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Books & printed materials Conflict & disaster

[2980] Reading Rashid Khalidi’s The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of those things that is always present in the background. Almost everybody is aware of it, even those who do not give any headlines any serious thoughts. It is easy to take it for granted, expecting the conflict to last a lifetime if not for eternity. It is as if it is a trouble that has no beginning. It just exists.

Throughout the 2000s, that was definitely my context. And I remember the decade as a violent period for Israel and Palestine. The news on TV, radio and on the internet told me so.

As a member of a Malaysian generation at that time who had only (mostly) experienced peace, that violence was hard to stomach. What is more is that it was easy for an outsider like me to fall into the stereotype that the modern Middle East is doomed to an endless cycle of violence. So, from the outside, it felt natural to blame both Palestinian groups and Israel for the bloodshed all at the same time. The Palestinian groups were wrong for their bombing tactics, and Israel was wrong for its disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force.

My views of the long conflict have changed over the last 20 years. Previously, I was willing to give Israel the benefit of the doubt… because the whole business was complex. And Israel appeared different from the rest in the region.

Now, no longer. Benjamin Netanyahu and his far right government played a role in that. The Arab Spring, in some cases, showed the Arab states are capable of reforms and could be democratic. And over two decades since, Arab states definitely have shown capacity for economic growth. All these developments and more made Israel less special.

But the recent leveling of Gaza by Israeli military has removed completely any sympathy I might have for Israel.

The ongoing Israeli atrocities have prompted me to read more about Palestine and Israel beyond disparate Wikipedia articles. I bought several fictions and non-fictions to do just that. One of them was The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by historian Rashid Khalidi.

The book reframes my experience of the 2000s and makes me understand why I had some sympathy for Israel at that time.

During that decade, Palestine and Israel were going through what is now known as the Second Intifada. It involved suicide bombings and other deadly tactics carried out by multiple Palestinian groups. The violence itself was the result of deep frustration at a decade-long peaceful process that was never meant to succeed.

The deadliness of the Second Intifada, as Khalidi notes, had sapped global support for Palestinian cause, which was abundant before. Not too many governments (and definitely liberals, which I roughly identify myself as then and now) were willing to justify violence even in the face of injustice during the 2000s. The decade after all began with the September 11 Attacks that marked the start of the US War on Terror.

So, the Second Intifada was ruinous for Palestinian reputation as far as outsiders were concerned. And I was among the many outsiders who frowned at the violence.

But what I did not understand then was that the Second Intifada came after period of relative peace, even as Palestinians continued to suffer injustice. The First Intifada that began in the late 1980s and ended in the 1990s was a peaceful organic Palestinian resistance. But Israel would have none of it and suppressed it brutally. The non-violent Palestinian approach, and the violent reaction by Israel forces created deep international sympathy the Palestinian cause. At the time, for the first time in a long time, Israel was seen as the bad guys. So strong was the sentiment that it jumpstarted a peace process.

Unfortunately, as the author argues, that peace process was problematic. On the Palestinian side, the PLO led by Yasser Arafat was incompetent and shortsightedness (who themselves were victims of Arab states’ political maneuvering against each other and were victims of Israel’s policies). On the Israeli side, there was no sincerity about the peace process and about the establishment of the state of Palestine. Meanwhile, the US was not an honest broker; the author describes the US as Israel’s lawyers instead of arbitrators. Already during negotiations, Palestine’s legal team was no match for Israel’s. In the end, Palestine sacrificed too much for nothing with Israel offering no real concession. This brought the successes and the hopes of the First Intifada to naught.

This made many Palestinians bitter. The First Intifada was an organic resistance which was hijacked by PLO. And when PLO had the chance to do something do, they botched it badly.

In Palestinian eyes, as the author sees it, this discredited the PLO and Yasser Arafat immensely. They felt betrayed by the PLO, by the US and even angrier at Israel (especially as the peaceful route towards independence was closed). This created a split in the Palestinian leadership and a room for Hamas to rise in Gaza, at the expense of the PLO which after Arafat’s death, was led by an uncharismatic and ineffective Mahmoud Abbas.

As I mentioned, that recontextualizes the bloody uprising of the 2000s.

