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Economics

[2947] Without carbon pricing, we are left with adaptive measures

Carbon pricing, and specifically carbon tax, has been criticized as false panacea to the emission problem. Overrated, Jomo wrote last week.[1] In the Financial Times, an opinion piece warns pricing carbon is a shock therapy doing more harm than good, recalling the hardship experienced by many in the former Soviet Union during Russia and eastern European countries’ sudden and forced transition from communism to free-market.[2]

A brief rationale for carbon tax

Carbon tax treats carbon emissions (and other greenhouse gases, which we tend to forget) as a negative externality. That means the emission costs are unaccounted for, and because polluting is free, too much is being emitted much to the detriment of the overall society. Carbon tax (there are other mechanism as well) is designed to price the emissions, put ownership on the emissions and make somebody pays for it. Once somebody pays for it, then that somebody would be more mindful about emitting carbon, thus reducing emissions to a more reasonable level, with respect to average global temperature rise. That is the theory at least.

Carbon inequity argument

But since emissions and human-induced climate change is a global problem—an example of the tragedy of the commons—carbon tax requires global coverage and cooperation. And this goes to the root of the problem: Who should reduce emissions? Who should pay what?

The question gets complicated when we understand emission reduction scheme, in this case carbon tax, affects rich countries differently from poorer ones. A growing country seeking economic prosperity will need to emit more and more emissions, unlike an industrialized economy that has already emitted a lot to reach its current affluence. Pricing ongoing emissions while ignoring past emissions is clearly unfair to the former set of countries.

Yet, the humanity does not have the luxury to take much more emissions. Emissions from non-rich countries like China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria cannot be ignored. Emissions from these big developing countries have to be addressed.

Cap and trade, and failure

There is a way to do this without resorting to carbon tax: set emission quotas and allow trading. For every cap and trade scheme, there is an equivalent carbon tax. Since there is an equivalence, theoretically, a cap and trade scheme should be able to reproduce carbon tax outcome.

The old Kyoto Protocol (and subsequent treaties) provides exactly such a cap and trade mechanism, which countries (and companies) with excess emission quotas could sell it to those who need it. However, it does not seem to be working 20+ years on. Most of the times, it feels more of a greenwashing, or virtue signaling at the corporate-level (Look! We are an environmentally-friendly company!) than a real attempt at reducing emissions economy-wide.

In Malaysia, the government wants to replicate the cap and trade system through a voluntary mechanism, which makes the system more flawed than what envisioned at Kyoto (see the Ministry of Environment and Water document here). The problem is, if it voluntary at the national level, the worst emitters would likely avoid entering the market. This will leave the market with inconsequential companies. Of course, the government can possibly force big carbon emitting companies like Petronas and Tenaga Nasional through their shareholding influence. But what about the more private companies like YTL Cement, Press Metal and the likes? Why would they participate voluntary and raise their cost? Maybe their greenwashing investors would apply pressures, but who knows. The bottom line is, a cap and trade system cannot be voluntary, else the worst emitters would avoid it.

A voluntary system, I would think, would have a very, very low carbon tax equivalence. And that will hardly incentivize companies and individuals to reduce emissions.

I would go as far as say carbon trading has been a failure globally, while carbon tax has not been introduced as widely as it should to be effective.

Cash transfer

One tool to address the emission inequity is for richer countries to pay off developing countries for reducing the latter’s emissions. Income from industrialization could partly replaced by income transferred from industrialized economies. It is a way to address historical emissions and ongoing emissions simultaneously.

But from the recent Conference of the Parties in Glasgow, and from years before, the approach is unpopular among the would be payers. Without enough such transfers happening, a globally carbon pricing will be hard to achieve.

Technological progress and transfer

Technological transfer comes in the same spirit of cash transfer. In-kind, instead of in cash.

The good news on this front is that all kinds of technology have improved significantly over the past two decades. I have an example: solar power.

During my undergraduate years in the early 2000s, I joined the school’s solar car team. The price tag of the vehicle then was roughly a million dollar if I remember it correctly. Most of it was due to high-grade solar panels used. Today’s car costs around a million still, but with better battery technology, better motor, better design and higher panel efficiency. I remember, the old early 2000s car had panels with efficiency in the teens or low twenties. By 2017, the newer generation of panels had an efficiency of 35%.[3] Efficiency here means the ability to convert light into electricity. In fact, top of the line panels have an efficiency close to 50% now.[4]

That better technology has become cheaper as well. Panel prices have come down significantly, from USD106/watt in the 1970s to about USD4-USD5/watt in the 2000s to USD0.2/watt in 2020.[5]  This is only solar, and not yet other sources of energy like wind. Or efficiency of internal combustion engine. Or the proliferation of electric or hybrid cars. All of which have improved.

