The state — or in common parlance, the government — is the guardian of public resource. These resources are ones that we own collectively, like petroleum, or of interest in the past few weeks in Malaysia, telecommunication spectrum. It is the responsibility of the government to manage and use the resources efficiently. If it cannot, then there is a case to privatize those resources to those who can.
In privatizing these resources, one would expect the government to raise some money it can use to improve the general welfare of the public. One of the best ways to raise money from such privatization is by auctioning the public resource.
Economists typically love auctions because it is efficient. In everyday English, it means an auction can extract the most benefit out of a transaction for the seller. In an auction that focuses purely on maximizing sale prices, the government will benefit enormously from the outcomes of the auctions.
In the Netherlands recently, the government raised nearly EUR4 billion by auctioning the 4G spectrum to the private sector. Initially, the government had expected to raise half a billion euro only. The large difference came as a pleasant surprise to the government. In time when the Dutch government is tightening their belt as a reaction to the economic crisis that Europe as a whole is facing, the EUR4 billion will help in maintaining the quality of public service in the Netherlands.
If one is concerned whether such privatization and auctioning would create a monopoly, there are types of auction that can address exactly that. Restrictions can be imposed so that nobody can buy everything, or buys too much. While total receipts out of those auctions may suffer, the government will still enjoy considerable revenue out of it that can put to good use.
One example will bring us to the United States in 2008 when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted a controversial spectrum auction. Restrictions were imposed to prevent telecommunication firms from gaining too much market power. Google, worried that these telecommunication firms would restrict access to various content and applications on the internet, even decided to participate in the auction despite not being a telecommunication firm per se. After all had been said and done, the FCC still raised nearly USD20 billion from that particular auction while addressing the issue of market power.
In contrast in Malaysia, 4G spectrum was transferred from the public domain to private firms for free. There was no sale at all, and much less an auction.
For the public, the privatization is an outright welfare loss. An asset that could have been worth billions of ringgit of public money ended up as being nothing. There is no new revenue for the government and so, the public cannot benefit from the privatization exercise as much as it should. And this comes at a time when the government recognizes that it needs to broaden its taxpayer base, which is narrow at the moment. So, the privatization will not be popular to discerning taxpayers.
Even libertarians, who would typically support privatization exercise, will find this particular Malaysian privatization as very disappointing.
Despite the fact that the privatization came at the expense of potential revenue for the public, some would no doubt defend the flawed privatization. Several defenses have been presented so far.
One argument suggests that with the free award, the recipients would be able to provide cheaper services with the same level of quality than they otherwise could. This is not a given unfortunately and right now, it is a mere speculation.
The reason is that these recipients can effectively form a cartel. This has happened in the past, even with the new Competition Act is in place. In fact, Maxis and Redtone International, two of the 4G spectrum recipients, are already collaborating in rolling out their 4G network. How far this particular collaboration will go is for all of us to see.
Worse, some could even essentially resell the spectrum to other more serious telecommunication companies instead of utilizing the spectrum for themselves. In doing so, they would realize the economic rent that should belong to the public in the first place. If there was an auction or even just a sale instead earlier, there would have been less opportunity for such rent-seeking activities. An auction especially would have squeezed the incentive for rent-seeking out into public pocket and force firms to try to create new wealth rather than engage in unproductive rent-seeking.
Unfortunately, now that everything is done, we are left with the possibility of collusion in the market and a whole lot of room for rent-seeking activities by private firms at the expense of the public. This is not an ideal market scenario.