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Economics

[2627] Does inflation hidden between the CPI and GDP deflator explain the CPI dissonance?

I have argued before that too many disbelieve the CPI inflation because they do not understand how inflation is measured. Some do not get the fact that CPI inflation is the change in price level and not the price level itself. Too many think that it is impossible that inflation is really that low in Malaysia when prices have jumped up so much over the years. They essentially compared prices to a different base than that used by the CPI and failed to take that difference into account. Others are just too stubborn that they express disbelief but they are unable to systematically justify their disbelief other than resorting to rhetoric. While this is a trivial macroeconomic issue, it does have real political implications in Malaysia unfortunately. This really highlights importance of communication between economists and the lay public in Malaysia.

Lars Christensen, an economist and a giant in the market monetarist circle, may have implicitly provided another explanation to describe the discrepancy between CPI inflation and the disbelieving sentiment on the ground.

He suggests that price controls are causing a wedge between CPI inflation and GDP deflator change.[1] If there were no controls, the CPI inflation and the GDP deflator change should have moved in tandem. So, price controls are suppressing the CPI inflation (because price controls target goods consumed locally and CPI measures good consumed domestically while GDP deflator is more descriptive of prices all of Malaysia because it measures prices of good produced locally regardless where it ends up). The claim on inflation suppression (by price controls and not the data itself) is completely uncontroversial.

So, as Christensen puts it, the difference between CPI inflation and GDP deflator change is hidden inflation. Would be it possible that despite the official CPI figures, the consumers feel the pain from the GDP deflator?

While this can be used to describe the dissonance between the official CPI inflation rate and disbelief on the ground, there is an obvious problem to the implicit explanation of the dissonance. Consumers do not face prices as measured by the GDP deflator. They face prices measured by the CPI instead.

Christensen does not explicit use the term hidden inflation in the same context that I am framing the issue. He uses it to describe the problem of shortage of controlled items, which does happen from time to time in Malaysia. I am just preempting any argument that may come out to explain the CPI dissonance that may originate from his points.

My view is that the CPI inflation is right and the reason for the disbelief has more to do with the fact that many do not understand the CPI. Furthermore, some components of the CPI are growing faster than the overall CPI and this might have contributed to the disbelief. In this sense, the pain index designed by Hisham of Economics Malaysia is helpful in addressing the disbelief.[2]

Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved Mohd Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved
[1] — The Christensen family arrived in Malaysia yesterday. It is vacation time! So since I am in Malaysia I was thinking I would write a small piece on Malaysian monetary policy, but frankly speaking I don’t know much about the Malaysian economy and I do not follow it on a daily basis. So my account of how the Malaysian economy is at best going to be a second hand account.

However, when I looked at the Malaysian data something nonetheless caught my eye. Looking at the monetary policy of a country I find it useful to compare the development in real GDP (RGDP) and nominal GDP (NGDP). I did the same thing for Malaysia. The RGDP numbers didn’t surprise me — I knew that from the research I from time to time would read on the Malaysian economy. However, most economists are still not writing much about the development in NGDP.

In my head trend RGDP growth is around 5% in Malaysia and from most of the research I have read on the Malaysian economy I have gotten the impression that inflation is pretty much under control and is around 2-3% — so I would have expected NGDP growth to have been around 7-8%. However, for most of the past decade NGDP growth in Malaysia has been much higher — 10-15%. The only exception is 2009 when NGDP growth contracted nearly 8%! [Lars Christensen. Malaysia should peg the renggit to the price of rubber and natural gas. The Market Monetarist. November 15 2012]

[2] — Inflation as measured by the CPI is up 1.6% in annual log terms, but my core inflation measure (CPI ex-food, ex-transport) decelerated to 1.1% from 1.2% from April’s reading. Price’s are up from the month before, but not by much — not so coincidentally, the Ringgit has been falling slightly against major currencies, so some pass through of inflation is to be expected. But the magnitude of price increases is still far below what people seem to feel is happening to their monthly household bills.

To get a feel for this, I’m going to invert the components of my core measure — instead of excluding the more volatile components to arrive at a stable long term inflation measure that’s useful for policy analysis, I’m going to exclude the non-volatile components instead i.e. measure inflation based exclusively on food and transport prices, which is more representative of what’s happening to people’s wallets.

You could call this the ”Pain” Index [Hishamh. May CPI: Measuring The Pain. Economics Malaysia. June 21 2010]

Categories
Economics

[2610] GDP measures output, not welfare

It may seem strange that GDP rises if there are more road accidents. This is partly because  of greater activity by emergency services. On the contrary, one would intuitively like to see GDP diminishing in such circumstances. But this would be to confuse a measure of output (GDP) with a measure of welfare, which GDP is not. At most, GDP is a measure of the contribution of production to welfare. There are a great number of other dimensions to welfare that GDP does not claim to measure.