Yet, the fact remains, the world even with impressive technological progress is not cutting emissions fast enough. This includes progress on tech transfer between rich countries and the rest of the world.

Green investment

There are green investments happening, that is possibly a proof of tech transfer happening. In Vietnam, the rise of solar power in a short few years through aggressive government incentives have been the country as the largest producer in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, solar represents just 5% of their generation mix, with approximately half coming from coal.

Yet, not enough investments are being done as well (if it was enough, we would not have the current emission problem). That shows the problem that we have: green investment is helpful, but it has become a bit of a sloganeering MMT-style.

Other tech

There are other stuff going on: carbon capture. Some of the crazier ones including launching the captured carbon into space. Or burying it underground. But those do not seem realistic at the moment.

Adaptive measures

Bottom line is, all this will require global cooperation, but it seems that cooperation is not happening as big as it should. And I think, any credible cooperation with respect to emission reduction needs to include carbon tax, and along with transfers to lessen the shocks. Other measures seem… half-measure and will not cut emission fast enough.

But perhaps what is left are adaptive, and perhaps a little of mitigate, measures. When we resort to adaptive measures, it signals that we have given up.

That is a shame. We had and still have global cooperation when it comes to the ozone hole through the Montreal Protocol, which, in many ways a precursor to the Kyoto ways of doing things. It was and is successful. Maybe, the ozone hole above Antarctica is an easier problem to deal with.Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved[1] — Jomo Kwame Sundaram. Carbon tax over-rated. Jomo. November 9 2021.

[2] — Daniela Gabor. Isabella Weber. COP26 should distance itself from carbon shock therapy. Financial Times. November 8 2021

[3]Top U.S. solar car team goes small to win big in 2017. Michigan News. July 8 2017.

[4] — Nikos Kopidakis. Reported timeline of research solar cell energy conversion efficiencies since 1976 (National Renewable Energy Laboratory). National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Wikipedia.

[5]Evolution of solar PV module cost by data source, 1970-2020. International Energy Agency. June 30 2020.

Categories
Economics WDYT

[2946] Guess the 3Q21 Malaysian GDP growth

Let us go straight to it:

How fast do you think did the Malaysian economy expand in 3Q21 from a year ago?

  • Faster than 5.0% (0%, 0 Votes)
  • 2.5%-5.0% (29%, 2 Votes)
  • 0.1%-2.5% (29%, 2 Votes)
  • -2.5 to 0.0% (29%, 2 Votes)
  • Slower than -2.5% (14%, 1 Votes)

Total Voters: 7

Loading ... Loading ...

With lockdown imposed throughout the third quarter and more—done to address the government’s mismanagement of the pandemic—economic growth is unlikely to be strong, if there is growth at all. Reuters’s poll has GDP falling 1.3% year-on-year. Bloomberg’s panel is more pessimistic by putting it at 1.9% contraction.

Supporting statistics are out there. Industrial production contracted in the quarter. Unemploment is still significantly high versus prior to the pandemic. More people are joining the job market and getting employed, but the rate that is happening is just not fast enough.

I do not know what to read from the inflation data anymore. It is mixed with supply-driven issues. Along with massive base effect, it makes the whole measurement less useful for assessing demand. There is core yes, but I don’t know.

One good news is the import growth, particularly retained imports were okay, signalling recovery momentum for private consumption during the quarter and going forward. In contrast, exports did not grow as fast, don’t expect much support from the trade front. Still trade issues with all its supply chain complication might not reflect the health of demand in the first place. That is yet another complication in assessing demand.

But the more important thing is, most relevant to people on the streets, the worst is probably behind us. Vaccination rates are high and further lockdown seems unlikely, unless somehow the vaccines suddenly stop working, or the Malacca election gets mismanaged like how Sabah was. That means, the fourth quarter would likely be much stronger (fingers crossed).

Yet another important point is that, we are very unlikely to return to pre-pandemic peak of 2019 this year. 2022, almost certainly but we are definitely behind the pre-pandemic growth trend. I blame Budget 2021 for that, due to the government’s misplaced priorities.

