My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a localized focus. In trying to deal with these problems I have tried to deal with three main aspects of my own contemporary reality that seem to me to point the way out of the methodological or perspectival difficulties I have been discussing, difficulties that might force one, in the first instance, into writing a coarse polemic on so unacceptable general a level of description as not to be worth the effort, or in the second instance, into writing so detailed and atomistic a series of analyses as to lose track of the general lines of forces informing the field, giving it it’s special cogency. How then to recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context? [Edward Said. Orientalism. 1978]
Category: Books, essays and others
So much for the doubts about the possibility of understanding the past. But to understand is not to accept. Vico experiences no intellectual discomfort – nor need he do so – when he damns in absolute terms the social injustice and brutality of Homeric society. Herder is not being inconsistent when he denounces the great conquerors and destroyers of local cultures – Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne – or glorifies Oriental literature or primitive song. This would not be consistent with conscious (or, shall I say, conscientious) relativism of values, but is compatible with pluralism, which merely denies that there is one, and only one, true morality or aesthetics or theology, and allows equally objective alternative values or systems of value. One can reject a culture because one finds it morally or aesthetically repellent, but, one this view, only if one can understand how and why it could, nevertheless, be acceptable to a recognisably human society. Only if its behaviour is not intelligible at all are we reduced to a mere ‘physicalist’ description and prediction of gestures; the code, if there is one, which would yield their meaning remains unbroken. Such men are not fully human for us; we cannot imaginatively enter their worlds; we do not know what they are up to; they are not brothers to us (as Vico and Herder supposed that all human beings were); we can at most only dimly guess at what the point of their acts, if they are acts, may be. Then truly do we have to confine ourselves to mere behaviourist reports of unexplained brute fact, or, at best, resort to the language of pure relativism, to the extent tht these men’s ends, somehow grasped as ends, seem wholly unrelated to our own. I repeat, pluralism – the incommensurability nd, at times, incompatibility of objective ends – is not relativism; nor, a fortiori, subjectivism, nor the allegedly unbridgeable differences of emotional attitude on which some modern positivists, emotivists, existentialists, nationalists and, indeed, relativistic sociologists and anthropologists found their accounts. This is the relativism from which I hold Montesquieu, Vico and Herder to have been free. This is no less true of other, more reactionary, critics of the Enlightenment: of Justus Moser, for example, in his polemic against Voltaire’s disparaging references to the absurd variety of laws and customs in the various little German principalities; or Burke, in his indictment of Warren Hastings for trampling on the traditional ways of life of the natives of India. I am not attempting to judge the validity of their objectivism or their pluralism, only to report it. Je ne suppose rien, je ne propose rien, je n’impose rien, j’expose. [Isaiah Berlin. Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought. 1980]
Stark’s system of government was based on mistrust. He looked for laziness, insubordination, drunkenness, and strife; he pretended to suppress them, and only succeeded in creating the further vices of cunning, deceit, and ill-will. Too many laws and regulations stifle the sense of good and evil. No one looks beyond his own personal interest; and nothing matters except the evasion of punishment: The plantation was an overgoverned state, as are all the European States of today; and the men were an army of demoralised by discipline. [Henri Fauconnier. The Soul of Malaya. Chapter 1. 1931]
I just learned that Albert Otto Hirschman, the economist who wrote Exit, Voice and Loyalty, died in December 2012 as I was traveling across Java. Perhaps, this is an opportune time to review Exit, Voice and Loyalty which was published in 1970. I read the book some years back.
The idea presented in the book is pretty widely known now. So if one is to read about the book now, one would probably go, ”what is the big deal?” But you see, that idea came from this particular book. It is an influential book. At the very least, Hirschman was the one who formalized the very intuitive idea of dealing with disagreement in an organization.
The New York Times in its obituary of Hirschman told a story of William Safire and Albert Hirschman. William Safire was an amazing writer. I remember enjoying his sometimes hilarious column at The New York Times. Being an expert on language, he wanted to learn the origin of the term “exit strategy.” Safire traced it back to Hirschman.[1]
That is one proof how influential the book is.
Exit, Voice and Loyalty introduces a simple idea. A person in an organization has two options: exit and voice. The organization can be anything. It could be marriage, firm or even a state. It should be noted that the full title of the book is Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States.
A member of an organization is a member of an organization because he or she agrees with it to some extent. Depending on how tolerant the member is to the differences, he or she may decide to first voice out against the disagreement in hope to affect the position of the organization. The member does so because he or she cares about the organization.
If the divergence of position becomes too great, the member may decide to leave the organization altogether. The decision to leave may hurt the organization as the organization loses members.
The two options interact with each other. Some members have no opportunity to leave and so they employ the voice option to express their dissatisfaction. For Malaysia, the easiest example may involve Muslims where apostasy is hard if not impossible given all the restrictions imposed. This may explain why some Muslims are very critical of the religion, or at least the one sanctioned by the state in Malaysia. Of course, that is not the only reason for criticism. Many criticize the way Islam is practiced in Malaysia because they care about Islam. There’s loyalty in the religion. To them, leaving is impossible not because they are not allowed to leave, but because leaving is unimaginable.
So, loyalty is the glue that encourages the use of the voice option. Exit option is exercised if the glue fails.
The exit and voice option and its interplay which involves the notion of loyalty is probably best demonstrated in political settings. Application of the idea within political parties is probably the most widely known.
Another application involves immigration. I think I have written something about this as part of my degree requirement in what seems like a long time ago. It is easy to see how robust the model is. How many people have migrated out of Malaysia because they disagree with the prevailing policy?
What is interesting is that when a country has an authoritarian setting when the voice option can be deadly and exit is not really an option for one reason or another. I am unsure if this particular example is presented in the book itself but on Wikipedia:
Exit need not be physical, but can be mental or emotional. For example, under communism, many could not physically exit the country, but did not want to participate in the system either. In these cases, citizens could be said to exit from civic or political participation, as they were neither loyal to the party nor were they willing to voice their dissatisfaction (except for noted times of dissent, e.g., 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Prague and the Revolutions of 1989) because doing so could lead to imprisonment, exile, or even death. Many thus mentally and emotionally exited their countries for the duration of a repressive regime they did not agree with but felt they could not fight or topple. The consequences of this exit can sometimes provide an explanation for why voter turnout is often low in countries where free elections are being held for the first time in years (or ever). [Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Wikipedia. Accessed on January 11 2013]
This obviously is not a comprehensive review. But what I can say is that it can be an enlightening reading, even if it is a common idea. It is not a thick book but there can multiple pow moments when you would go wow. You should read it as a tribute to a great economist.
”Did he coin the phrase?” Mr. Safire wrote after interviewing Mr. Hirschman. ”No; it’s nowhere in his book. He used exit option. ”˜It was a somewhat new concept then,’ Hirschman recalls. ”˜I used exit to indicate a possibility, a strategy. When you are dissatisfied, you can use your voice option or your exit option. It is not so different from the political use today. Speak up or get out.’ ” [Nelson Benjamin Albert Hirschman, Optimistic Economist, Dies at 97. The New York Times. December 23 2012]
Up in Washington,
he wrote the Lexington,
now in the mist,
no longer an economist.
(Peter David, the Lexington columnist at The Economist, died in a car crash in D.C. yesterday)