Categories
Economics History & heritage Politics & government

[2966] A short history of soft-budget constraint in Malaysia, and the challenge the Anwar administration faces

For the past few days, I have been thinking about the 2020-2022 roles reversal in the Malaysian version of soft-budget constraint, but ended up trying to trace the history of SBC in Malaysia.

First off, a short primer on SBC: soft-budget constraint is usually a problem between a government, and its state-owned enterprises. In Malaysian parlance, those enterprises are government-link companies. It is called soft-budget constraint because the budget of those enterprises is hard to be fixed; company revenue does not provide a hard limit on company expenditure. The government ends up financing those companies beyond what the latter’s revenue provides. That financing comes in the form of subsidies, loans, tax breaks and grants, and designed to meet various political, social or even economic objectives.

This problem is most prevalent in command economies, but it also exists elsewhere where the market is more open, like Malaysia.

Now, let us dive into the history of SBC in Malaysia.

From the 1970s until the 1990s: NEP and privatization

Malaysia had several influential state-owned enterprises prior to the 1980s and this made SBC a common problem, especially with the New Economic Policy running at full steam.

Luckily for Malaysia, raw material prices—petroleum, rubber, tin—were high at that time, making budget constraint problem manageable. These companies’ budget constraint was soft, but government revenue was bountiful.

Troubles came in the 1980s, when global recession depressed commodity prices. Budget constraint suddenly became very pressing, when government coffers could no longer support growing expenditure needs. Here, Mahathir Mohamad, addressed it through rapid and widespread privatization. Market discipline was instilled, and these companies found their budget constraints becoming stricter than in the past.

During the 1990s, through rapid modernization and super economic growth, along with privatization, SBC seemed like it had been consigned to history. SBC became a curiosity. The government enjoyed large growing surplus, and there were fewer companies requiring government support, save several instances where Mahathir insisted on import-substitution industrialization (Perwaja?).

When the Asian Financial Crisis hit Malaysia, all the bailouts meant the return of SBC.

SBC of the 2000s

The 2000s is significant in this telling because it was during this decade that off-budget spending took off earnestly. Government revenue did not grow fast enough to meet the country’s rising spending needs, especially so soon after the late-1990s recession. The government overcame its finance gap by devising clever methods to circumvent various accounting rules, and expand its spending capacity enormously. The methods are complex, and I will not go through it here except by sharing a post I wrote several years back, which explains various liabilities the government carried, but previously undisclosed.

Expanding off-budget obligations necessarily means growing SBC problem. Off-budget approach gave the government extra leverage, but it does not mean the government not having to fund them.

Off-budget approach, and SBC, came under intense scrutiny when 1MDB corruption came into the picture, and brought onto the government severe public demand for transparency. That demand, along with other concerns, led to collapse of the Barisan Nasional government, and the rise of Pakatan Harapan administration.

PH attempted to solve the problem by instituting greater transparency (this is part of the RM1 trillion debt and liabilities controversy), putting some off-budget spending back on budget (this partly raised the 2018 fiscal deficit ratio) and adopting accrual accounting, to make sure all financial obligations get recorded properly. But the SBC problem, intertwined with complex off-budget method, has become so big that it needs time to be addressed. And PH fell short of two years into office.

Reversal of roles during Covid-19 pandemic

The fall of PH coincided with the Covid-19 global pandemic. The new government needed to expand its spending fast to save lives and to preserve the economy’s productive capacity. But those in power were reluctant to boost government spending, possibly out of inexperience while facing a steep learning curve. With that reluctance, they looked to state-owned enterprises for solutions.

This caused a reversal of roles between the government and its companies. The government leaned on its GLCs to support its spending needs, instead of the other way round in the normal SBC problem. This made government budget to be softer than it was. GLC’s capacity became the government’s capacity.

Those financial supports from GLCs to the government come in the form of extremely long delayed payments. More specifically, the government throughout 2020, 2021 and 2022 engaged in massive subsidies and these subsidies were financed by the GLCs. The GLCs were supposed to be reimbursed immediately but that did not happen. To put it more plainly, these GLCs ended up financing the government.

For proofs, I would encourage everybody to inspect some of the largest utilities-GLCs out there. Check their growing receivables listed in their balance sheet (receivables refer to amount owned by buyers to suppliers).

There is another way to understand the roles reversal: these companies’ budget constraint becomes stricter than it was during normal times. Soft-budget constraint at the GLC level becomes really hard-budget constraint.

The problem became more complex in the post-Covid recovery, where subsidies ballooned tracking surging commodity prices.

2023 and into the future

Unlike the government, companies have troubles going over their budget constraint without outside support for too long. The cash crunch is coming.