Categories
Economics

[2944] Run higher deficit, let the economy recover first

We are not out of the woods yet.

Yet, already there are individuals wanting to shift attention away from the economy towards government finance. The latest of these individuals are Najib Razak, who has the guts to talk about new taxes in the next two years when he is not paying his, with amount that would rival some of the taxes he proposes:

“I propose a temporary Covid-19 recovery tax package for two years. This, for example, will include a windfall tax, luxury condominiums development tax, stamp duty on transactions, inheritance tax, stock market trading tax, and higher personal income tax on high-income individuals.

“After two years, we can end this temporary tax.”

He also suggested that the government tax tech giants that have a presence in Malaysia, such as Amazon, Netflix, YouTube, Google, and Facebook, which have raked in a lot of profit, but have never been taxed here.

He said this should not impact consumers, and instead be levied on the companies’ profit margin. [Azril Annuar. Tax the rich: Najib proposes 2-year temporary recovery tax. The Vibes. September 15 2021]

While taxes in general will have to come, we cannot impose it as soon as possible and then pretend it will not jeopardize recovery the Malaysian economy is experiencing. Recovery so far has been weak. It has been so bad that the government are now celebrating base effect. Such is the quality of our leaders today.

From the look of it, 2021 GDP will likely still be smaller than the one in 2019. This just shows the incompleteness of our ongoing recovery. Unemployment is another measure to worry about, with the latest rate (July 2021) remains stubbornly high at 4.8%, well above of the 3.2%-3.4% range recorded during the pre-pandemic year of 2019. The incoherent management of the pandemic has exerted additional costs to the economy.

Here, we still need to prioritize the overall economy over government finance. While both are important and both are linked, the government has more room to run a loose fiscal policy more than families as well as small and medium-sized businesses. As I have mentioned before, the only barriers to greater borrowing are legal restrictions and there is nothing ‘economics’ about those legal restrictions. Furthermore, borrowing costs are low, with yields on 10-year MGS at 3.30%.

For this reason, it is better for the government to keep their hands off those onerous tax levers and instead run higher deficit ratio (or stay at the current ratio). Allow the economy to grow first. Let the economy recover properly before pushing of any kind of taxes. Once the economy comes, the taxes will also come too.

Only once the economy has returned to its pre-crisis level and trend can we begin to introduce new taxes. In the meantime, while the economy is still below pre-crisis conditions, other non-punitive measures should be introduced first.

Tin identification number (TIN) is one of those measures that will improve transparency in the market without imposing new tax burden to the economy. TIN would require all persons and entities be assigned a unique identifier, which must be appended to any transaction (like the opening of account, transfer of money, purchase of large assets like homes and cars). This will allow the tracing of money better. A little bit like the VAT/GST, but without the tax. Once the system is stabilized, data from TIN could be used to better design new taxes that are needed, including some of the taxes Najib mentioned. Things like wealth tax for instance need data on data on wealth in Malaysia is horrible. TIN can improve data collection by leaps and bounds, which will assist in designing a good tax.

TIN was in the works under Pakatan Harapan as part of their reform program (unfortunately, it was opposed by Muhyiddin in 2019 over concern the opposition would attack the move as a new tax. That was not the only reform that was sabotage by multiple people, which hobbled the overall institution reform efforts). One good news is that there is a good chance the TIN would finally be instituted beginning next year, based on signals given out by the Ministry of Finance.

I would like to reiterate that sequencing is important, and Najib ignores that factor.

The timing and sequencing inappropriateness are not the only concerns here. The other is its temporary nature of the proposal. Najib wants those taxes to last only two years. This is detrimental to longer term attempt at reforming the taxation regime.

Unlike Najib, I am in favor of having a 10-year or 15-year tax reform program, which makes permanent some of the taxes Najib mentions. Easy measure like TIN would happen within 2-3 years. Making the income tax more progressive is another easy move that could happen within 5 years, for instance. This longer-term plan solves several problems (underfunding of public sector, the need for off-budget financing, low taxbase, unfair treatment between labor and capital income, the growing digital economy relative to brick-and-mortar model, etc) more permanently while taking into account the state of the economy.

Having temporary tax measures as soon as possible ignores the state of the economy, and does not address some of the fiscal (and economic) challenges faced by the government.