But the The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine is not just about the First Intifada, the subsequent 1990s peace process that failed and the Second Intifada in the 2000s. Rashid Khalidi goes back to the earliest days of Zionism to argue how the whole conflict should be seen within the lens of settler colonialism. He goes through the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1947-1948 war that led to the Nakba, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon and all the way to the Trump years.

Each of these events represented a major turning point in Palestinian struggle for statehood over 100 years. In each of these events, the author demonstrates that it was never an even fight for the Palestinians.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2949] Misaligned powers, incentives between the federal regulator and state authorities contributed to the 2021 great Malaysian flooding

The government has blamed the recent flooding on once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall. Blames have been assigned to climate change too.

I have never experienced such prolonged rainfall before, and it was an extraordinary experience. Thankfully I did not have to suffer the flooding. Unfortunately, many others did and they were cursed with an incompetent government at the helm that was slow to realize the problem, and slow to act upon it. For a government so used to living the crisis-mode, one would expect they would have some kind of preparedness, or seasoned enough to lead a proper competent response. But no, it was a disastrous handing. Old clueless men and women, they are.

The Environment Minister himself back in October dismissed the talks of big floods, despite the prevailing La Nina phenomenon that brought increased rainfall across the Asia-Pacific region. His dismissal played a deplorable role of lowering down the greater population’s guard. There are several persons in government should be fired for incompetence and negligence—lives were lost, properties damaged—and that particular minister is high in the long list.

But the severe floods across Malaysia has happened much more often than once in a century. Kuala Lumpur alone has had its share of several bad floods. The big one in Kelantan that happened less than 10 years ago. Clearly, there is more to it than just once-in-a-hundred-years rainfall.

And excessive logging is one of those several contributing factors.

Specifically, here, I would like to highlight the regulatory environment relating to logging. The system is flawed and provides excessive incentives leading to widespread environmental disasters that makes the big flooding possible. Instead of remedying the problem of misaligned incentives, the system makes the tragedy of the commons worse.

The two-part systemic flaw

There are two major parts of the systemic flaw: the state controls the issuance of logging permit, while the federal authority leads the environmental policing part. To further complicates matter, the federal regulator regulates peninsular matters only.

The approving authority trumps federal authority due to the current constitutional arrangement, as provided under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia. The extensive power of the state governments over the forest is further clarified in the National Forestry Act 1984. In short, the federal regulatory body is powerless in the face of state governments.

Furthermore, the state governments, particularly the poorer ones like Pahang, suffers from adverse incentives arising out of the lack of revenue. In Malaysia, tax revenue (income tax and consumption tax are the major ones) is mainly the purview of the federal government and not enough has been returned to the states from the federal level. This insufficient sharing is also a reflection of the low-tax regime Malaysia has: you cannot share if you do not have enough in the first place. It is also a reflection of partisan politics, as Kelantan and Terengganu suffered before.

Given the state’s lack of tax revenue, and insufficient revenue support from the federal government, the states have to resort to other means of generating revenue: among them include monetizing land and the forest. With the goal of supporting state government operations, excessive logging permits are issued.

(In Sabah and Sarawak where the regulator comes under state authority unlike in the 11 states in the Peninsular, arguably the pressure for revenue forces the government to prioritize harvesting over protection. For instance, Sabah recently lifted its state-wide ban on timber exports that was imposed in 2018).

Additionally, many of these states come under the influence of the royal houses, which demand a share of the forest resources. The state government more often than not, would comply. I have a short family history to share here to illustrate the problem of toothless regulation in the face of state rights. An uncle of mine decades ago used to be a forestry officer in a certain large state. He stopped a logging operation linked to the royal house of the state. He ended up being transferred out of the state. The logging operation continued.

Managing the commons

One way to address the flaw and manage the commons better is to take away the states authority over the forest, and have the federal government compensates the state government through large institutional sharing of tax revenue beyond what is provided currently through items like capitation grants. The downside is that, as you can guess it, higher tax burden for everybody on average.

Through this realignment of powers and incentives, the pressures of deforestation through logging could be removed, and the regulatory authority would have stronger powers to preserve the jungle. That will help lessen the chances of big floods recurring (with all else the same).