The new Anwar Ibrahim administration will have the misfortune of having to address the roles reversal problem. It will be painful, involving large payments to be made/reimbursed by the government. Anwar Ibrahim the Finance Minister does not have much time: the cash crunch at several GLCs is coming.

That will add pressures for a broad tax hike, that Malaysia needs even before the pandemic.

Categories
Politics & government

[2965] Anwar Ibrahim and Pakatan Harapan are a means to an end

It has been a long wait. Anwar Ibrahim is finally the Prime Minister of Malaysia.

Many have remarked how he deserves it. Or that he has been cheated out of it before. Or everybody has had their chances and now, it is Anwar’s turn to rule. Or he suffered to get here.

But, I tell myself that it is never about Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar, and Pakatan Harapan for that matter, is a means to an end.

The end is something much bigger than any one of us. The end is a Malaysia where everybody has a place under the sun, living in dignity and as equal, prosperously.

It will not be easy to achieve that, especially when even such a goal is not quite concrete. It is fluffy. It is intangible, at least the non-economic part. In fact, it is clear not everybody will agree—vehemently disagree at that—to the kind of equality envisaged in that kind of Malaysia.

The first step towards that end, is clearly reconciliation between major groups in the country, and some kind of compromise. But that reconciliation cannot be about making everybody happy. There are principles and ground rules to be adhered to. That we are all Malaysians, that we all have dignity that must not be violated. Reconciliation does not mean reconciling everything. Something, like deep fascism, cannot be reconciled with inclusive values.

The meeting ground has to be reasonable.

Ultimately, the core of that inclusive values, to me are (among several others) the end to the means that are Anwar Ibrahim and Pakatan Harapan.

Categories
Economics WDYT

[2964] Guess the 3Q22 Malaysian GDP growth

It is almost certain the third quarter growth will be massive as far as year-on-year calculations are concerned. Consensus compiled by Bloomberg has it at 12.1%. What do you think the number would be? The official figures will be released this Friday.

How fast do you think did the Malaysian economy expand in 3Q22 from a year ago?

  • Slower than 8.0% (64%, 7 Votes)
  • 8.0%-9.9% (0%, 0 Votes)
  • 10.0%-11.9% (18%, 2 Votes)
  • 12.0%-13.9% (18%, 2 Votes)
  • 14.0% or faster (0%, 0 Votes)

Total Voters: 11

Loading ... Loading ...

Big as it will be, it will not inform us much about the state of the economy. At least, not by itself alone. So, do not be taken by it and read it with extra context.

It is important to remember what happened a year ago: the third quarter 2021 real GDP dropped by 4.5%, as shown in the chart below (in the same chart, you could see another instance of massive base effect in the second quarter of 2021, responding to the drop the year before).

One simple way to avoid the problem of base effect altogether is to look at quarter-on-quarter growth, and compare it with historical numbers.

For 2015-2019, quarter-on-quarter growth for the third quarter averaged around 3.5% (range: 3.1%-3.9%). Let us ignore 2020 and 2021 due to the usual circumstances those years represent. Since 2022 appears to be a more normal year (as far as normality is concerned, we could probably take the first quarter of this year as the beginning), 2015-2019 appear like a reasonable for casual comparison.

Now, if third quarter growth is indeed 12.1% year-on-year, then quarter-on-quarter growth would be 2.9%.

That 2.9% is below the quarter-on-quarter average of 3.5%, and misses the lower bound of 3.1% (see the second chart above). This also means, if the year-on-year growth figures is to be truly impressive, third quarter growth will have to be significantly higher than 12.1%. Maybe 13% or 14%. Else, it would be either bad, or normal at best.

The quarter-on-quarter growth is something to watch out for, especially at a time when the global economic outlook points toward recession in Europe and the US, along with a weak China. Ignore the year-on-year one for the time being.

Categories
Economics

[2963] Is inflation the reason behind BNM hikes, at a time when the output gap is big?

Bank Negara raised its benchmark rate yesterday, from 2.50% to 2.75%. While the general reasoning is fighting inflation, I am not that convinced of it. My primary reason is, Bank Negara’s own analysis shows inflation (demand-push) is not a problem. Yes, consumer price index has been rising high, but most of those price increases are not something monetary policy can address without exerting damage to the economy.

The central bank regularly published estimates of output gap in the economy. Looking at the output gap is the easiest way to understand the economy quickly. To put it simply, the gap tells us about the capacity utilization of the whole economy. It is the difference between total (or maximum) capacity, and capacity used. When the used capacity is well below max, then inflation should be relatively low with unemployment high. When resources are not used up, there will be slack in the economy which is reflected in inflation and unemployment numbers. The same is true vice versa.