Categories
Economics Politics & government

[2940] Immediate fiscal agenda for the new (old) government

The next finance minister is unlikely to be thinking too far ahead since election is just less than 2 years away. It is short time to set any long-term agenda. There will not be enough time for learning and there will not be enough to start implementing. For the most parts, the new finance minister will likely be carrying on with established policy until the general election is called. Even if he or she dares introduce new long-term measures, there is a good chance it would be overturned once a new minister takes the Level 12 office in the Treasury Building in Putrajaya after the election.

Nevertheless, given the situation we as a country are in, the 2-year period is important. I think there are two items of concern during this period that could affect the long-term fiscal policy of the country:

  1. The 2023 fiscal cliff
  2. Fiscal consolidation.

The Perikatan Nasional government that Umno was committed to a quick fiscal consolidation exercise that necessitates a 2023 fiscal cliff and I think there is a question whether the same policy would be taken up.

What is the 2023 fiscal cliff?

To handle the Covid-19 crisis, the government changed certain law that allowed it to practically have a current deficit. Without the changes, the government’s current balance must always be in surplus, or in balance. In other words, total revenue must exceed all operating expenditure. Here is a restatement of: the government can only borrow for investment purposes (or in public sector jargon, development expenditure).

More specifically, the government created a Covid-19 fund that officially neither operating or development expenditure (but in fact, mostly operating expenditure). It was a necessary accounting trick that bends the law. Revenue dropped substantially during 2020 and 2021 relative to previous immediate years, while the need for spending rose dramatically. If the laws were not changed, we would have faced a worse version of this already bad recession. Even so, actual spending done was insufficient (the comic I drew below) due to the then policymakers’ naïve belief in V-shape recovery, and failure to adopt precautionary approach. This was the costly mistake of Budget 2021.

This fund is set to expire on December 31 2022. Upon expiry, the normal way of doing things—current balance cannot in deficit—becomes the rule again. This means any borrowing must be repaid (or from what I am seeing, I suspect it would be absorbed into development fund despite a large chunk of it is not developmental in nature. The 2020-2021 RM21 billion drop in Covid-19 is almost as large as the sudden RM19 billion increase in the corresponding development expenditure).

Based on Ministry of Finance publication, the fund had RM17 billion in it as of end-June 2021. It is likely higher given additional spending announcement made during the quarter. Expiry would mean (assuming it is not reclassified lock, stock and barrel as development expenditure) paying off that RM17 billion to meet the current balance requirement. It could also mean a percentage point worth of government spending unmade if it is paid off. That RM17 billion is roughly equivalent to a percentage point of 2021 deficit ratio.

So, if the fund expires in 2022 and the borrowing gets paid off (instead of reclassified as development expenditure), there will be a fiscal cliff: a stark drop in spending, which would take some steam off GDP growth, and more importantly, recovery.

Remember, economic recovery is not merely about growing again after a recession. Neither is it just about returning to pre-crisis level (which by the way, we are a risk of not doing so in 2021). A comprehensive recovery is one where current level would match the level it would be if no crisis had happened. Our insufficient spending had left the gap big, and catching up with that pre-crisis level and trend is hard.

Inappropriate time for fiscal consolidation

This is on top of fiscal deficit-to-NGDP ratio that the government might target. It is unclear now what the deficit ratio target is. Former Finance Minister Zafrul Abdul Aziz had stated that the figure for 2021 after accounting additional unplanned Covid-19 spending could rise to 6.5%-7.0% of NGDP, from the unrealistic Budget 2021 projection of 5.4%. It is unclear if this accounts for lower-than-expected GDP growth. If it does not, it will go higher.

If the new government (if it could be called new given the composition is… the same) insists on fiscal consolidation still, there will be pressure to let the Covid-19 fund expire while cutting services to keep spending under control.

Two immediate agenda for the next finance minister

Malaysia is clearly behind the curve by a big margin in terms of economic recovery. Getting recovery on track is the immediate concern. Unfortunately, as much as I hate to say it, the government is likely the main driver of growth in these times.

The government can start playing that role properly by first, extending the expiring date for Covid-19 fund and second, postponing any fiscal consolidation exercise. The second can be done by maintaining deficit ratio high, possibly in the range of 6%-8% in the next several years.