Categories
Conflict & disaster Personal Politics & government

[2938] From political to personal

Favored mindless slogan among Pas, Bersatu and Umno members and supporters early during the incompetent handling of the pandemic had something to do with politics. Despite the deeply political nature of the whole situation, they would say “jangan berpolitik.” That roughly translates into “don’t politicize the issue.” Do not politicize Covid-19. Do not politicize the handling.

They repeat the phrase while politicking, and eventually causing the state-wide Sabah by-election. Coupled with uneven enforcement of physical distancing, we are here today: a nearly collapsed healthcare system and continuing rising number of infection cases.

Failures in managing the case, and actions worsening the situation persisted, amid the mindless slogan: don’t politicize the issue.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

My grandmother died in her bed six days ago, a day before Eid. Initially, everybody thought she died of old age. She died in her sleep. Her death was shocking, but she was old. And she had a good life.

Post-mortem at the hospital revealed she had Covid-19.

She was unvaccinated. I am unsure why. I am just angry.

I could not go to her burial. I have not met her for nearly two years. No, too late. I had not met her.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

Five days after her death, I received by second Covid-19 vaccine jab. A slot I had to fight for. Such an inequity, created by an unscientific hunch.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

I am sure my experience is not unique. With nearly 8,000 deaths and counting, everybody must have known somebody who has died.
I wonder how they feel. Do they feel all those incompetence, mismanagement and failures political? Is 3-day quarantine political?

Is death of a family member political? Or is it personal, meant to be grieved privately?

Are these killings political, or are they a private matter?

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

It must be politicized. It is the only way to make irresponsible, incompetent and unaccountable men and women of this government accountable.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2937] Premature fiscal consolidation influences our vaccination strategy adversely

Our vaccination program is taking the big solution approach. Since the Covid-19 pandemic is a big challenge, it might be natural to come up with a big solution. Mega vaccination centers are a critical part of the program. Big space with hundreds if not thousands of personnel vaccinating hundreds if not thousands more individuals. Big, shinny glittering, big. It is as if Mahathir of the 1990s is back.

It has been a slow painfully slow start with some big mess made along the way, but the program is picking up steam. Vaccination pace is still below what is required but we are getting somewhere: on June 10, approximately 155,000 dosages were administered, and close to 10% of the population has received at least one dose of Covid-19 vaccines.

Behind the headline numbers, stories are appearing that people are not showing up for vaccination despite registration. The authorities at first tied the no-show to vaccine hesitancy. Earlier rationale for separating Astra-Zeneca vaccines from the main public vaccination program was based on the understanding that the public distrusted that particular vaccines. After all, AZ had bad press for some time.

After a while, that rationale is starting to become weak, especially given logistical concerns on the recipients’ side. More and more, it sounds like that particular claim was based on a misreading of incomplete data, and hasty conclusion. The kerfuffle between the Selangor state government and the federal government regarding total dosage the former received, for example, does not inspire confidence in the analytical skills of those in power in Putrajaya. Hesitancy is a big problem, but it is becoming clear that it had been used as a catch-all excuse to brush aside other big problems faced by the vaccination program.

To me, the no-show cases and the government’s preference for the big approach raise a question regarding our vaccination philosophy: are our methods primarily designed to be the easiest for the central authority to deliver the vaccines, or for individuals to get vaccinated?

The first part of the question—is the method easiest for central planners?—has the program administrators firstly in mind. If the administrators are the primary focus of the process, then having big centers is the way. This is because the big approach pools resources and rides on economies of scale. Pooling makes the vaccination program cheaper for the side managing it. Also, easier. The big approach necessarily means having few centers. And having fewer centers means the logistics becomes simpler, given all else the same: manage 3,4 or 5 big centers is significantly less complex than dealing 30, 300, or 3,000 spread across wide geography.

The second part of the question—is the method designed to be the easiest for individuals to get vaccinated?—puts potential recipients as the primary focus. It makes it easier for individuals interested in vaccinating themselves get vaccinated. Instead of having to travel from one part of the city to the another, or worse, having to travel from one part of the state to another (which is common enough), a person would be able to get his or her dose from the neighborhood clinics, hospitals, public halls or anything that could function as a vaccination center. This path is more expensive compared to other approach because it is more complex: it requires hundreds or thousands of small vaccination centers all around the country. It will involve resources being spread as widely as possible. But it is easier for potential vaccine recipients.

