intensity. Achieving 5% cut as demanded by Kyoto is a lot harder than 5% cut in carbon intensity. The difference is clearer when one takes note that emissions itself can increase even under a situation of decreasing carbon intensity.

A demostration is in order. The most convenient way of showing this is by using intensity per capita as a unit rather than per GDP. In order words, this refers to emissions per person.

Assume that the emissions per person is 2 and there are a total of 10 persons in a neighborhood. The total emissions is therefore 20.

Assume further than emissions per person improves to 1.5 and total population increase to 15. Total emissions gets worse: it is now 22.5.

A cut in emissions will address total emissions. A cut in carbon intensity does not guarantee that.

A concrete example is the United Kingdom. According to the National Environmental Technology Centre of the UK, total emissions fell slightly between 1990 and 2005. Carbon intensity? It fell more or less by 40%. [3]

Hence, the act of stressing the difference is not a matter of splitting hair.

Carbon intensity has the tendency to decrease over time due to application of technology. The typical criticism directed at any commitment at reducing carbon intensity is that even without such commitment, carbon intensity will decrease anyway. This is especially true for developing countries where there is a lot of space for technological improvement through by merely copying.

Given this, the Prime Minister’s conditional offer is not something to shout about. China also made an offer to cut carbon intensity and it has been rightly criticized for trumpeting an unremarkable target and then demanding moral authority at the negotiation table in Copenhagen during the 15th Conference of the Parties that ended recently.

(Despite this tendency, Malaysia’s carbon intensity between 1990 and 2004 increased. I suspect a Kuznets curve.[4] The ratio may increase up to a certain level before decreasing. Malaysia after all was industrializing during the 1990s and now, Malaysia is largely done with industrialization.)

It should only be seen as a brilliant diplomatic maneuver and not a big effort at cutting emissions. It is brilliant not just because that the commitment is very likely to be achieved anyway and thus, making the offerers look good, it is brilliant because it makes demand for aid — and making the exercise cheaper than it would — even when the cut in carbon intensity is very likely to be achieved without any binding commitment.

This is not to dismiss the importance of cut in carbon intensity. I myself believe that technology is the answer to climate change but it is important to get the right message across while the Malaysian mass media failed the public miserably.

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

[1] — COPENHAGEN, Dec 17 (Bernama) — Malaysia has agreed to reduce its carbon dioxide emission to 40 per cent by the year 2020 compared to the 2005 levels subject to assistance from developed countries.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said the cut was conditional on receiving the transfer of technology and adequate financing from the developed world.

“I would like to announce here in Copenhagen that Malaysia is adopting an indicator of a voluntary reduction of up to 40 per cent in terms of emissions intensity of GDP (gross domestic product) by the year 2020 compared to 2005 levels,” he said in his speech at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 here, on Thursday,

United Nations data shows Malaysia’s carbon emissions in 2006 stood at 187 million tonnes or 7.2 tonnes from each Malaysian. [Malaysia Announces Conditional 40 Per Cent Cut In Emissions. Bernama. December 17 2009]

[2] — PM Najib says Malaysia is committed to do its best in combatting climate change.

MALAYSIA will voluntarily slash by up to 40 per cent her carbon emission by 2020 compared with 2005 levels.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak, who made this commitment yesterday, said the cut was part of Malaysia’s contribution to global efforts to combat climate change. [40 per cent reduction of carbon emission by 2020. Mimi Syed Yusof. New Straits Times. December 18 2009]

[2] — COPENHAGEN: A roadmap towards realising the 40% reduction of carbon emission per capita from the 2005 level by 2020 will be presented to the Cabinet soon. [40 per cent reduction of carbon emission by 2020. Mimi Syed Yusof. New Straits Times. December 18 2009]

[3] — [Page 18 and 19. Carbon dioxide emissions and energy consumption in the UK. The National Environmental Technology Centre]

[4] — See Kuznets Curve at Wikipedia. Accessed on December 25 2009.

Categories
Personal

[2029] Of goodbye Malaysia

Goodbye dear country. Be a good boy now. Please do not be a pariah while I am away.