Ideally, this should followed by a long-term agenda of tax reform to increase government revenue, which the Pakatan Harapan government, and the previous Perikatan Nasional government, as I understand it, was willing to go ahead with parts of it.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2937] Premature fiscal consolidation influences our vaccination strategy adversely

Our vaccination program is taking the big solution approach. Since the Covid-19 pandemic is a big challenge, it might be natural to come up with a big solution. Mega vaccination centers are a critical part of the program. Big space with hundreds if not thousands of personnel vaccinating hundreds if not thousands more individuals. Big, shinny glittering, big. It is as if Mahathir of the 1990s is back.

It has been a slow painfully slow start with some big mess made along the way, but the program is picking up steam. Vaccination pace is still below what is required but we are getting somewhere: on June 10, approximately 155,000 dosages were administered, and close to 10% of the population has received at least one dose of Covid-19 vaccines.

Behind the headline numbers, stories are appearing that people are not showing up for vaccination despite registration. The authorities at first tied the no-show to vaccine hesitancy. Earlier rationale for separating Astra-Zeneca vaccines from the main public vaccination program was based on the understanding that the public distrusted that particular vaccines. After all, AZ had bad press for some time.

After a while, that rationale is starting to become weak, especially given logistical concerns on the recipients’ side. More and more, it sounds like that particular claim was based on a misreading of incomplete data, and hasty conclusion. The kerfuffle between the Selangor state government and the federal government regarding total dosage the former received, for example, does not inspire confidence in the analytical skills of those in power in Putrajaya. Hesitancy is a big problem, but it is becoming clear that it had been used as a catch-all excuse to brush aside other big problems faced by the vaccination program.

To me, the no-show cases and the government’s preference for the big approach raise a question regarding our vaccination philosophy: are our methods primarily designed to be the easiest for the central authority to deliver the vaccines, or for individuals to get vaccinated?

The first part of the question—is the method easiest for central planners?—has the program administrators firstly in mind. If the administrators are the primary focus of the process, then having big centers is the way. This is because the big approach pools resources and rides on economies of scale. Pooling makes the vaccination program cheaper for the side managing it. Also, easier. The big approach necessarily means having few centers. And having fewer centers means the logistics becomes simpler, given all else the same: manage 3,4 or 5 big centers is significantly less complex than dealing 30, 300, or 3,000 spread across wide geography.

The second part of the question—is the method designed to be the easiest for individuals to get vaccinated?—puts potential recipients as the primary focus. It makes it easier for individuals interested in vaccinating themselves get vaccinated. Instead of having to travel from one part of the city to the another, or worse, having to travel from one part of the state to another (which is common enough), a person would be able to get his or her dose from the neighborhood clinics, hospitals, public halls or anything that could function as a vaccination center. This path is more expensive compared to other approach because it is more complex: it requires hundreds or thousands of small vaccination centers all around the country. It will involve resources being spread as widely as possible. But it is easier for potential vaccine recipients.

So, why did we choose the big approach, i.e. the method easiest for the central planners?

There might be multiple reasons behind that. I suspect one of them is related to cost consideration.

This goes back to the November 2020 when Budget 2021 was tabled in the Parliament. In that Budget, the government of the day in all its wisdom decided to embark on fiscal consolidation immediately. That policy was made based on rosy assumptions: the economy was to experience a V-shape recovery as soon as possible. Things would return to normal soonish.

That consolidation plan has gone awry. Recovery, if it could be called as such, is proceeding slower than what the government expected. When the budget was unbelievably passed despite it grave flaws in December 2020, Malaysia was still in recession. In fact as of the first quarter of 2021, the country was still in recession.

Since then, the government has been spending additional resources little by little, but not enough to solve the pandemic problem comprehensively. It has been reactive as the crisis develops, always one or two steps behind, almost ways coming short to the challenge. With available resources limited by the badly designed Budget 2021, those planning for vaccinations had to resort to the big approach: pooling resources, economies of scale, cheaper method. They had to minimize the monetary cost.

That comes at a (different) cost of course: it makes logistically hard to some individuals to get to the vaccination centers. Some is an understatement as we race toward herd immunity. The big approach contributes to the no-show cases: no-show because the big approach needs the people to go to the central planners, instead of the central planners coming to the people. All this raises the risk of Malaysia failing to achieve herd immunity as soon as possible, and letting the economy to muck around longer.

In short, the premature fiscal consolidation planned by this government had influenced our vaccination strategy adversely.