So, why did we choose the big approach, i.e. the method easiest for the central planners?

There might be multiple reasons behind that. I suspect one of them is related to cost consideration.

This goes back to the November 2020 when Budget 2021 was tabled in the Parliament. In that Budget, the government of the day in all its wisdom decided to embark on fiscal consolidation immediately. That policy was made based on rosy assumptions: the economy was to experience a V-shape recovery as soon as possible. Things would return to normal soonish.

That consolidation plan has gone awry. Recovery, if it could be called as such, is proceeding slower than what the government expected. When the budget was unbelievably passed despite it grave flaws in December 2020, Malaysia was still in recession. In fact as of the first quarter of 2021, the country was still in recession.

Since then, the government has been spending additional resources little by little, but not enough to solve the pandemic problem comprehensively. It has been reactive as the crisis develops, always one or two steps behind, almost ways coming short to the challenge. With available resources limited by the badly designed Budget 2021, those planning for vaccinations had to resort to the big approach: pooling resources, economies of scale, cheaper method. They had to minimize the monetary cost.

That comes at a (different) cost of course: it makes logistically hard to some individuals to get to the vaccination centers. Some is an understatement as we race toward herd immunity. The big approach contributes to the no-show cases: no-show because the big approach needs the people to go to the central planners, instead of the central planners coming to the people. All this raises the risk of Malaysia failing to achieve herd immunity as soon as possible, and letting the economy to muck around longer.

In short, the premature fiscal consolidation planned by this government had influenced our vaccination strategy adversely.

Categories
Conflict & disaster Economics

[2936] Latest government Covid-19 spending plan is ‘dasar cukup makan’

Severely underwhelming.

Those are the words I would use to describe the financial assistance the government launched in conjunction of the latest round of lockdown. The government values the program at RM40 billion, with approximately RM5 billion involving actual government spending. The rest are exemption or postponement-based initiatives, with loan repayment moratorium being the biggest and borne by somebody else.

What we need is not a band-aid program with actual spending being slightly greater than the RM3 billion auditor KMPG has trouble tracing in brewing Serba Dinamik financial scandal. Malaysia needs a new comprehensive program cognizant of the trouble we are facing collectively. I have earlier suggested the government will need to ramp up its spending significantly by raising its deficit ratio from approximately 6% of 2021 GDP currently to 9%-10% or even higher, while making all the consequential legal changes. We need to do whatever it takes to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.

But this government has failed to do that. The latest program proves this government is reactive to events, and always one-step behind. Muhyiddin and his incapable ministers just cannot look beyond the molehill. They keep holding on to plans which foundation has been dismantled by the worsening crisis. Those earlier plans, encapsulated by Budget 2021, were based on rosy assumptions that did not come true. Even with flawed assumptions, they keep going at it. Worse, a huge chunk of spending under the previous plans has yet to be executed.

That mistake of inadequate actual and approved spending in favor of unthinking fiscal consolidation has hobbled Malaysia’s response to the Covid-19 crisis. The government is unnecessarily self-limiting public spending that is needed to raise the health system capacity immediately and hasten the pace of vaccination in the population.

This is a disappointing policy that the Prime Minister should be embarrassed of announcing.

What the latest program really is, is that it is a “at least we tried” policy. Dasar cukup makan.

This spending is not about resolving the crisis. It is the government providing talking points to unthinking political operatives on the ground. It is to show the government is at least is responding to public demand. Moratorium? Yes, half-hearted but at least it is included. Wage subsidy? Yea, it is minimal by at least it is provided. “At least we the government are doing something.”

To come on top of this crisis, at least we did something is not good enough. The leadership of this government is not capable of doing more than “at least we tried.”

“You’re dying, but at least we’re giving you a glass of warm water.”

How comforting.

Hafiz Noor Shams. Some rights reserved

Awani interviewed me on June 2 2021 about my views. Here it is (when I said US and UK with respect to sovereign debt crisis, I meant Europe. I misspoke):