[…]

While the national accounts system has the above major limitations, it should not be criticised out of misunderstanding about its objectives and definitions. For example, many people fail to understand why GDP does not fall following major natural catastrophes (or terrorist attacks). This is because they misunderstand the definition of GDP, which, as we have seen, measures output during a given period. People tend to confuse GDP with the country’s economic wealth. Undoubtedly, major calamities destroy part of the economic wealth (buildings, houses, roads and infrastructure), but they do not, per se, constitute negative production and so do not directly contribute to a decline in GDP. Destruction can indirectly affect production in a negative or positive way. When a factory is destroyed it ceases production, but it also has to be rebuilt and this constitutes production. For this reason, paradoxically, it is possible for a natural catastrophe to have a positive impact (in the purely mathematical sense of the word “positive”) on GDP. [Page 37. François Lequiller. Derek Blades. Understanding National Accounts. OECD Publishing. 2006]

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Economics

[2579] Far higher potential output for Malaysia?

Both the GDP and the CPI numbers for Malaysia were released yesterday.

Real GDP growth grew by 5.4% in the second quarter from a year ago. Although I suspected that growth would be strong due to strong showing in the industrial production index, I found 5.4% as surprising still. It was too strong for whatever the production index was showing.

The strong growth, along with low unemployment rate, provides a puzzle when it is considered together with inflation trend. Inflation in Malaysia, both headline (1.4% in July from a year ago) and core (1.3%) inflations, has been decreasing since the beginning of the year. Typically, strong growth creates demand-pull inflation. That demand-pull inflation has been absent in the second quarter despite strong GDP showing.

Furthermore, the unemployment rate has been low and I tend to consider the current rate to be quite close to the idea of full employment.  The latest employment rate, which is for the month of May, is 3.0%. Previously, the rate hovered between 3.3% and 3.1%. Labor participation rate is also quite high given historical standard. The assumption of full employment implies the economy has been working close to its full potential. Any growth stronger than the potential will put upward pressure on prices.

Yet, inflation, especially core inflation, has been decreasing throughout the year.

This may suggest that the potential output is higher than the growth the Malaysian economy has been experiencing so far. It also suggests that the already low unemployment rate can go down further and that we are not really that close to full potential.

So, Malaysia can grow faster still, which is an exciting realization. I heard of the go-go 1990s. Maybe, it is time for the go-go 2010s in spite of everything. Let us just hope things will not go down in flame like it eventually did in the 90s.

Whatever it is, if growth so far has been unsustainable, then inflation should accelerate in the near future. If it is sustainable (i.e. actual growth is lower than potential), we should see only limited demand-pull inflation.

Finally, I previously projected the Malaysian economy to grow by 4.0% for the whole of 2012. I am looking like a fool now and will be looking to upgrade the growth rate soon. Nevertheless, I am ultimately skiddish about that upgrade. Although domestic demand, which grew by 12.0% year-on-year, has proven to be capable of cushioning the adverse impacts from weak exports, the global risk is still there. Trade has not collapsed but it can and if it does, an upgrade will be a very foolish thing to do.

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Economics

[2502] A too convenient instance of government spending

The Malaysian GDP figures for the 4th quarter came out today, with the full year growth being slightly above 5%. Judging by the components of the GDP and their respective growth, I find the growth rate of 5% to be too convenient for the government, which projected the 2011 economy to grow between 5% and 6%. The reason is that government spending grew by close to 17%.

I shared this last month, and the 4th quarter growth for government spending was even higher than the previous quarter: 23.6% from a year ago.

I did a little calculation just now while I was finishing a GDP report for my bank. I found out that if government spending had not grown at all, that would have shaved almost a complete percentage point out of the 5% annual GDP growth. If the spending increase had been slightly more modest, the overall growth would have missed the government’s target easily. Really, it would not take much to miss the target.

I know there is a low base effect given that there was hardly any government spending growth in 2010. It is very likely that spending planned for 2010 was postponed to 2011.

But the government spending growth is still convenient, too convenient, nonetheless. This may appear to be a case of perverse incentive.

It is much like a case in Liar’s Poker:

One trader remembers that ”Lewie would say he thought the market was going up, and buy a hundred million [dollar-worth of] bonds. The market would start to go down. So Lewie would buy two billion more bonds, and of course the market would then go up. After he had driven the market up, Lewie would turn to me and say, ”˜See I told you it was going up’”¦”

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Economics

[2491] Malaysian real government spending growth

This is the Malaysian government spending year-on-year quarterly growth from 2001 till 2011, as classified in the real gross domestic product.