And based on the latest estimates published by Bank Negara back in March 2022, there is a huge slack this year (and estimated to be bigger than last year’s):

When the gap is big and when there are no other concerns, you would want to encourage the economy to keep going. You would want to close the gap, and approach full capacity (which is another way of saying full employment). And you can do this without much concern for inflation. That means, rates could be left low.

When you raise rates in these circumstances (as Bank Negara is doing), it means widening the output gap. You would lower demand-pull inflation (if there any), but since you have no control over supply-push inflation, you are just targeting the wrong part of the economy. You are pulling demand down almost immediately, but do nothing to the supply side, which is out of your immediate control (in fact, low rates improve supply, but not in the short term). Hence, widening the gap.

Beyond domestic considerations and on top of the current gap situation, there are concerns the global economy will go into yet another recession so short after the last. The US economy is close to experiencing one although its growth resilience so far has surprised many economists (and demand-pull inflation is problem there). Europe is almost certain to enter recession next year (war and gas supply are exacerbating supply-push inflation). Growth in China has been weak but there is some hope it would provide some cushion in an otherwise sullen world. When we look ahead, Bank Negara’s rate hike feels even more jarring and lags behind expectations, when they should be ahead of the curve.

So, when I read the Monetary Policy Statement and the references to inflation, I am not so sure inflation is the primary driver for the hikes. I have been suspecting so for a while now.

In my opinion, there are two other things at work that convinced the Committee to do what they did yesterday:

  1. It is about the ringgit. The currency along with many others out there have been under severe depreciation pressure due to US Federal Reserve’s series of drastic rate hikes. The end of easy money is upon us. And domestic benchmark rates are a big lever to relief the pressure partially: rising domestic rates would keep the difference with those in the US smaller than it would have been otherwise. And smaller difference means less depreciation pressure on the ringgit.
  2. The problem of zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP) and liquidity trap. Many conventional economists (of the 1990s?) believe monetary policy loses its potency the lower the rates go. And since Bank Negara Rates is already low by historical standards, maybe they are concerned about losing monetary influence and hoping to build up ammo for the next crisis.

In both cases, the cost of pursuing the goals will widen the gap today.

The relevant question is (especially with respect to the ringgit), how big would the gap be if the ringgit is allowed to depreciate beyond what the rate hikes allowed? Supply-pull inflation does hurt demand after all, and weaker ringgit means more imported inflation. Comparing the two gaps would help determine which policy to take.

I would love to read the minutes and see references to the gap, if any.

Categories
Politics & government

[2962] 2022 manifesto represents progress in PH policymaking

Going through Pakatan Harapan’s latest 94-plus pages manifesto reminds me how far things have progressed over the last 10 or so years. By things, I mean the current component PH parties’ ability to churn out policy documents, and overall sophistication in promoting policies. Ten or 15 years ago, PH struggled to produce such policy documents.

The inability to do so was among others due to lack of manpower or professionals in various fields within party ranks and volunteers. In the past, most professionals or even experts stayed well in the private sector. If they had political ambition or interest, they would join Barisan Nasional. Contributing to parties like DAP and PKR (or then Pas) then meant career suicide. Few were willing to sacrifice their living standards for partisan politics.

That has changed as the urban middle class now relies less on  government largess, and with private employment opportunities well diversified beyond the reach of partisan hands. That trend, I think, comes as multiethnic urban voters shift their party preference from that of BN to PKR, DAP and their various allies over the years. Now, PH has access to those professionals and experts.

Even when DAP and PKR were weak during those years, they were measured on a harsher scale versus the one faced by BN. BN would be allowed to play on noob mode, but the public insisted DAP and PKR played only the hard mode. Where is your manifesto? Where is your alternative budget? Where is your shadow cabinet? That BN never took their own manifesto seriously was never questioned.

Prior to the 2010s, this was perhaps understandable because most would ask, why change when things are going okay? Reading We Are Marching Now recently, most voters then were interested in stronger checks and balances, but not a change in government. Voters were scared of change and if they were to be convinced of change, then advocates of change would need to surpass a very high bar before any convincing could take place. The status quo was easier and familiar.

But by the 2010s, changes are no longer something scary. And PH is more than capable of providing policy alternative to back its overall rally for federal power.

As for the PH manifesto itself, there are measures that I disagree with. Furthermore, I do feel there is an element of kitchen sink in it. Nevertheless, I suppose I need to remind myself that this is the nature of coalition politics, a compromise between equals. Messy but that is democracy. What is important is that, there has been progress over the years, and that progress as represented by the latest manifesto is not small by any measure.

Progress in developing policy-making skills among PH members have been so significant in the past 10 years that the corporate sector no longer could ignore PH manifesto.